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Abstract
Despite the fact that privateers cruised in all the major inter-colonial wars of the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, often enjoying far greater success in 
capturing prizes than the Royal Navy, for the twentieth century mind privateering is an 
almost unknown enterprise. Piracy and the activities of the navy, by contrast, are far 
better understood. Historians must, first and foremost, take the blame for this anonymity, 
for by neglecting to discuss privateering history in a detailed and accurate fashion, they 
have tended to shroud Its existence and significance. The role of literature and film has 
exacerbated this situation.
Since the 1970s, a growing number of academics have begun to discuss the 
prize war generaliy, and privateering specifically, in a far more systematic fashion. The 
work of Kenneth Andrews, J.S. Bromley and David Starkey, to name but three, have 
greatly improved our understanding of the role and importance of private men-of-war. 
Their work tends to concentrate on privateering in European waters, leaving the colonial 
experience largely at the mercy of traditional historiography. Carl Swanson has made 
some useful inroads into this inequality with his investigation of the American prize war in 
the 1740s. He has convincingly demonstrated that privateering was a popular and 
widespread enterprise that was actively encouraged by imperial governments. British- 
colonial privateering in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, by contrast, 
has received only scant attention from historians, old and new alike. This fact seems 
strange when one considers that during this period government took an unprecedented 
interest in privateering and the prize war. In the W ar of the Spanish Successuion 
(sometimes known as Queen Anne's War), for instance, British privateering became
more strictly regulated than ever before, while French naval resources were almost 
entirely handed over to private armateurs.
My aim in writing this thesis is to try and extend our understanding of British- 
colonial privateering in the W ar of the Spanish Succession. French privateering and the 
activities of the Royal Navy will also be occasionally discussed in an attempt to provide a 
more complete picture of the prize war. I will seek to discard traditional historiography 
wherever possible and approach my research with an open mind as to the significance of 
privateering in early eighteenth century warfare. I have focused on three main areas, 
namely, the rules of privateering, its attraction to government, investors and seamen, and 
finally, its effect on commerce and economic development.
The major evidential base for this study is a data file, of references to prize 
captures that have been drawn from a variety of manuscript and printed primary sources. 
Secondary sources have also proved extremely useful, particularly in my discussions of 
French privateering and the activities of the Royal Navy.
The results of my research have broken with traditional historiography and 
suggested that rather than being a borderline enterprise of limited significance, 
privateering played an important part in the colonial sphere of the W ar of the Spanish 
Succession. In addition, I have argued that the early eighteenth century marked a crucial 
turning point in privateering history, the ramifications of which were felt in later inter­
colonial wars. Encouraged by imperial and colonial governmental officials at every level, 
British-colonial privateers were more numerous in Queen Anne’s W ar than ever before. 
The outbreak of hostilities in May 1702 was greeted with jubilation because of the 
opportunity it offered for privateering. Royal instructions were issued, and parliamentary 
legislation enacted, to ensure that privateering was not only better regulated, but also 
more financially attractive for investors and seamen. As a consequence, many of the
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most affluent and respected members of British North American and Caribbean society 
invested ships and money in privateering, while thousands of seamen risked their lives in 
the hope of making their fortune. Privateers not only captured hundreds of enemy 
vessels, worth hundreds of thousands of pounds, but also helped indirectly protect 
British colonial trade. Privateering thus had a significant impact on inter-colonial and 
Atlantic commerce, and, more generally, on the progress and even the outcome of the 
War of the Spanish Succession.
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Chapter 1
RULES OF PRIVATEERING
The seventeenth century had produced little interest in an effective, uniform system 
of control over British North American and Caribbean privateering. Steady 
commercial and maritime expansion under Queen Anne changed this situation. 
Privateering was no longer merely a 'private' means of redress against individual loss 
during peacetime, but rather an officially sanctioned and controlled form of 'general' 
reprisal against an enemy during wartime. Privateering became a tool of war, a way 
to protect England’s growing interest in overseas trade, as well as expand it at the 
expense of her rivals.
Instructions from the Crown and legislation enacted by Parliament legitimized 
privateering activity within an established international maritime code. The various 
regulations outlined the eligibility of privateers, stipulated which vessels could be 
sought as prizes, and articulated a complicated procedure for ensuring compliance 
with basic rules. They also made privateering a more profitable enterprise, increasing 
its attraction to seamen and prospective investors.
The principal means by which the Crown regulated privateering was through 
Admiralty courts. Dating back to the fourteenth century, Admiralty courts were 
established to control the issuing of privateering licenses, regulate the behaviour of 
privateers once at sea, and adjudicate over the condemnation of prize captures. As a 
result. Admiralty courts were, In theory, able to control numbers of privateers, channel 
their conduct within acceptable boundaries of international maritime law, and ensure 
that prize captures were taken from the correct nationalities and did not exceed the 
loss to be recovered. Admiralty courts also acted as a way for the monarch and the 
Lord High Admiral to collect the percentage of prize profits due to them.
In the reign of Henry VIII, the adjudication of the High Court of Admiralty in 
England was extended by the creation of an extra 19 Vice-Admiralty courts in the 
English districts. They looked after local maritime business, leaving all matters 
involving offences against the King’s revenue to the common law courts, and all 
cases involving prizes taken at sea, or criminality on the high seas involving life or 
death, to the High Court of Admiralty in London.
In the Elizabethan era, official regulation of privateering through Admiralty 
courts was far from efficient or effective. According to Kenneth Andrews, "The 
working of the machinery for the regulation of privateering provides a striking 
example of the late Elizabethan administration at its worst -  feeble and corrupt."^ The 
system of licensing was particularly ineffective, for although the High Court of 
Admiralty was in theory responsible for the issuing of all 'letters of marque and 
reprisal’ and the resolving of all 'controversies arising thereof, in reality, no one knew 
how many commissions were being issued or to whom. This situation resulted in an 
embarrassing stream of complaints from neutral governments.
Vested interests and political interference constantly undermined Admiralty 
court regulation of privateering. Dr Julius Caesar, judge of the High Court of Admiralty 
in the 1590s, frequently had his judgements quashed by the Privy Council. This 
interference was justified on the grounds that the work of Admiralty courts affected 
questions of international significance. The reality of the matter was more based on 
the vested interests of powerful men concerned in privateering.^ Most significant was 
the Lord High Admiral, who in addition to a stake in prize captures, also often 
invested in privateering ventures. Further down the administrative ladder, unpaid 
officials, ranging from Vice-Admirals right down to the lowest subordinates, did their 
upmost to connive at piracies, smuggling and the like, in order to augment their
earnings, in such a situation, the Admiralty system was looked upon as a source of 
private profit at the public’s expense. ^
Gradually over the course of the seventeenth century, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of Admiralty court regulation of privateering improved. A separate prize 
division was established within the court, for instance, while new legislation more 
clearly set down rules and procedures. The extension of the Vice-Admiralty court 
system to the British colonies in North American and the Caribbean was part of this 
process. The first colonial trials of prize were witnessed on Jamaica in the 1660s. At 
this early stage, local trials in the colonies were wholly illegal; all captures were 
supposed to be sent to the High Court of Admiralty. Nevertheless, many prizes were 
condemned in Vice-Admiralty courts erected by governors under the authority of their 
commissions. Only in 1689, with the outbreak of war, did this long established 
practice receive some form of official recognition as captors were permitted “to resort 
to the next judicature port where a court of admiralty is or shall be e re c te d .T h is  
concession was granted owing to the inconvenience and danger of sending prizes to 
England. The outbreak of the W ar of the Spanish Succession in 1702, and the 
prospect of large numbers of prize captures, induced the English authorities to 
permanently transfer responsibility for prize adjudication to Vice-Admiralty courts. 
This decision was popular with colonial merchants who had been for some time 
lobbying for a mechanism that would allow the quick and efficient condemnation of 
privateering captures. Vice-Admiralty courts, (viz. New York, Virginia, Rhode Island / 
New Hampshire, Connecticut /  East Jersey, Pennsylvania /  West Jersey, Carolina / 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands) first set up in 
1697, from now on operated independently from the High Court of Admiralty.
The condemnation of naval prizes in the colonies proved more problematic. 
Throughout the early years of the war it was not settled whether Vice-Admiralty courts
in America had the power to try naval prize cases or not. It was the opinion of the 
Admiralty's legal advocate, for instance, that the authority of a special commission 
under the great seal of the Crown was needed for the trial of prizes. He further 
argued that as no commission had been sent to colonial governors or Vice-Admiralty 
courts, prizes taken by the navy in American waters had to be condemned before the 
High Court of Admiralty in England.^ The Admiralty, following this advise, 
recommended captains and governors to ensure that all prizes were sent to London 
for trial. Their compliance was half-hearted to say the least, as large numbers of 
prizes were disposed of in the colonies. However, with the passing of ‘An Act for the 
Encouragement of Trade to America’ in 1708 (hereafter referred to as the ‘America 
Act’), which abolished not only central control in the adjudication of prize 
condemnation, but also the Queen’s share in the proceeds, naval prizes were freely 
condemned in the colonies.®
The new Vice-Admiralty courts, in conjunction with customs officials, 
represented an unprecedented extension of Crown authority to British North America 
and the Caribbean. They marked a consolidation of metropolitan power within the 
empire. Colonists, who had long been comparatively free from royal interference, 
were now confronted with a form of oversight and restraint that placed definite 
limitations upon their comings and goings. New judicial and jurisdictional agencies 
were seeking to take cognizance of and to punish their lapses from obedience to 
those acts of Parliament which included within their scope the colonies, as well as 
England itself. This change was met by a hostile reaction from many colonists. 
Colonial Vice-Admiralty courts, by settling issues which even their English 
counterparts had nothing to do with, quickly came into conflict with other jurisdictions 
that possessed legal powers anterior to its own. These opposing jurisdictions were, 
first of all, the private and proprietary governments, and secondly, the courts of
common law. Colonial governments, operating under charters that contained 
undisputed grants of legal and judicial rights, took offense at being denied Admiralty 
powers and endeavored to limit the scope of Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction, preventing 
any encroachment on what they considered their rightful prerogatives. The extent and 
novelty of Vice-Admiralty courts also conflicted with the jurisdiction of the common 
law courts. This challenge was complicated by the fact that at no time were Admiralty 
powers clearly defined. Even the Board of Trade remained unsure of the authority of 
Vice-Admiralty courts throughout the War of the Spanish Succession.
Over time, Vice-Admiralty courts were grudgingly accepted as a beneficial 
change. Only the colonial government of Connecticut achieved any real success in 
limiting the scope of Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction. By the 1730s, all the other colonies 
had submitted to royal authority. Colonial Vice-Admiralty courts, by exercising a 
jurisdiction that far surpassed the same jurisdiction in England, gave to the latter 
system its peculiarly varied and vigorous character. Colonial Admiralty courts were, 
for instance, more open to modification and less restrained by precedent and tradition 
than their English counterparts. As a consequence, it became clear that they served 
colonial interests far more frequently than they opposed them. The confused nature 
of authority in the colonies meant that both customs officials and Vice-Admiralty 
judges were often puzzled to know just what the law was and how far they were 
justified in interpreting It. Significantly, however, while British customs officials in 
America frequently made mistakes and aroused discontent, it was rare for Vice- 
Admiralty judges to render unjust or erroneous verdicts. Colonists were rarely 
disappointed in obtaining the decisions they sought.
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The legality of a privateer was guaranteed by the possession of a privateering 
license. This separated the privateer from a pirate, who committed a capital crime 
when he captured merchant vessels and sold their cargo. Originally these licenses, 
known as ‘letters of marque and reprisal’, were given by the Crown as a means by 
which an individual could redress, by force if necessary, a proven grievance against a 
foreign subject. It was a measure of last resort, for the wronged party could only 
petition his sovereign for a letter of marque once all methods to obtain satisfaction 
using legal processes through foreign courts had failed. Once granted, this 
authorisation empowered the petitioner to recover the amount of his loss from any of 
his transgressor’s compatriots, with any surplus accountable to his sovereign. He was 
entitled to use the armament of his trade ship, or even to fit out a private warship, for 
the purpose of waging a private war against the nationals of a country that had 
wronged him. In 1293, for instance, a ship in what was then the English province of 
Gascony, carrying a cargo of fruit from Malaga to Bayonne, was intercepted by a 
Portuguese armed cruiser and had her cargo confiscated. The king of Portugal was 
asked to return the fruit or make good the loss, as England was not at war with 
Portugal. When this was not done, a license was issued to the owner of the ship, 
empowering him to seize the property of the Portuguese people for five years, or 
alternately until he had made good his loss.® Initially the prerogative of the Lord 
Chancellor, letters of marque were from 1357 issued by the Lord High Admiral in the 
High Court of Admiralty. Such rights were regularly granted to individuals during the 
Middle Ages. The practice survived until the late sixteenth century; Elizabeth I thought 
fit to authorise numerous private reprisals against the Spaniards. ®
This form of private war was regulated to ensure that it conformed to 
international norms. Application for letters of marque, for instance, contained a 
statement of the grievance and an account of the monetary value to be recovered. 
Prize courts were established to adjudicate over whether the value of seizures did not
exceed the loss to be recovered. In England, the High Court of Admiralty was made 
the legal prize tribunal in the late seventeenth century. It was agreed that this national 
prize court should be outside the control of the Crown, in the hope that it would make 
Admiralty prize law as internationally acceptable as possible. The capacity of 
powerful men to demand preferential treatment, and the intervention of the Lord High 
Admiral, undermined the achievement of independence in the regulation of 
privateering. The Lord High Admiral, with a vested interest in the condemnation of 
prizes captured by private men-of-war, did not hesitate in pressuring Admiralty judges 
in cases which affected his own pocket. Judge Caesar received a letter in March 
1603, for example, stating:
...and as touching certain Barbury ducats brought home by Captain Canyan 
long since and delivered unto my servant Robert Bragg, I must-entreat you to 
forbear granting any attachment against him for the same, because if they be 
to be restored I myself must make satisfaction for them, who received them of 
Bragg...You yourself have told me that in cases of coin there ought to be no 
restitution because the same is without mark.^ ®
While the ancient right of reprisal clearly underlay eighteenth century 
privateering, it was distinct in that it was not intended to break peace existing 
between nations. Privateering commissions, on the other hand, dating back to 
Norman times, were specifically given to private ships by the state for the purposes of 
war, in the days when royal navies were non-existent or in ad eq u ate .H en ry  VIII, for 
example, made use of large numbers of hired merchant ships to augment his 
fledgling navy in the French wars of the 1540s. With the growth of the Royal Navy in 
the seventeenth century, the state became less reliant on the merchant service, and 
by the 1660s, only purpose-built warships were powerful or adept enough to serve in 
line-of-battle. However, the facility to commission merchant vessels was retained and
occasionally it was invoked to justify acts of private maritime warfare. Together these 
two devices form what we know as modern privateering - a general form of reprisal 
against an enemy during wartime. By the eighteenth century, differences in the 
respective powers of letters of marque and privateering commissions were purely 
technical. In the eyes of the Admiralty, merchantmen that held letters of marque were 
addressed in the same breath as specially fitted out privateers holding commissions - 
together they were collectively private ships-of-war.
Privateering licenses enabled the English authorities to ensure that private 
men-of-war operated within a recognised framework of International relations as a 
tool of war. Refusal of a license also provided a means to control privateer numbers. 
The Charles \Nas refused a privateering commission in 1706, for instance, because
At the time of the application seamen, were extreemely. scarce and a 
considerable fleet was then preparing for the West Indies. The Merchants 
seem’d very much concerned that a vessel that carryed a great number of 
men should not be fitted out as a privateer to the obstruction of trade.
The wording of commissions could also restrict the cruising ground of 
privateers. The brigantine Greyhound, commanded by Captain William Wanton, was 
issued a commission out of Rhode Island in July 1702, which restricted his 
operations within the Banks of Newfoundland to the east, and the thirteenth parallel 
of north latitude to the s o u t h . I n  another more isolated instance, the commissions 
of Jamaican privateers required that their crews repair to the island every six months 
for military service. '^  ^This reflected the small number of white men on the isiand and 
the fear of arming the black population. A final element of control existed in the right 
of colonial governors, as de facto Vice-Admirals, to restrict the duration of 
commissions to short periods, sometimes as little as a few months. In this way, they 
were able to regularly reassess the issuing of commissions. The aforementioned
brigantine Greyhound was commissioned for merely five months. This situation 
meant that many privateers were commissioned several times throughout the war. 
The sloop, Three Brothers of Bermuda, commanded by Captain Thomas Lea, was 
commissioned three times between October 1709 and the end of the war -  28 
October 1709, 18 December 1710 and 11 February 1712 respectively.
Prior to 1708, the procedures involved in obtaining letters of marque and 
privateering commissions could vary greatly between the colonies. In some it would 
be straightforward, in others, especially in the West Indies, a bribe to the governor 
might be required or the further approval of a Vice-Admiralty judge. Political 
standpoints and grievances could come into play in such decisions. In 1708, the 
passing of the ‘America Act' streamlined the procedures for obtaining letters of 
marque and privateering commissions. Section III stated that any British vessel could 
acquire a privateering license by fulfilling two requirements: firstly, filing a request, 
which involved attending a Vice-Admiralty court and making a declaration relating the 
exact account of their vessel; and secondly, guaranteeing the good conduct of the 
crew, by posting security.^® In 1674 it was laid down that £1500 was payable for ships 
with less than 150 men on board and £3000 for vessels with bigger crews. These 
new rules were intended to eliminate the ability of the Crown and colonial governors 
to influence the issuing of privateering licenses. The court would then issue a code of 
practice, compiled by the Lords of the Admiralty, intended to guide the behaviour of 
privateersmen.
Within this code, the Admiralty's concern to maximise the military utility of 
commissioned vessels is evident. Commanders were instructed to aid British vessels 
in distress or under attack, as well as to maintain a regular correspondence with the 
Admiralty giving accounts of their activities; information concerning the designs of the 
enemy was particularly sort after. Captains were required to keep an exact journal of 
the:
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Station, Motion and Strength of the Enemy, as well as he can discover by the 
best Intelligence he can get; of which he from Time to Time, as he shall have 
an opportunity, to Transmit an Account to Us [Lords of the Admiralty] or our 
Secretary, and to keep a Correspondence with Us or him by all Opportunities 
that shall present/^
Any prisoners acquired in prize actions were required to be identified and delivered 
into port, where they would be put into the care and custody of a civil magistrate or 
military commander. Disposal of prisoners on remote coastlines or islands was a 
crime punishable by death.
The vast majority of instructions related to the arrest and adjudication of 
vessels and goods seized. A large body of evidence was required for the Vice- 
Admiralty judge to grant condemnation. Captains were required to record in their 
journals as much detail concerning their prizes as possible. Particularly valued was 
"the nature of such prizes, the Time and Place of their being taken, and the Value of 
them as near as he can judge."^® The captor or the libellant had to show that the ship 
or cargo, either or both, belonged to the enemy, because fraud, collusion, and 
conspiracy, were a constant temptation. Consequently, two or three ‘principal’ 
members of the captured crew were required to attend and give evidence at the 
hearing. The captain and several of his officers were preferred, although ordinary 
mariners were acceptable if no others were available. This examination, consisting of 
up to 34 questions, was designed to establish the nationality, destination, and 
ownership of the arrested vessel and its cargo, together with the location and 
circumstances of its capture. Any papers found on the captured vessel were required 
to be examined, to verify or contradict the evidence given by the various witnesses.^® 
The rights of any assisting ships to share in prize money also had to be determined.
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Generally, the distance from the prize action, the intention of the captain to share in 
the attack, and his readiness or otherwise for battle, were the deciding factors. A 
vessel beyond supporting distance or pursuing a different course was unlikely to be 
successful. Contested division of prize money was a common source of delay to 
condemnation proceedings. Captures made by naval squadrons were particularly 
problematic, owing to the larger numbers of ships involved and the generally greater 
value of prizes. Disputes could drag on for years and generate considerable popular 
interest. The distribution of prize money arising from the capture of the Spanish 
galleon, Santa Cruize, by Commodore W ager in the West Indies in 1708, was a 
source of considerable dispute amongst the captains of his squadron. Captain 
Brookes, commander of H.M.S Vulture (a fireship), was deemed, for instance, not to 
have sufficiently contributed to the capture to warrant a share in the prize money. 
Captain Brookes, disagreeing with this view, presented and read a petition to the 
House of Commons on 10 April 1709, complaining that his crew had "lay ready with 
lighted matches...to destroy the enemy..."
The contents of captured vessels were required to reach port intact. Section 
VI of the ‘America Act’ required privateers to deliver their prizes to the city's naval 
officer, without breaking bulk, immediately upon entering port.^  ^The only exception to 
this rule, which included ships furniture, guns, arms, powder, ammunition and stores, 
were those goods and merchandise, excluding aforementioned items, found upon or 
above the gun deck, which were deemed lawful pillage. On arrival in port. Admiralty 
officials would board prize vessels and record the condition of the ship and cargo. 
Once complete, prize captains were required to establish a watch to prevent any 
embezzlement. If prize goods needed to be removed, a detailed inventory had to be 
taken and delivered to Admiralty officials for inspection, before any storage 
arrangements could be made.
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Delivering a prize safely into port for condemnation was a difficult business. 
As prizes were accumulated, crews needed to be found to sail them. This weakened 
the privateer, increasing its risk of capture. Prize vessels were even more vulnerable, 
owing to the fact they ran the additional risk of being overpowered by their prisoners. 
Reports of the recapture of prizes being sent to port for condemnation figure highly in 
contemporary official correspondence. Most recaptures occurred when prizes were 
unescorted. Boston privateers were reported in 1708 to have recaptured five prizes 
taken from Nevis by a French naval squadron, commanded by D’ebervili.^® H.M.S 
Trinton’s Prize, Captain Davis commander, similariy recaptured a Virginian ship, 70 
leagues off the Virginia capes, in the summer of 1707. '^^ The capture of an enemy 
privateer often resulted in the additional recapture of its prizes, which would usually 
be sailing in consort. H.M.S Suffolk, Rear-Admiral Whetstone commander, in taking a 
French privateer from Martinique in 1704, subsequently recaptured its prize, a 
Jamaican sloop.^® Occasionally prizes would be recaptured from predators of the 
same nationality. Captain Stone, for instance, commander of a privateer 
commissioned out of Carolina, captured and had condemned a brigantine, in October 
1708, that was already the prize of a Jamaican privateer.^® The risk involved in 
weakening the crew, the effect this might have on the subsequent ability of the 
privateer to take further prizes, and the likelihood of the prize being recaptured, 
sometimes resulted in the release of a prize vessel and crew for a ransom. The sloop 
Friendship of Boston, commissioned for H.M service. Captain Wain commander, was 
ransomed for 100 guineas by a French privateer in June 1705.^^ Similariy, the Boston 
Galley, a letter of marque, ransomed a French ship of 21 men and 6 guns, in early 
July 1706, for 350 pistoles in gold.^® In such cases, written reasons and preparatory 
examinations similar to those employed in Vice-Admiralty cases, had to be sent to 
Admiralty officials. Commanders of privateers and letter of marque ships who
13
contravened these instructions risked the forfeiture of their commissions and 
confiscation of their bond payment.
If uncontested, condemnation could be granted quickly. The ‘America Act' 
clearly set down time limits for prize adjudication.^® Litigation began with the filling of 
a libel with the Vice-Admiralty court asking for a capture to be condemned as lawful 
prize. Within five days, judges had to complete the examination of witnesses and 
papers relating to the capture. Next, documents called monitions had to be posted, 
informing the public that a vessel had been taken and was being proceeded against 
in court. To prevent condemnation by default, parties interested in the captured 
vessel or its cargo had to file a claim within twenty days of the libel. Claimants were 
required to provide sufficient security to pay double the court costs if the capture 
should be judged a lawful prize. If no claim was filed and all necessary witnesses 
were available, judges were required to “immediately, and without further delay, 
proceed to sentence”, within a period of ten days. Provision was also made for 
examining witnesses who resided at great distances from the court. When this 
occurred, the judge would have the vessel appraised and require the claimants to 
post security equal to the amount in case the capture should be subsequently 
condemned. An interlocutory order, releasing the vessel to the claimant's custody, 
would then be issued. Within two weeks of the claim this process was supposed to 
be completed.®®
Quick condemnation of prizes was a difficult task as judges were often called 
upon to decide cases in the face of conflicting testimony, forged documentation, and 
insufficient evidence. If claims upon the seized property were lodged by neutral 
subjects or rival captors, or if irregularities were alleged to have taken place in the 
conduct of arrest, long and complex proceedings might ensue, particularly if evidence 
from overseas was required. It was rare for such irregularities to frustrate the
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condemnation of prizes, not least as Admiralty judges, often with interests in 
privateers themselves, were not averse to bending the rules to smooth the process. 
When condemnation was refused, political and popular pressure usually resulted in a 
reversal of the decision. The refusal of judge Nathaniel Byfield in June 1705, for 
instance, to condemn a Spanish prize captured In the West Indies by the brigantine 
Charles of Rhode Island, commanded by Captain John Halsey, was met with 
considerable outrage. Judge Byfield claimed the commission held by Halsey was 
invalid because the Queen had instructed in March 1704 that no commissions should 
be issued from Rhode Island. Considerable political pressure was placed on Byfield 
from Governor Cranston of Rhode Island, John Coleman, agent for the Lord High 
Admiral and Commissioner of Prizes, as well as part owner of the Charles, and even 
Governor Dudley of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire. Popular discontent, 
manifesting in Byfield’s belief that his life was threatened if he did not condemn the 
prize, also played its part In his eventual judicial U-turn.
A further development in the regulation of privateering in the W ar of the 
Spanish Succession can be seen in the transfer of responsibility for the management 
of prizes from official to Independent agents. Prior to 1708, the Commissioners of 
Prize and the Prize Office were responsible to the Treasury for the management of 
prize captures. This included a wide variety of tasks, ranging from organising lading, 
warehousing and appraisal of prize vessels and their cargo, to the distribution of net 
proceeds once condemned. In a small minority of cases, prize officials were also 
responsible for restoring captured property to their original owners. In 1708, this 
whole situation changed. The Prize Office disappeared, for instance, while the 
granting of sole ownership of prizes to captors also transferred responsibility for the 
cost and organisation of their safekeeping, appraisement, condemnation and sale.®® 
Captors from now on hired independent prize agents to deal with these tasks. The
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navy was additionally required to ensure that an equal number of agents acted on 
behalf of commanders, officers and the crew, at appraisements and sales. Their 
involvement, especially in cases where more than one captor was involved in a prize 
action, could greatly complicate the distribution of prize shares.
Despite the many regulations, the ability of Admiralty courts to control the 
behaviour of privateersmen was limited by problems in detecting offences committed 
at sea. The Royal Navy was responsible for apprehending known offenders and 
indiscriminately searching privateers on suspicion of offences. The small aggregate 
number of naval vessels stationed in the colonies made the achievement of any 
effective control impossible. Informants were encouraged to report transgressions for 
a share in the proceeds of an alleged action. Penalties were often severe for the 
errant privateersmen. Cases of serious misconduct, murder, rape, mutiny and robbery 
could result in the death penalty. Lesser offences normally resulted in the withdrawal 
of a letter of marque or commission, confiscation of bond, or restoration of seizures to 
their owners. This final punishment brought with it a host of additional legal costs. 
Privateer owners were understandably keen to avoid these penalties, as they 
seriously affected the likely profitability of their investments. Consequently, as a 
further measure of self-regulation, privateering crews were required to sign articles of 
agreement drawn up by their promoters. These articles required the crew to agree not 
to distort evidence, plunder prizes prior to condemnation, mistreat prisoners, or 
capture neutral vessels.
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, changes were made to 
legislation governing the distribution of prize money. The English ‘Prize Act’ of 1649, 
required all prizes to be condemned in the High Court of Admiralty, the value of the 
prize to be deposited in the ‘Prize Fund’, and one half of it paid eventually to the 
Treasurer of the Admiralty to support seamen’s charities.®® In 1661, a distinction was
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established between ’Droits of the Crown’ and ‘Droits of the Admiralty’. The latter 
were ships surrendered in English harbours or wrecked, and the Lord High Admiral 
was entitled to the full value. Droits of the Crown were divided between the captor 
and the Crown until 1692, when the monarchy waived its share. From the 1690s, an 
effort was made to make privateering more profitable. Prize legislation reflected a 
growing acceptance on the part of the crown that captors could not be expected to 
share the proceeds of prize captures with a government which had not contributed to 
the expenses. The 'Privateers Act' of 1693, granted privateers 9/10 of any lawful 
prize, besides being freed from the attentions of the Prize Commissioners, widely 
believed to be responsible for cases of theft and damage to prize ships and cargo, 
before selling them for less than they were worth. The navy, on the other hand, prior 
to 1708, operated under far more unfavourable rules. A Royal Proclamation in June 
1702, granted naval captains merely half the 'neat proceeds' of prizes after the 
payment of import duties and other charges:
...after Satisfying the Duties and Customs Payable by Law, other than the 
Rates and Duties Imposed on French Wine, Brandy, Vinegar, and other 
Goods of the Growth, Product or Manufacture of France, by an Act of the late 
King William the Third, made in the Seventh Year of His Reign, Intituled, An 
Act for Granting His Majesty an Additional Duty upon ail French Goods and 
Merchandize, and the Legal and Necessary Charges thereupon, One Half-part 
of the Meet Proceed of such Prize shall be Answered and Paid to the Flag 
Officers, Captains, Officers and Company of Her Majesties Ships of war, or 
Merchant Ships in Her Service, Surprising and Taking the same.®'^
The capture of vessels that were subsequently taken into Royal service provided a 
better deal. The whole value of enemy privateers, less a tenth belonging to the Lord
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High Admiral, were granted to captors, while ’gunnage and tonnage' - that is, £10 for 
every gun and 10 shillings for every ton - was paid for the capture of enemy naval 
vessels. The ‘America Act’ equalized this inequality, by providing both naval and 
privateering crews the sole property of their captures; no longer was 1/10 required to 
be paid to the Lord High Admiral. According to the second clause of the act, “the 
officers and seamen of every vessel of war shall have the sole interest and property 
in every ship, vessel, good and merchandize they shall take In any part of America.^^ 
Another innovation, referred to as 'head money' - that is £5 for every man alive on an 
enemy warship at the beginning of an engagement - was paid in conjunction with 
'gunnage and tonnage' money. These two payments were loosely termed as ‘bounty 
money.' Prizes that were adjudged prerequisites of the Admiralty were subject to 
special rates. The rights of the Admiralty arose on:
(1) All enemies' ships that shall come into Port, whether by mistake, stress of 
weather or other accident, the same do wholly belong to the Lord High 
Admiral. (2) All such that shall be seized either by any of N.M. men of war or 
otherwise within any Road or Harbour, or within gun-shot of any of H.M. forts 
or castles, do likewise wholly belong to the Admiral...Salvage of ships and 
goods retaken from the enemy belongs to the Lord High Admiral. There are 
many other Droits of Admiralty such as wrecks of the sea, flotsons, jetsons, 
lagons, derelicts, ships and goods of pirates, deodants, and many others 
which come more particularly under the care of Vice-Admirals, for which they 
are accountable to the Lord High Admiral.^^
The distribution of privateering prize money was a matter for the owners. It would be 
set down in the articles of agreement. As a general rule, the distribution of prize 
shares between officers and crew was far more generous on privateers than was the
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case on naval vessels,^^ Generally, 1/2 of the proceeds went to the officers and men, 
and 1/2 to the owners.
Early forms of privateering were small scale and sporadic. Not only was there 
little need for a comprehensive set of rules, but the means to effectively enforce them 
did not exist in the Middle Ages. As colonial empires developed, and the value of 
overseas trade escalated, privateering, now restricted to wartime, became a highly 
lucrative business in its own right. In this situation, a greater level of regulation was 
needed to ensure that the conduct of privateersmen stayed within acceptable legal 
boundaries and that the proceeds of prize captures were properly distributed. Vice- 
Admiralty courts were established in the colonies to oversee the implementation of 
privateering regulations. At first many resisted a jurisdiction which was thought to 
contravene rights already granted in colonial charters. Overt resistance was short­
lived, however, in the face of English determination to extend Crown authority over 
the Atlantic. Covert resistance was more effective. The remarkable level of success 
that privateers enjoyed in obtaining the condemnation of their prizes reflects the fact 
the Vice-Admiralty judges were unwilling to submit completely to imperial controls. 
This can be explained by the fact that Vice-Admiralty judges were not salaried and 
relied on fees for their emolument. Added to this, as Michael Craton has noted:
Since colonial posts were rarely lucrative enough to attract highly qualified 
personnel from the metropolis, the courts were customarily staffed with local 
men not only unqualified but also strongly under the Influence of local 
interests...Colonial judges had neither the competence nor the incentives to 
support metropolitan authority against local
At the beginning of the W ar of the Spanish Succession, both the Crown and the 
Admiralty received a percentage of prize proceeds. By the end of the war, prizes
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were the sole property of the privateers that captured them. This reflected not only an 
increasing realisation that it was unfair to demand a stake in the captures of privately 
financed warships, but also the contribution privateers could make to the war effort. 
By making privateering more profitable, government hoped that investment would 
increase, thereby helping the navy to concentrate on protecting trade rather the 
chasing prizes.
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Chapter 2
ATTRACTION OF PRIVATEERING
By the standards of the twentieth century, by appealing to the base desire for 
plunder, privateering looks like a disreputable enterprise. Contemporaries of the 
eighteenth century would have held a different view. According to Swanson, writing in 
regard to American privateering in the wars of the 1740s:
...far from being an insignificant activity of borderline legality, privateering 
represented a major and popuiar form of maritime endeavor. Officials in 
London and the colonies encouraged privateering ventures, and well- 
respected merchants responded by investing heavily in private men-of-war. 
Hundreds of stout colonial vessels worth thousands of pounds sterling were 
active in the maritime prize war, and thousands of jack tars put their lives on 
the line.^ ®
In the W ar of the Spanish Succession, while aggregate British-colonial privateering 
was not as widespread as later in the eighteenth century, its Importance to the war 
effort and attraction for seamen was still great. Privateering was certainly not, as 
traditional historigraphy has tended to claim, a borderline exercise, limited to marginal 
elements in society, but rather, a key economic stopgap that effected the lives of 
great numbers of British colonists in and around the port towns of North America and 
the Caribbean.
Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, privateering 
becomes increasingly more evident in imperial warfare. Explanation for this is twofold. 
Firstly, one begins to notice an increase in both the volume and value of colonial
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trade; between 1660 and 1688, for instance, the English merchant marine doubled in 
size, while between 1663-1669 and 1699-170, the English export trade expanded by 
5 6 % /°  Greater numbers of merchant vessels encouraged greater numbers of 
privateers when war began in 1702. Furthermore, as colonial commerce grew, the 
rivalry between the major colonial powers intensified. Each sought more desperately 
to increase their proportion of world trade, by reducing that of their rivals. W ar was a 
good way to pursue this end, albeit by the forced seizure of enemy goods and 
shipping. W ar with France and Spain offered Britain the opportunity to take control of 
the colonial sources of profitable trade goods, while at the same time reducing the 
size of enemy merchant fleets. The importance of privateering in this wartime strategy 
stemmed from the fact that the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had 
witnessed a ’revolution’ in European Warfare,'^^ Armies and navies became larger 
and more specialised, thus enhancing the role and power of the state. Government 
became responsible for raising the revenue needed to pay for these larger military 
forces. It also had to develop a larger and more sophisticated bureaucracy to 
coordinate the recruitment of soldiers and sailors, as well as the movement and 
supply of equipment. These requirements, however, placed a huge strain on 
eighteenth- century states. According to Carl Swanson, "Nations were unable to build 
and maintain fleets sufficiently strong to control the sea lanes during imperial conflict. 
The costs were prohib itive.Privateering, by mobilising the private sector to equip 
and man private men-of-war, became the means by which the government was able 
to augment its sea power.
In the later Middle Ages, when royal navies were small, monarchs depended 
upon their legal rights to ‘arrest’ ships for war purposes because they could dispose 
of very little revenue. Medieval armies were summoned to provide a traditional 
service that was legally required to be unpaid. Naval forces had to be mobilised in the
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same way. The English fleet which fought the Spanish Armada in 1588, was 
composed of 34 Royal ships and 163 belonging to private persons. The hardship this 
placed on merchants who had their trading revenue reduced by a Crown, who might 
not even pay for wages or damage, was mitigated by the issuing of letters of marque. 
This innovation guaranteed the maintenance of an adequate war fleet.'*^ Unless a 
state could mobilise private capital by providing incentives, it could not finance a fleet 
of commerce raiders at the same time as it maintained a battle fleet. Private war 
became public war in this context, as the individual was permitted to make a profit out 
of war so long as the state was provided with a low-budget navy. By harassing 
enemy sea-ports, warships and merchant marine, as well as acting as coast guard 
vessels, as convoys, as auxiliaries to the navy, as scouts, and as pirate chasers, 
privateersmen lifted a great many weights from the shoulders of the Admiralty. They 
also served as a training school for the navy; it was not uncommon for able privateer 
captains to eventually receive commissions.
The strength of naval forces in American waters was never particularly 
impressive during the W ar of the Spanish Succession. This reflected the fact that the 
Admiralty was overwhelmingly defensive in its allocation of naval resources. 
According to N.A.M. Rodger, ‘The navy's primary function was to guard against 
invasion, for which purpose the bulk of the fleet was almost always kept in home 
waters. Its essential duty remained in 1815 what it had been for at least 400 years: to 
guard the Narrow Seas.” Bruce P. Lenman continues, “Eighteenth-century Britain was 
a European power...threatened by powerful European neighbours, and that the first 
priority of the Royal Navy was to protect Britain from invasion, not to conquer an 
overseas Empire. Naval forces were generally concentrated in European waters with 
only limited detachments overseas.”'*'* in this context, the need to encourage
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privateering in foreign waters was essential; privateers were a cheap way to improve 
the defence of trade without sending additional naval forces
The attraction of privateering for government is also revealed in its 
compatibility with mercantilist politics, which were uppermost in the minds of 
eighteenth-century commercial theorists and policy-makers/® Mercantilism grew out 
of nationalism, which had been the prime political force in Northern and Western 
Europe since the fifteenth century. The creation of nation states, beginning with 
Spain and later followed by France, England, Portugal and Holland, required secure 
and expandable sources of revenue. The suppression of internal and external rivals 
was a key consideration. To increase local taxes was deemed unwise, given that 
domestic opponents might exploit consequent discontent. The rising nation states of 
Atlantic Europe turned, instead, to the foreign sector of their economies, as a source 
of money with which to buttress their central governments. Mercantilism, an economic 
doctrine that called upon government to develop the economy in the best interests of 
the state, encouraged the development of foreign trade. The expansion of a nation's 
foreign trade brought quick and continuing benefits to central government. The 
stronger the central government, the stronger the support for foreign trade: the 
stronger the support for foreign trade, the stronger the central government. 
Mercantilist doctrine suggested a way to accomplish and justify policies in the pursuit 
of these ends. The expansion of foreign trade could be achieved directly, through 
protectionist legislation, as well as indirectly, by destroying a rival's trade. 
Privateering’s utility was primarily concerned with the latter option. According to 
Swanson, "With its emphasis on destroying a rival’s commerce but not adding to the 
governments financial burdens, privateering was perfectly attuned to the mercantilist 
world view."'*^ Four basic tenets formed the core of mercantilist politics. Firstly, 
nations should strive for a favourable balance of trade. This idea became the central
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tenet of mercantilists - it reflected their belief that the safety of the kingdom was more 
closely tied up with trade than it was with either politics or diplomacy. To achieve a 
favourable balance of trade, nations enacted measures designed to encourage 
exports and limit imports, especially of manufactured goods. This economic 
structuring in the interests of the state was a direct response to the transition from 
weak, local, feudal governments to strong, central, national governments. Although 
the need for, and the value of, individual and corporate participation in the economy 
were recognised, mercantilism insisted that the prime consideration should be given 
to the national usefulness of any particular enterprise. Both the British and the French 
governments were content to ban the domestic production of tobacco, for instance, in 
order to promote overseas trade, which yielded customs revenues/® The carrying 
trade of both imports and exports was Ideally monopolised in ships that that were 
built, owned, and operated by a nation’s own citizens, because the earnings from 
foreign trade were guaranteed to come home when the ships came home. To export 
more goods by value than one imported meant that the balance of trade was always 
in your favour. The importance of the North American and Caribbean colonies in this 
context, can be explained as they produced something that previously the kingdom 
had to import. In this way, not only were debits reduced in the current account, but by 
re-exporting from the metropolis, they also helped earn credits in the current account. 
The use of metropolitan shipping services profited the nation’s businessmen. The 
duties collected on colonial produce when it entered or exited metropolitan ports 
replenished the monarch’s treasury. Laws and regulations, sharing considerable 
common content, strove to bind the trade of the colonies to the interests of the 
mother country. The famous English ‘Acts of Trade’, enacted in the early 1660s, and 
reinforced by the Plantation Duty Act of 1673, the Navigation Act of 1696, and a 
plethora of eighteenth century rules and regulations, found parallels promulgated by
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every continental regime. The Spanish imperial system and Le system exclusif of 
France, like the English navigation system, codified in a cacophony of statutes and 
edicts the commercial designs of the mercantilist mind, for the colonies and beyond.
In achieving a favourable balance of trade, mercantilists secondly argued that 
precious metals, in the form of gold and silver coin or bullion, should be sought as 
payment. An accumulated body of treasure was believed to represent the true and 
only embodiment of national wealth. It was a symbol of solvency - a necessary 
commodity for trade in Asia and the Baltic, as well as a means to continue multilateral 
trading relations at a time when bills of exchange and other financial services were 
not fully developed. Furthermore, in a world where the British Empire was surrounded 
by rivals and enemies, creating an environment of international tension, as Wilson 
has noted, "Men put more trust in treasure than I.O.U’s."'*® Mercantilists argued that 
England needed a surplus from trade that could be laid by for emergencies. 
Preserving or enhancing human capital or capital goods was not part of the 
mercantilist thinking.
A third feature of mercantilism was its belief that the volume of trade and 
wealth were fixed and limited. In this situation, it was possible to improve one’s own 
position and weaken one’s competitors at the same time. The more gold and silver a 
nation had, the better off it was. Consequently, the aim of commercial policy was to 
secure the largest proportion of trade and bullion as possible, by way of state- 
sponsored economic nationalism. This fourth aspect encouraged the state to play an 
active role in the nation's economic life.
The utility of privateering in a mercantilist world is not hard to appreciate. By 
enabling a nation to pursue economic warfare, the balance of trade was benefited not 
only by the capture of enemy goods and shipping, but also by the protection 
privateers afforded to seaborne commerce. A flow of precious metals and specie also
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resulted from privateering, especially by way of the Spanish shipping lanes of the 
Caribbean, which a West Indian merchant, writing in 1712, described as "the happy 
region where gold and silver do most abound."
The wider importance of privateering to British commercial predominance was 
of far less significance to those actually involved. Whether one was an investor, a 
sailor, or merely an ordinary American colonist, the attraction and popularity of 
privateering was explained by its potential to provide windfall profits for the individual.
The appeal of privateering was strongest in the Caribbean which possessed a key
advantage over more northerly waters, in that it was Ideally located for preying on the 
busiest and richest trade routes of the Spanish and French empires. According to 
Swanson;
...the commerce of Mexico, Louisiana, Central America, South America and
Asia passed through the Caribbean...The sea-lanes around Cuba and
Hispaniola, where most of Spain's colonial commerce aggregated, were the 
most popular. Fleets from Veracruz on the Gulf of Mexico and from Portobello 
and Cartagena on the coast of New Granda rendezvoused at Havana to take 
advantage of the favourable winds and currents in the Florida straits and the 
Old Bahamas channel. At Havana, they also enjoyed the protection of greater 
numbers of Spanish men-of-war. French vessels also sailed in this area going 
to or from the sugar colony of Saint-Dominique on Hispaniola. Many British 
colonial privateers operated in the shipping lanes north of Cuba, the Windward 
Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola, and the Mona passage off Hispaniola's 
east coast. Moreover, this area was closest to British North American ports.
The second major cruising area lay six hundred miles east of Hispaniola. 
Martinique and Guadeloupe were France's most important sugar colonies, and 
their commerce attracted American privateers that lay to windward and picked 
up merchantmen sailing to or from the French possessions. Along the Spanish
27
Main, the southernmost theater of British colonial privateering operations in the 
Caribbean, private men-of-war preyed on vessels en route to Cartagena and 
Portobello or raided the coastal commerce from Panama to Cayenne.®*
The goods that were being traded were also worth considerably more than North- 
American products. Rich staples, such as sugar, molasses, cocoa, coffee, indigo, 
logwood, spices and silks, fetched far higher prices than fish and furs.
Privateering was an expensive business. To start off with, there were the 
Initial costs of the venture. According to Starkey:
A suitable vessel was obviously required, together with a letter of marque, or 
commission, to authorise commerce-raiding activities, the requisite number of 
men to navigate and fight her, and a sufficient quantity .o.f victuals and 
provisions to supply the crew for the duration of the voyage or cruise. The costs 
of this initial outfit naturally varied with the scale of the project and such 
exogenous factors as the state of the shipping market and the availability of 
labour...Labour costs were another significant factor in the initial outfit of 
privateering vessels. Seafarers were often relatively scarce in time of war as 
the demands of the Navy, the merchant service and the privateering business 
generally exceeded the supply of trained mariners. In such a market situation, 
financial inducements were often necessary to entice seamen to ship aboard 
‘letters of marque’ and private men-of-war.®^
Following the initial outlay, a second set of costs were incurred during the course of 
the voyage or cruise. Starkey continues:
These ‘running’ costs might accrue from the calamities of war, the hazards of 
the sea, or the mismanagement, ili-conduct or bad fortune of the crew. Repairs
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were often necessary as a result of engagement with the enemy, navigational 
error or simple wear and tear...In addition to the expense of the necessary 
repairs, cost accrued from the detention of vessels in port, their crews idle but 
not discharged...wasting crucial time while rivals were at sea seeking prizes.
Further charges might result from the profligacy of the commander and his 
crew In the consumption of stores and provisions, such excesses leading to the 
disruption of cruises for re-victualling and the purchase of additional 
supplies.®®
A third set of costs emanated from the actual capture of prizes, for the apprehension, 
detention and condemnation invariably entailed expenses. To encourage vigilance 
and bravery amongst the seamen, payments were given for being first to sight and 
board enemy vessels, as well as compensation for being injured or killed. Once 
landed, the detention and management of prize captures entailed further 
expenditure. Particularly significant were charges for adjudicating the value of 
detained property. Condemnation resulted in a final set of payments, ranging from 
duties on prize cargoes, the cost of warehousing facilities, and fees for Vice-Admiralty 
proceedings. Because of the expenses associated with the privateering business, 
owners and investors tended to be wealthy merchants, businessmen, or possibly 
government officials. Merchants were most easily able to participate, as many already 
owned ships that could be converted into privateers, thus avoiding the cost of 
purchasing a suitable vessel. The involvement of men experienced in business and 
influential in colonial society says a great deal about the financial appeal of the prize 
war. Indeed, while the financial risks associated with privateering were great, the 
rewards to be earned were potentially far better.
Privateering success was by no means guaranteed, however, for not only did 
a prize need to be found and captured, but done so before other predators had a
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chance to do so first. The relatively small size of French-colonial trade in the W ar of 
the Spanish Succession, compared with later conflicts, meant that privateering 
captures were sporadic and usually of only moderate value. As a result, most 
privateers were owned by a variety of different interests in order to spread the impact 
of any losses that might be incurred. Privateering was a very risky business after-all, 
with capture by the enemy, shipwreck, embezzlement of prize goods, financial 
penalties resulting from an illegal capture, or failure to capture any prizes, all being 
possible disasters that could occur. Even after a prize had been appraised and sold, 
a variety of deductions still had to be made before the owners got their share. Before 
1708, the Admiralty took a tenth, while certain incidental legal and administrative 
costs could prove significant if condemnation was disputed. The crew also had to be 
given a share in the prize money that was their due.
The continued growth of privateering in the W ar of the Spanish Succession 
proves, however, that despite the risks, it remained an appealing investment 
opportunity. Swanson reiterates this point in his study of privateering in the wars of 
the 1740s, stating that the outbreak of war with Spain In 1739 was greeted with 
enormous popularity throughout the principal ports of North America and the 
Caribbean. In Newport, Rhode Island, for example, there was jubilation:
Upon receiving the so longed wish’d for News, that Liberty is granted us to 
make Reprisals upon the Spaniards, the Merchants of this Place are fitting out 
their Sloops for that Purpose, and will sail next week at farthest, they having 
already each of them several Volontiers inlisted. This good News, and the 
Small Pox seeming inti rely stop’d, causes universal Joy among the inhabitants 
here.®'*
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In the W est Indies, merchants were no less anxious to begin privateering voyages: 
‘Tis said, that upon the first Advise of a War, all business will be laid aside in 
Jamaica, but that of Privateering, the men waiting with Impatience to have their 
Hands united.”®®
In northern waters, where there was less risk of capture, privateers were 
outnumbered by vessels carrying letters of marque. These commissioned 
merchantmen were first and foremost committed to the completion of a trading 
voyage, only indulging in prize actions if they came across an inferior or disabled 
opponent. Seamen serving on such vessels did not depend on prize money for their 
livelihood as they received a monthly wage. In areas of insufficient enemy commerce 
the costs of fitting out a privateer could not be justified. Organising letters of marque 
was far more sensible; owners only had to pay for some extra ordinance and an 
enlarged crew to indulge in prize taking. ®®
In more southerly waters, off the coasts of the Chesapeake and the Carolines, 
as well as the Caribbean, the risks of continuing normal commerce were such that 
privateering became virtually the only form of economic activity that could be pursued 
relatively safely and profitably. The French commissioned unusually large numbers of 
privateers in the W ar of the Spanish Succession.®^ This reflected official support for a 
privateering guerre de course. With the risk of capture heightened, many merchants 
involved in shipping turned to privateering as an essential outlet for resources 
otherwise dammed up by war. Studies of French privateering in the eighteenth 
century reflect a similar picture.®® The profits made from commerce raiding only 
became attractive when the risk of capture made the continuation of normal trading 
impossible. When British warships raided and destroyed much of the St. Malo fishing 
fleet on the Grand Banks, for instance, the Maloese turned to privateering. Most
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privateers were converted merchantmen. Very few were purpose built from the keel 
up, except in the West Indies, where privateers tended to carry a heavier armament.
The financial appeal of privateering was an extremely important feature of its 
attraction for owners and crew. Without the prospect of prize taking, merchants were 
unlikely to invest in privateering and seamen unlikely to enlist. Privateersmen were 
only entitled to a share in the value of the prizes they captured and to ‘Bounty Money’ 
paid by the English Crown for enemy warships which were sunk at sea. In this 
context, the profitability of privateering was essential for its existence. According to 
Chapin:
Some few may have entered the service from a desire for revenge for some ill 
treatment received from foreigners or from a hope of escaping the press 
gangs of their own country, and under such circumstances they'would seek to 
deceive themselves and others by the faint veil of patriotism. For the minority, 
romance may have spread a charm, but for most men it was the lure of filthy 
lucre, dollars and cents; pounds, shillings and pence; or, more strictly 
speaking, pieces of eight.®®
Contemporary literature, most notably the colonial press as existed in the early 
eighteenth century, eagerly reported the capture of both British and enemy prizes, 
fuelling seaman’s perception that privateering would make them rich. A privateer was 
reported in November 1708, for example, to have captured an enemy ’barco' off 
Havana, with 200,000 pieces of eight on board. French privateers were similarly 
reported, in December 1706, to have captured 270,000 pieces of eight from the 
Tempest sloop, 12 leagues to the leeward of Cartagena.®® Dockside auctions of 
captured ships and cargoes were another tangible sign of the potential success of the
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business. Merchants gathered around in a bidding frenzy hoping to snap up a 
bargain.
One should be careful not to overestimate the financial rewards of 
privateering. Privateers after-all did not pay wages and stood only a moderate 
chance, especially in northern waters, of capturing any prizes, let alone any wealthy 
ones. Before 1708, privateersmen were paid in two ways. Firstly, they received a 
share of the profit after various deductions had been made. Division of prize shares 
between the owners, officers, and crew, was agreed prior to the cruise and laid down 
in the articles of agreement. The size and reputation of the ship, the difficulty of 
recruiting men, and the ability of the captain, were perhaps the most important factors 
in the eventual decision. Usually the owners held around half the shares and so 
received half the prize money. Distribution was organised through the creation of a 
prize fund. Once the net proceeds had been distributed, a further division took place 
amongst the seamen and owners. According to Starkey:
The principal constituent of this general account was the gross proceeds of 
prize goods seized and condemned, supplemented in some cases by sundry 
Items such as fines or shares forfeited by miscreants...Charges were then 
deducted from this fund, and the residue, the net proceeds, divided between 
the venturers according to the shares each held in the enterprise...Once the 
net receipts were split between the respective parties, further division took 
place, with the owners’ portion distributed in line with the stake each individual 
held in the venture, and the men’s allocation divided according to the number 
of shares each crew member was afforded in the agreement. Invariably this 
was decided by rank: thus, if an able seamen was entitled to a single share, 
lesser ratings, such as boys, landmen or ordinary seamen, might own a 
quarter, a third, a half or three quarters of a share, while specialise crew
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members, such as the carpenter, boatswain or gunner, and officers, could 
claim larger allocations, rising to 12 or 16 shares for the commander.®*
Seamen were paid in a second way by what was known as 'ship plunder'. This 
referred to everything above the main deck, apart from the actual fittings of the 
captured ship herself. The captain and the officers shared in what was termed as 
'cabin plunder’. After 1708, this second form of payment became less significant with 
the disappearance of the Prize Office. For the rest of the war, the entire value of the 
prize was the sole property of the captor. The volume of Atlantic trade, while growing, 
was simply not sufficient to provide a never-ending stream of prize captures. In the 
wars of the 1740s, by contrast, there were far more potential prizes, especially in the 
W est Indies. This maintained a high rate of captures throughout most of the war; 
before the entrance of the French in the war in 1745, a slight lull was witnessed as 
the Spanish could no longer maintain levels of colonial shipping.
Despite the highly speculative nature of privateering in the W ar of the Spanish 
Succession, privateers recruited men with relative ease. Successful commanders 
often secured their complements within days of the announcement of a cruise by 
'beating up’ for volunteers - that is literally beating a drum in an area of a port 
frequented by seamen to attract their attention. Advertisements in the colonial press 
and printed broadsides, normally left in waterfront taverns, reveal that many captains 
less well known could experience difficulties. The recruitment problems of privateers 
paled into insignificance when compared with many merchant vessels and the navy. 
This may at first glance seem surprising, when one considers that they paid monthly 
wages. Indeed, the pay on merchantmen far exceeded peacetime levels. Wages rose 
from between 22 and 35 shillings in peacetime, to between 35 and 55 shillings per 
month during wartime.®® Usually, this money was paid at the second port of delivery 
and at every second port thereafter, as well as upon the completion of the voyage.
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During wartime, with competition for seamen high, perhaps as much as half of total 
wages were advanced before the voyage to discourage desertion.
If privateers offered financial insecurity, although admittedly the chance of 
windfall profits, while merchantmen and the navy offered a guaranteed monthly 
wage, how can the attraction of privateering for seamen be explained? The answer 
seems to lie in the quality of life between the three respective forms of employment. 
The privateering lifestyle was appealing in a number of ways. The workload on 
privateers was relatively light. This reflected the use of small vessels which were fast 
enough to out-sail enemy predators. Large crews, which greatly outnumbered those 
needed to sail the ship, but merely existed to overrun the crew of potential prizes, 
also helped reduce the length and frequency of work shifts, thus giving the crew more 
free time.
Discipline on private men-of-war was far less violent than many of the 
alternatives. Privateersmen were after-all volunteers, who did not need the threat of 
physical punishment to motivate them to do their jobs properly. They knew that the 
sailing efficiency of their ships could be the difference between success and failure. 
Most merchant vessels, especially in colonial waters, were small, fast sailing sloops, 
easily capable of escaping a badly handled privateer.
Another popular feature of privateering was the flexibility of ships' hierarchy. 
Decision-making over navigation and prize actions seems to have been more equally 
shared between officers and men: "Every man has a vote, and so the majority carry 
the vessel where they please."®® This more egalitarian regime must have given 
seamen a gratifying sense of self worth. Captains were required to employ tact and 
diplomacy when issuing orders, rather than rigid on board discipline. In this respect, 
privateers were similar to pirate vessels, where authority was placed in the collective
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hands of the crew; egalitarianism, while a core value of the privateering lifestyle, was 
institutionalised on pirate ships.
Privateering cruises were relatively short and sometimes a definite period was 
fixed for their duration, at the end of which seamen had the right to their discharge.®'* 
At the beginning of the voyage the crew would sign articles of agreement which 
determined their length of service. These written articles, normally drafted by the 
owners, also allocated authority, distributed plunder, and enforced discipline.®® This 
feature of the privateering lifestyle was of particular importance to early colonial 
sailors who were often not professional seamen in the same way as many English 
sailors were. According to Richard Pares, "American seamen were ’jack of all trades’ 
not adverse to occasional voyages at sea but due to land ownership and family 
responsibilities, wholly unsuited to long periods at sea."®® The naval historian Daniel 
Baugh has reiterated this point, stating that, “No people resented impressment more 
than Americans did, partly because they were not ordinarily career seamen in the 
sense that English sailors were; they made only occasional voyages and were 
accustomed to spending more time with their families.” ®^
When one contrasts these facts with employment in the merchant service or 
the Royal Navy, the appeal of privateering can be better understood. Merchant 
vessels, for instance, had far smaller crews relative to their size. The crew of a 
merchant vessel consisted of a master, a mate, a carpenter, a boatswain, a gunner, a 
quartermaster, perhaps a cook, and four or five able seamen. A larger or more 
heavily manned ship included a second mate and four or five more common tars.®® 
As a consequence of these smaller crew sizes, the workload for individual seamen 
was greater. During wartime, this workload increased yet further, as the scarcity of 
seamen meant that many merchant ships were forced to sail short of their full 
complements. Indeed, seamen frequently complained that their vessels were
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undermanned. In 1705, John Turnbridge deserted the Neptune because “the ship 
had not hands enough on board to work her.”®° Those that honoured their 
commitment gained the advantage in the form of higher wages.
The merchant service also had a reputation for harsh discipline. This must 
have compounded all the other negative features. According to Rediker,
The organisation of labour on each ship began with the master...Frequently a 
small part owner himself, the master was the commanding officer...He 
possessed near absolute authority. His ship was virtually a kingdom on its 
own, his power well nigh unlimited, and all too frequently, to the muttering of 
the sailors, he ruled it like a despot...The dominant institutions of the 
eighteenth century English and American societies played relatively small 
parts on the deep sea craft. The absence of family, church, and 
state...created a power vacuum within the wooden world. Into this vacuum 
stepped the merchant captain, armed with extraordinary powers.*'®
Masters used a wide range of strategies to ensure that obedience was adhered to. 
Physical punishment seems to have been a popular choice. Most brutal was the use 
of a cat-of-nine-tails. Other items in the captains’ armoury included canes, ropes, 
belts and sticks; indeed almost anything that could be made to function as a 
weapon.*'* Admiralty records provide some useful examples of the potential severity 
of physical punishment because seamen were often injured to the extent that they 
were forced to seek official retribution. John Pattison, a foremastman of the Unity 
sailing to the W est Indies in 1708, had his head forced “under the 2"  ^ Gun on the 
larboard side by Captain Matthew Beesley for failing to remember a chore. Beesley 
then proceeded to beat his victim with a great Roap...so long and in such a 
barbarous & Cruel manner that...Pattison for sometime after was scarcely able to lift
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his Arms or hands to his head.”^ ® James Conroy, similarly testified In 1707, that 
Captain Wherry had “...catched him fast by the Nose with his left hand & thrust his 
thumb into his left Eye & with his right hand struck three Blows on his said Thumb & 
in that manner wilfully, designedly, & malitiously maimed & put out his eye.”*'® 
Cruelties such as these represented a tactic of authority utterly central to maritime 
discipline, namely intimidation. As Richard B. Morris has written, “Masters frequently 
drove their crews to the limit of endurance by bullying, profane threats, and the 
unsavory practice of hazing or ‘working up,’ which consisted of assigning dirty, 
disagreeable and dangerous tasks to a particular seaman.” *''*
Another important tactic of maritime authority was the withholding of victuals 
from the crew. Merchant captains had the right to restrict rations if they believed a 
crime warranted it. Normally this punishment was restricted to relatively minor crimes. 
In effect, however, masters had a significant hold over the health of seamen - a 
matter of special importance among men who notoriously suffered from yellow fever, 
malaria, dysentery and scurvy. Habitual troublemakers might, furthermore, be 
prematurely discharged or incarcerated into a man-of-war or prison.
The tactics used to maintain maritime authority in the merchant service were 
little different from those used on privateers. Seamen were well aware of the likely 
punishment they would face if they crossed ships’ authority, and on the whole 
accepted it, when it was administered in a fair manner. Where many merchant 
masters seem to have acquired a more notorious reputation, was in the personal 
vengeance that often accompanied physical punishment and the unjustified use of 
other forms of punishment in an attempt to increase profitability. Merchant captains 
seemed to connive at the latter almost whenever the opportunity arose. A ship might 
be blown hundreds, maybe even thousands, of miles off course by contrary or 
unexpected winds, or becalmed for weeks, even months, by a lack of wind. These
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situations demanded the issuing of half rations as a means to make supplies last 
during an extended voyage. Under normal circumstances, owners were required to 
buy, and captains to distribute, adequate food and drink. All too often, however, 
seamen were unjustly denied their rightful necessities as a means to increase 
profitability. Captains connived on their owner’s behalf towards this end by limiting 
ships’ rations as often as possible. Captains who were owners themselves were 
particularly infamous for withholding victuals. William Roberts complained in 1710, 
that the crew of the Selby, commanded, not surprisingly, by Ralph Selby, had been 
kept “very short of Provisions so that they grew weak & almost starved - when in fact 
sufficient provisions for the seamen were on board the ship."*^ ® When a voyage was 
delayed by contrary winds, captains rarely purchased extra supplies, in effect denying 
seamen their proper wages. The seamen of the Warnstead at anchor in Maryland in 
1719 were “almost starved on board the ship tho in a very plentiful Country where 
provisions and victuals are very reasonable.”*'® Captains and officers with the means 
to purchase private supplies, rarely shared In the plight of the common seamen. A 
seamen testified in 1700, for instance, that whereas the people “were att short 
allowance and wanted bread, the captain, steward, and the doctor had and were 
allowed in the said Masters Cabbin their full allowance of provisions and liquors as if 
there had been no want or scarcity of any thing on board.”*^  Such offences against 
equality of condition were made all the worse by the fact that the men often had to 
use their wages to buy victuals without any hope of recompense. Masters typically set 
themselves up as a supplier of basic necessities, with the result that his men lost the 
majority of their wages.
Payment of wages was in itself rarely a straightforward process. Merchant 
ship owners and captains tried their hardest to pay their men as little as possible, and 
at a time which suited them rather than one which conformed to law. In other
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instances, captains exaggerated or even invented crimes as an excuse to maroon 
seamen on deserted islands or in foreign ports, refusing to carry them the stipulated 
distance. This was done in the hope that they would never see them again and thus 
avoid having to pay their wages. Even when seamen avoided these pitfalls they were 
rarely paid their wages on time or in full. Seamen had a legal right to be paid in every 
second port of delivery. Captains concerned that their crews might desert, especially 
during wartime in the American colonies, rarely paid wages in full, in an effort to 
maintain the services of their men till the end of the voyage. Owners often advised 
their captains to act in this illegal manner. Thomas Ekines and Samuel Mitchell 
advised Captain Owen Searie: “Y[ou]r wages must be paid off at Jamaica but if you 
want men and feare theire leaving you its best [to] stop 2 or 3 months pay...to those 
you Distrust.”*^® Deductions made at the final payoff of wages were also a source of 
conflict. The volume of Admiralty business over wage disputes highlights the problem. 
The most common source of complaint surrounded the legal right granted to 
merchants and masters to dock wages. Admiralty law, as well as protecting seamen 
and their access to wages, also upheld and protected the interests of the owner, 
merchant and captain of the shipping industry. Numerous legal provisions required 
the forfeiture of wages by seamen. Perhaps most bitterly contested were deductions 
for “Such damages as do arise and acrue by ill stowage, imbezelments and want of 
goods.” Captains were also entitled to sue for damages caused by the crews alleged 
refusal to pump water from the hold.
Another source of frequent conflict were attempts by captains to pay their 
crews in deflated colonial currencies, which were valued 25-50%  less than sterling 
money. Wartime, furthermore, offered captains the opportunity to defraud their crews 
of wages when men were pressed into the Royal Navy. A contemporary seamen 
commented that, “Many times the master of a ship payeth what he pleaseth when a
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man is pressed and not there to answer for himself; and some men having no friends 
or acquaintances to take that care for them, then that poor man who hath nothing but 
what he must get by hard fare and sore labour.”*'®
Employment on merchant vessels was worse during peacetime. In wartime, 
when merchants had to compete with the navy and privateers for the services of 
seamen, discipline was always less severe, victuals more generous and pay higher. If 
a merchant ship had acquired letters of marque her crew also had the chance to 
share in prize money. These concessions were granted, however, as a direct result of 
the added danger that merchant seamen faced during wartime. Along the main trade 
routes, engagements with enemy privateers were common. These encounters were 
feared because of the likely financial loss, and the potential to receive a debilitating 
injury. Indeed, when masters changed a ship's destination to, or through, an area 
where such a confrontation was likely, seamen often complained or even mutinied. 
William Howell penned a protest to his shipmates in 1713 upon discovering such a 
change, saying “that they did not hire themselves to fight and properly wondering in 
case they should lose a Legg or an Arme who would maintaine them and their 
Familys.”®® Even if a seaman survived injury, when captured by enemy predators, he 
ran the risk of losing his pay, personal effects and liberty.
In the same way that the disadvantages of employment on merchant vessels 
helped make privateering seem more appealing, the nature of life in the navy made 
its attractiveness seem even greater. The work regime was extremely hard. The effort 
needed to keep large naval ships, especially ships of the line, in constant fighting 
trim, meant hours of back-breaking cleaning and gunnery practice for the crew, to say 
nothing of the many adjustments needed to the sails to maintain maximum sailing 
efficiency.®* To make matters worse, these relentless tasks had to be carried out with 
unquestioning obedience, in an atmosphere where the slightest mistake or affront to
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ships’ authority could result in harsh retribution. The most common form of 
punishment was the indiscriminate striking of the men with 'starters' (bamboo cane 
tipped with twine) in order to make them work faster. More serious crimes normally 
resulted in lashes with a 'cat-o-nine-tails'. A variety of punishments also existed that 
were intended to result in death. These forms of punishment became particularly 
severe in the late seventeenth century. The grisly spectacle of ‘flogging round the 
fleet’ (whipping a sailor to death in view of the men of an entire squadron of vessels) 
was implemented in 1698 and reached a pinnacle during the W ar of the Austrian 
Succession. ‘Running the gauntlet’ also grew to prominence during this period.®® The 
level and frequency of this punishment, while set down in the Articles of War, was 
largely at the discretion of individual captains. Unfortunately, those few captains who 
went too far tended to give the navy an unsavory reputation that seamen 
understandably sought to avoid. Complaints about the brutality of captains in the 
British Navy ran especially high between 1688 and 1708. Peter Kemp notes, that 
while excessive punishments were not applicable to the service as a whole, " there 
can be no doubt that the numbers of naval captains who measured up to even 
reasonable standards of care and decency in their treatment of the men under their 
command was pitifully small."®®
Another unpopular feature of service in the navy was that naval vessels were 
expected to engage strong enemy opposition, so long as the odds were reasonably 
even. Court martial waited for those captains who were deemed to have not done 
their duty. The commanders of privateers and merchantmen, by contrast, were 
encouraged to avoid superior force whenever possible. Naval tars were far more 
likely, therefore, to be killed of injured in a sea battle. The capture of H.M.S. 
Adventure (44 guns and 194 men) for instance, between Montserrat and Martinique,
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in March 1709, by the French man-of-war Valeur {36 guns and 286 men) resulted in 
29 killed and 85 wounded.
The only redeeming feature of naval prize actions was that they were 
frequently of greater value. In 1708, a small squadron under Commodore Wager 
attacked a Spanish bullion fleet in the West Indies, sinking or capturing treasure to 
the value of 14-15 million sterling. In another instance, in the spring of 1709, H.M.S. 
Portland, a fourth rate of 54 guns and 280 men, captured a French Guinea Ship with 
400,000 pieces of eight on board, as well as another vessel with a cargo valued at 
£75,000.®^ The likelihood of prize money was greatest for those serving on small, fast 
sailing naval frigates. Colonial staples were normally transported in small sloops and 
brigantines. This reflected the relatively small-scale nature of colonial trade in the 
early seventeenth century. These vessels could easily out-manoeuvre large naval 
line-of-battle ships. Consequently, fourth to sixth rate frigates were preferred for 
colonial service. Larger, first to third rates, were usually stationed in the English 
Channel, off the French coast, or in the Mediterranean. Sailors stationed in colonial 
waters stood a far better chance of sharing in prize money than their European 
counterparts. Wherever one was stationed, however, the proportion of prize proceeds 
assigned to the crew was so pitifully small that it compared poorly with wages and 
prize money obtainable on merchantmen and privateers. The system employed for 
the division of prizes in the navy worked against the interests of the common 
seaman. The ‘Cruisers Act’ of 1708, established that prizes should be divided into 
eight shares, three of which went to the captain, one to the commander-in-chief, one 
to the officers, one to the warrant officers, and two to the crew. In this situation, only 
seamen serving on extremely successful frigates could expect to make a good living.
The payment of prize money and wages was wrought with frustration and 
embezzlement. Prize shares were often unfairly distributed by officers’ eager to
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enrich themselves at the expense of their crews. Wages were also habitually withheld 
by the practice of transferring men from ship to ship, which was contrary to the terms 
on which they had enlisted. Ships were paid yearly and alphabetically. By transferring 
seamen from one ship to another with a name further down the alphabet, therefore, 
the navy could avoid payment. Seamen were given a ticket for the amount of pay 
they had earned, which would only be honoured when his new ship was paid, if 
indeed he was not transferred again. It was not unusual for seamen to go six or 
seven years without receiving any pay. This put wives and children in a precarious 
situation. Occasionally, late payment of wages resulted in violence. The crew of 
H.M.S Blackwell, for instance, mutinied in 1706 and went pirating. While it was in 
theory possible for seamen to make a good living in the navy, delayed payment of 
prize money and wages meant that seamen were far more likely to die from the many 
other miseries of the service before they saw a decent return.
The unpopularity of service in the navy was reflected in high levels of 
desertion. During the W ar of the Spanish Succession, seamen entered the navy like 
“men dragged to execution.” When the opportunity arose, few turned down the 
chance to find alternative employment on merchant ships or privateers. The 
Admiralty's attempts to solve the problem merely made matters worse. Wages and 
prize money were withheld for sometimes years at a time, in the hope that seamen 
would not desert when they had money owing. Naval commanders stationed in 
colonial waters often criticised this strategy. Captain William Mill, commander of H.M. 
Brigantine Larke, stated to the Council of Barbados in June 1703, that it was
...very difficult on any or great occasion to man her, the men often deserting
for want of being paid at the end of their cruise, and that 'twould conduce
much to H.M. service and the good of this Island, if a certaine number of
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sailors were constantly paid every six weeks, that they might be sure of them 
on all occasions.®®
The Admiralty undeterred by such views, furthermore, encouraged that seamen 
should be denied regular shore leave and confined below deck. This life of 
confinement goes along way to explaining the navy’s deplorable record for disease 
related deaths; the naval diet was after-all little different from that provided by 
privateers, who never achieved a similar reputation for ill health. Indeed, while both 
suffered from Scurvy and Typhus, it was the navy who bore the vast majority of 
Yellow Fever and Malaria cases, reflecting its greater tendency to confine men, both 
healthy and sick, together for long periods of time.
Employment in the navy was expected to last for the duration of wartime 
hostilities. This fact must have intensified all the other unpopular features. According 
to Daniel Baugh, because seamen
...could remember a time when ships were manned each spring and paid off 
in the autumn...service for the duration was seen as an unnatural 
development, an evil Innovation; it forced the seamen to make a heavy 
commitment, a seemingly Irrevocable one, when he volunteered for the King's 
ships.®^
The navy relied heavily on impressment to man their ships. Press-gangs were active 
both in port, as well as at sea. By land, seamen employed a variety of tactics to avoid 
impressment. Port-side riots were raged, for instance, while press boats full of 
recruits inflicted upon themselves disabilities and feigned every manner of paralysis, 
idiocy and fits. Without a good disguise seamen “could not walk the streets without 
danger, nor sleep in safety.”®® Impressment was feared by married men most of all.
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for they had no means of ensuring that their loved ones would not starve In their 
absence.
The ’America Act' freed privateersmen from the threat of impressment. There 
was no change to the situation for merchant seamen, however, despite the fact many 
held exemption papers. Their knowledge and experience made them far more 
tempting prey than landsmen, who required months of training before they would be 
able to perform even the simplest tasks. Sometimes, whole crews were taken off 
merchant ships and men ’in lieu’ or ’ticket men’ put in their place. The threat of 
impressment helps explain why merchantmen, offering high wages, often with the 
additional chance of sharing in prize money, still found it difficult to recruit seamen in 
contrast to privateers.
The attraction of privateering was overwhelmingly financial; patriotic fervour 
and romantic charm played but a minor role. For government, privateering was a way 
to cheaply augment naval forces during wartime. By focussing on prize taking, 
privateers enabled the navy to concentrate on trade protection. In this way, privateers 
helped government achieve mercantilist objectives. For investors, privateering was 
simply a business venture, undertaken for purely personal gain. It provided a useful 
alternative to normal business activities made more difficult, if not impossible, by the 
effects of enemy commerce raiding. For seamen, privateering offered the chance of 
windfall gains, as well as a highly attractive lifestyle. In both these respects, the 
merchant service and the navy found it hard to compete. Merchant vessels, for 
instance, offered good wages, but little chance of prize money. Naval vessels, by 
contrast, offered the chance of prize money, but poor wages. In both cases, on-board 
life left much to be desired in comparison with what was available on privateers. As a 
consequence, while privateers recruited men with relative ease, merchant vessels 
and the navy often had to rely on landsmen and elderly seamen, or otherwise were
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forced to stay in port short-handed. The attraction of privateering also extended to the 
inhabitants of port towns as the numerous tasks involved in the fitting out of 
privateers provided business for a wide variety of tradesmen, while prize captures 
brought goods and money into colonial ports, helping to offset captures by the 
enemy. The loss of provision ships was felt particularly hard. Privateering provided a 
secondary supply, sold at a reasonable price to facilitate a quick return.
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Chapter 3
THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATEERING
By capturing seaborne commerce the effect of privateering was widespread. Few 
colonies, be they British, French, or Spanish, could avoid the impact of privateering 
for two important reasons. Firstly, colonial expansion westwards was at this time 
limited, except in South America. Secondly, most colonial economies were still 
focused towards the development of staple agriculture that tended to leave them 
reliant on other sources for a wide variety of provisions and manufactures. As a 
consequence, seaborne commerce was extremely important, both as a source of 
imports, as well as a means for the export of colonial produce. Privateering, 
therefore, by threatening the flow of imports and exports, inevitably had an effect on 
colonial commerce and economic development.
This chapter examines the impact of both British and French privateering. It 
will seek to establish which were the principal privateering centres, when, where and 
how private men-of-war operated, as well as a whole host of information concerning 
their captures. Reference will also be made to the Royal Navy in those areas where 
an overlap exists in the operation and effect of privateering. Owing to the availability 
of sources, my examination of French privateering is largely restricted to secondary 
sources, although the Calendar of State Papers, in particular, provides some useful 
contemporary views on its effect.
I
Traditional historiography has largely ignored the importance of privateering. Naval 
historians have concentrated on fleet actions of the Royal Navy, while economic and
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business scholars have focused on merchant shipping and the growth of American 
mercantile communities. Since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval historians 
have minimised the importance of privateering and adopted Mahan’s view that ‘sea 
power means naval power’. Mahan repeatedly asserted that privateering played a 
trivial role in maritime warfare:
It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that 
strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that 
overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it 
to appear only as a fugitive...The overbearing power can only be exercised by 
great navies.®®
Mahan went on to ridicule French reliance on guerre de course, stating that, ‘The  
mulitude of French privateers was Indeed a sad token to an instructed eye, showing 
behind them a merchant shipping in enforced idleness, whose crews and whose 
owners were driven to speculative pillage in order to live.”®® Subsequent studies by 
naval historians reveal the enduring acceptance of Mahan’s theories. Scholars such 
as W . L. Clowse, Sir Herbert Richmond, Julian Corbett, Gerald S. Graham, Peter 
Kemp, Christopher Lloyd and John Tilley have largely ignored privateering in 
preference to naval fleets.®  ^ Military and economic historians have followed suit, 
devoting scant space to privateering activity.®  ^ Studies of American merchant and 
seaport communities have, furthermore, tended to view privateering investments as a 
sideline.®® Students of ocean shipping have focussed on the effects of the prize war 
at greater length. Rather surprisingly, however, instead of talking about the 
expanding numbers of privateers and naval frigates that disrupted commerce 
progressively throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they have 
concentrated on increasing stability and security. Because of the supposedly low risk
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of capture by predators, merchants lowered their costs by reducing crews and 
armaments and by employing vessels more efficiently designed for carrying cargoes. 
Douglas North has stated that
All Improvements in manning efficiency during the period [1600-17701 came 
from a decline in crew requirements per constant average ship size...It was the 
decline in piracy and privateering...which contributed most to the fall in PSL 
[cost per day at sea of labour] prior to 1800.®'^
James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton have taken North’s thesis even further: ‘The  
argument presented here is that the crew reductions were made possible by the 
elimination of piracy and privateering.”®®
Alongside the arguments of those who denigrate the importance of 
privateering is another school of thought which recognises its political, military, 
economic and social impact. These studies, which have investigated privateering in a 
far more systematic fashion, have tended to eclipse the outdated views of Mahan and 
others.®® Kenneth R. Andrews has demonstrated the enormous political, economic 
and military consequences of English privateering, as well as its key role in the 
genesis of Britain’s maritime empire. Richard Pares has written valuable studies of 
privateering’s legal framework, its impact on the navy’s manpower requirements, and 
a masterful account of imperial warfare, including the role of private men-of-war in the 
Caribbean. Recent works by Walter Mitchinton, David Starkey, J.S. Bromley, Peter 
Raban, Alan Jamieson, and William R. Meyer, discuss the economic and military 
significance of English and Channel Island privateering from the Glorious Revolution 
to 1815.®^ These historians have argued that private men-of-war contributed 
significantly to British sea power by capturing nearly as many prizes as the Royal 
Navy throughout the 1700s. Naval historians in the light of this new research have
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also begun to appreciate the impact of privateering. Daniel Baugh has discussed the 
enormous political influence of the ‘privateering interest’ in the eighteenth century 
London. He has also stressed an important connection between commanders of 
public and private men-of-war - namely prize money. Like privateers, the navy 
devoted considerable time, shipping and manpower pursuing enemy prizes. Baugh 
has called prize money the “chief attraction” of naval service. Julian Gywn has 
convincingly demonstrated the importance of prize money for Admiral Sir Peter 
W arren’s personal fortune. Similarly, Fred Anderson has emphasised that 
Massachusetts relied on the prospects of plunder and personal gain to recruit troops 
for the French and Indian Wars. Ralph Davis, a leading economic historian, has 
furthermore stated, in regard to the marked impact that warfare in general, and 
privateering in particular, exerted on Atlantic shipping: “By far the most spectacular 
wartime calamities were the capture of ships and their cargoes by enemy privateers 
and warships.”®®
Documentary materials concerning privateering are sparse. English records are 
reasonably complete, and consequently, the best studies of privateering in the 
imperial wars of 1585-1815 focus on English private men-of-war. The shortage of 
North American and Caribbean records are more pronounced. Vice-Admiralty records 
are largely incomplete due to loss or destruction. Those remaining still provide, 
however, a wealth of information concerning prize actions, such as the names of 
privateers, their home ports, names of commanders and owners, tonnage, ordnance, 
crew size, value of captures and so on. Ships’ journals and the correspondence of 
captains and owners of privateers, as well as merchants affected by their activities, 
have also largely disappeared over the centuries. Carl Swanson, in his influential
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study of American privateering and imperial warfare in the wars of the 1740s, finds a 
solution to this problem by undertaking a systematic investigation of American 
newspapers, which were widespread by the 1740s.®® These newspapers provided 
3,852 of the 3,973 prize references contained in Swanson’s data file. They provided 
a wealth of information regarding reported engagements and captures involving 
privateers and merchantmen. A comparable series of newspaper evidence is not 
available for earlier imperial conflicts unfortunately, making the study of British- 
colonial privateering in the W ar of the Spanish Succession extremely difficult. This 
may explain why it has received only scant attention by historians, normally in studies 
primarily dealing with other topics.
An investigation of privateering in the Queen Anne’s W ar is possible, 
however, using British, North American and Caribbean manuscript and printed 
primary sources. My study is limited to British sources available in the British Library, 
the Public Record Office, the Institute of Historical Research, and finally the National 
Library of Scotland. These sources, largely Admiralty, Colonial Office, and colonial 
government records have enabled the construction of a relatively large data file of 
information concerning the activities and effect of privateers and the Royal Navy in 
the colonial prize war.^°°
III
Imperial warfare was popular in America because it permitted privateering. Many 
colonial merchants and mariners were eager to fit out and serve on private men-of- 
war in the hope that they would get rich while the opportunity existed. All the leading 
ports in British North American and the British West Indies fitted out private men-of- 
war. The activity of these ports can be assessed in a variety of ways. One might, for 
instance, count the number of privateers that sailed from each city, or alternatively.
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count the number of prizes captured by a colony's privateers. Due to lack of 
information in the data file, the latter of these two options will be the method adopted 
here for measuring each port’s participation. This limitation makes assessment of the 
commitment of each port’s resources to privateering impossible.
According to the data file, the privateers of twelve colonies captured prizes in 
the W ar of the Spanish Succession. Private men-of-war from the W est Indies 
dominated these captures. The valuable cargoes embarking from the Caribbean 
made the area a centre of privateering operations from the sixteenth century until the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars. During Queen Anne’s War, the participation of Jamaica 
was by far the most significant, accounting for 125 prize captures. This dominance 
was witnessed in all the other major inter-colonial wars of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and reflected the unique advantages that Jamaica possessed 
as a privateering base. The other colonies of the British W est Indies totalled only 51 
captures in comparison.
Unlike the Caribbean, those captures made in North American waters were 
more evenly spread amongst the colonies. The middle colonies of Massachusetts 
and New England accounted for 36 prize captures, closely followed by New York, 
Rhode Island and Carolina with 31, 28 and 8 captures respectively.
The nationality of these prize captures was predominantly French. Out of the 
237 captures recorded in the data file as belonging to a specific country, 146 were 
reported to be French, followed by 50 from Spain. The remaining 41 captures 
consisted of 31 from a variety of neutral nations for illegal trading and 10 recaptures 
of British vessels.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of British-Colonial Privateering Prize Captures, 1702-1713
Colony N %
British West Indies:
Antigua 10 2.4
Bahamas 12 2.8
Barbados 13 3.0
Bermuda 13 3.0
Jamaica 125 29.3
St. Christophers 2 0.5
St. Kitts 1 0.2
British North America:
Carolina 8 1.9
Massachusetts* 31 7.3
New England 5 1.2
New York 31 7.3
Rhode Island 28 6.4
Unknown* 148 34.7
Total 427 100.0
*While the areas of Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island infact comprised New England In the early Eighteenth 
century, in an effort to provide a more detailed breakdown of North American prize captures the later geographical 
boundaries have been used in some tables and subsequent analysis.
*Of the 148 captures that did not refer to a connection with the privateer of a specific colony, only 43 were definitely 
privateers. The status of the British vessels that captured the other 105 prizes is uncertain.
TABLE 3.2
Distribution of British Colonial Privateer Prize Nationality, 1702-1713
Nationality N %
French 146 34.2
Spanish 50 11.7
Other 31 7.3
Recapture 10 2.3
Unknown 190 44.5
Total 450 100.0
•Category described as ‘other’ refers to the capture of neutral vessels for illegal trading with the French or Spanish (Includes 
16 Dutch, 5 Danish, 10 British).
"Of the 427 prize captures, 40 were made by British vessels of uncertain status (16 French, 6 Spanish, 2 Dutch. 1 
recapture, 2 British, and 8 unknown).
French vessels dominated prize captures for a variety of reasons. Firstly, French trade 
was far more accessible to British colonial privateers than that of the Spanish, who 
rarely traded in American waters, preferring instead to trade along the coast of New 
Spain in South America. In these waters, hundreds of miles from Britain's colonies in 
the Caribbean, and thousands of miles from those in North America, Spanish inter­
colonial shipping was far less likely to encounter privateers from more northerly
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waters. The costs of provisioning privateers for long voyages appears to have been 
more than the majority of investors were prepared to pay. In Caribbean and North 
American waters, by contrast, French trade from Martinique, Guadeloupe, Hispaniola, 
St. Dominique, Newfoundland, Placentia and Arcadia provided a more readily 
available supply of shipping. The closer proximity of British ports also meant that 
privateers could more quickly refit when damaged, and dispose of their prizes after 
capture. A second reason why British colonial privateers captured more French 
vessels than Spanish centres around the greater protection the latter was given. 
Guard ships, hired at the expense of governors and merchants to protect inter-colonial 
trade, acted as a useful deterrent to the attentions of privateers. The British 
government, furthermore, eager to develop illicit trade with the Spanish took a number 
of steps to ensure that the actions of privateers did not upset what was at the best of 
times a delicate relationship.^®^ In 1704, or instance, the Council of Trade and 
Plantations ordered that privateers and men-of-war should not molest British or 
Spanish vessels involved in the Spanish-American trade.^®® In 1707, furthermore, 
special passes were issued to Spanish merchants so that they might be able to more 
safely trade at Jamaica, following accusations that the recent decline in contraband 
trade was a consequence of the continued robbing of Spanish vessels by British- 
colonial privateers. The ‘America Act’ went a step further by creating a zone between 
Rio de la Hacha and the Rio Chagre, within which the capture of Spanish vessels was 
forbidden. According to an official memorial sent to the American colonies in August 
1708, moreover, the commissions of privateers who intended to cruise to the leeward 
of Rio de la Hacha had to include instructions that:
(1) That they shall attack and take no other ship, on that coast, but such as shall 
be mann’d and sailed by French men; preserving the ship’s company to 
evidence the lawfuilness of the capture. (2) That in case they take or destroy
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any Spanish coasting vessel! mann’d with Spanyards on the said shore, carrying 
coastwise the manufactures of Europe, that then they shall be subject to the 
penalty of paying to the Spanyard the double value in the same specie they 
shall take or destroy/®®
Trade witfi the Spanish was hugely important because it supplied silver coin 
and bullion, “the measure and standard of riches”/®"' These commodities provided 
Britain with a form of payment that could supplement the cloth industry in the 
continuation of important trades to the Baltic, the Levant, and the East Indies. 
Receiving payment in coin also supplied the English with a source of hard currency for 
their North American and Caribbean colonies.^®® The opportunity to vent English 
manufactures was another attractive feature of the Spanish-American trade, which by 
the late seventeenth century was esteemed above all other commerce. The Earl of 
Inchiquin, governor of Jamaica between 1689 and 1692, for instance, claimed that the 
fleet leaving Jamaica in 1690 carried away £100,000 worth of bullion, representing 
more than the island’s recorded sugar export for 1689 (£88,000). This figure was also 
more than a fourth of the value of England’s entire trade with Old Spain via Cadiz.^®® 
With the accession of Philip of Anjou to the Spanish throne and the acquisition of the 
Asiento contract by the French Guinea Company in 1701, English contraband trade 
appeared for the first time to be on the brink of being completely cut off. According to 
Nettles,
Spanish colonial ports that were closed to the English opened at the approach of 
the French. Everywhere French and Spanish vessels went together -  the two 
became almost indistinguishable in the trading fleets of the war...not only did 
the Asiento vessels gain admittance into the lands of Philip V, but the 
importation of general merchandise from France proceeded on a grand scale.'®^
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The English considered this threat so great that they were prepared to go to war 
because of it. Sir Charles Hedges, Secretary of State, for instance, considered the 
Asiento a leading cause of the conflict, “it having been the aim of the French in 
possessing themselves of Spain, to make themselves masters of the West Indian 
t r a d e , I n  addition to fighting the French and Spanish militarily, the English 
government gave unprecedented encouragement to the development of the Spanish- 
American trade on a diplomatic and legislative level.'®® Restrictions on the capture of 
Spanish vessels by British-colonial privateers in areas where they might be involved in 
covert trade, was pursued in this context.
When one considers that Spanish commerce was well guarded and that 
captured vessels might be involved in the Spanish-American trade, one can 
appreciate why the coast of New Spain did not figure highly in the data file as a 
cruising ground for British-colonial privateers. Only seven prize actions, for which an 
area of capture was noted, occurred off the coast of New Spain. Transatlantic 
Spanish trade, organised into huge convoys under the protection of naval squadrons, 
was even harder to target. Small, fast-sailing privateers had little chance of attacking 
ships that were well manned and gunned. Their date of departure was, furthermore, a 
closely guarded secret; Spanish officials were only too aware of the importance their 
treasure held for a mercantilist-minded British government and fortune-seeking naval 
commanders.
The leading ports of British North America and the British West Indies 
dominated participation in the prize war. According to Carl Swanson, there was a 
“strong correlation between urban development and participation in the prize war. 
Privateering ventures required entrepreneurial ability, shipping, and manpower. The
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largest seaports...possessed more of the requisites than did smaller communities.” 
Swanson goes on:
Organisation of a privateering cruise required experienced merchants unafraid 
of taking risks and in command of sufficient capital to acquire strong sailing 
vessels, substantial ordnance, and enough provisions for a long voyage. They 
needed skilled captains with established reputations to attract large crews.
Once a privateer captured an enemy merchantmen, the owners' business skills 
were especially important because profits did not materialize until the prize was 
condemned In a vice-admiralty court and the vessel and cargo were sold to 
advantage. Business correspondence, warehouse facilities, and market 
information were all necessary for success."®
It is no surprise, therefore, that the majority of privateering Investors were merchants. 
Owners represented their privateers at Vice-Admiralty proceedings and prize sales. 
For this service they demanded an additional percentage of the profits, over and 
above the 1/3 they normally received.
In addition to entrepreneurial ability, shipping and manpower were also more 
readily available in the larger ports. Most private men-of-war were converted 
merchantmen. As the size of the enemy's commerce was relatively small, except for 
the trade conducted by the ships of the French Guinea Company, there was little 
need for large specially built privateers 'of force' as existed later in the century."' 
Indeed, In the W ar of the Spanish Succession, fast-sailing merchantmen appear to 
been have just as effective as specially built privateers. Communities with large 
merchant fleets could rapidly dispatch private men-of-war when hostilities erupted in 
1702. In addition, the principal ports more easily supplied the enormous numbers of 
men needed for privateering crews, which was often three times larger than that
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needed to sail the vessel. Obtaining crews of this size was a difficult task; the 
services of seamen were in high demand during wartime.
The correlation between urban development and involvement in the prize war 
was most marked in North America. The well established ports of Boston, New York 
and Newport were able to commission and fit out far more privateers than smaller, 
less well developed port towns, such as Charleston. Merchants in Newport, Rhode 
Island, for instance, dispatched a privateer, under the command of Captain William 
Wanton, within eleven days of the declaration of war in 1702. Port towns in the British 
W est Indies, by contrast, played a major role In privateering despite being deficient in 
many of the requisites previously mentioned. Many of the Islands were dependent on 
shipping from other ports and had a small white population. Nevertheless, their 
location made the difference, being ideally situated for preying on the richest trade 
routes of the French and Spanish empires. The attraction of merchantmen carrying 
the lucrative agricultural staples of the West Indies and the lure of the fabled treasure 
ships of New Spain made the area a magnet for cruisers from all belligerent nations. 
In addition to location, the island colonies had a long and successful history of 
privateering, as well as a body of seamen and ships' officers thoroughly experienced 
in this kind of venture."® Many of the principal towns of the W est Indies were built on 
the profits of buccaneering. Port Royal, for instance, before its destruction by 
earthquake in 1692, was still reliant on privateering to finance agricultural 
developments. For these several reasons, the British West Indian colonies were 
among the leaders in sending out private men-of-war.
British-colonial privateers operated right up the Atlantic coast from Central 
America to Newfoundland in the far north. They concentrated, however, where the 
pickings were richest in the Caribbean. It is extremely difficult to be accurate about 
the precise cruising grounds of British-colonial privateers. While most references to
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prize actions provided information concerning numbers of captures and their 
condemnation, few offer any detail about the location of the capture or cruising 
grounds in general."® One can get round this problem by using the condemnation of 
prizes as an indication of the likely cruising ground of a privateer prior to a prize 
action. This assumption can be made for a variety of reasons. Firstly, most privateers 
were small and incapable of long cruises over hundreds of miles. Secondly, 
governors keen to use British-colonial privateers as a deterrent to enemy predators 
often restricted their cruising grounds to local waters. Thirdly, owing to the high risk of 
recapture, privateer captains were usually instructed by their owners to return to port 
once a capture was made. For these three reasons, one can logically assume that 
the place of condemnation of a prize capture coincided, in the vast majority of cases, 
with the rough area of the privateer’s cruising-ground. By this rationale, with the 
British W est Indies, particularly Jamaica and Barbados, accounting for a large 
proportion of the condemnation of both privateering and naval prize captures, the 
Caribbean can be seen as the principal cruising-ground of British predators in the 
W ar of the Spanish Succession. The smaller number of prizes condemned in the 
ports of North America, by contrast, suggest that more northerly waters were a less 
attractive option. New York and Rhode Island were again most significant, accounting 
for the condemnation of 44 prize captures. The 67 prizes condemned at 
Newfoundland were also significant, although one cannot be sure of the status of the 
captors. It is entirely likely that a sizeable proportion were made by merchantmen and 
the Royal Navy.
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TABLE 3.3
Distribution of the Condemnation of British-Colonial Privateerinc Prize Captures, 1702-1713
Colony N %
British West Indies: 
Antigua 9 2.1
Bermuda 14 3.3
Barbados 12 2.8
Jamaica 64 15.0
Nevis 7 1.6
St. Kitts 1 0.2
St. Thomas 1 0.2
Bahamas 4 0.9
British North America:
Carolina 3 0.7
Maryland 2 0.5
Massachusetts 6 1.4
Newfoundland 67 15.7
New York 28 6.6
Rhode island 15 3.5
Unknown 194 45.5
Total 427 100.0
*0 f the 427 prize captures recorded in the data file, 194 did not refer to a colony of condemnation, with 5 of this figure being 
predators of uncertain status. A further 10 captures were burnt, sunk or ransomed at sea. Of the remaining 223 prize 
captures that did refer to a colony of condemnation, 89 were prizes of British vessels of uncertain status.
The respective attractiveness of one area over another as a cruising ground 
for British-colonial privateers was dependent on the value and availability of enemy 
shipping. Privateer captains were understandably more likely to cruise where there 
was the best chance of success. West Indian goods were worth considerably more 
than North American products. The value of French trade in fish and naval stores 
from her North American colonies was small. As a consequence, numbers of British 
colonial privateers operating in northern waters were relatively insignificant compared 
to the Caribbean. Nevertheless, a sizeable number of French vessels were captured 
in the Gape Breton area and particularly off the Newfoundland Banks. The 67 prizes 
recorded in the data file to have been condemned at Newfoundland lay testament to 
this fact.
British-colonial privateering ebbed and flowed with fluctuations in Spanish and 
French commerce, as well as with the introduction of prize legislation. The years of
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peace between King William’s W ar in the late seventeenth century and Queen 
Anne’s W ar in the early eighteenth, helped French and Spanish commerce return to 
its former levels. This rejuvenated body of shipping appears to have enabled the 
capture of a relatively large number of enemy vessels in the early years of the war. 
According to the data file, British-colonial privateers took 120 vessels in the first three 
years of the war, while the navy took 56. Chapin further notes that between 4 May 
1702 and 20 November 1703, 35 prizes were condemned at Jamaica. By the 1 March 
this total had reached 41 Further explanation for this phenomenon can be seen in 
the tendency to fit out merchant craft of every description as privateers in the early 
years of the war, in an attempt to catch the enemy unprepared. After several years, 
as the effect of the captures was felt by enemy shipping, and merchantmen began to 
arm themselves more heavily, not only does one see a reduction in numbers of 
privateers, but also a reduction in captures as well. The data file reveals that 
privateers and the navy were considerably less successful in 1705 and 1706, 
compared with the two previous years, taking 50 and 18 vessels respectively
TABLE 3.4
Yearly Prize Captures of British-Colonial Privateers, 1702-1713
Year N %
1702 50 11.7
1703 34 8.0
1704 36 8.4
1705 22 5.2
1706 28 6.6
1707 15 3.5
1708 40 9.4
1709 27 6.3
1710 33 7.7
1711 20 4.7
1712 6 1.4
1713 0 0.0
Unknown 116 27.1
Totals 427 100.0
•Of the 116 captures that could not be assigned to a specific year, 64 were to British vessels of uncertain status. Of the 
remaining 311 prize captures, 34 fell into the aforementioned category.
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Privateer commanders had to plan their voyages to take into account bad 
weather and to coincide with the height of the shipping season, which was 
determined by the growing cycle of the various colonial staples. This was true for all 
privateers, whether they were French, Spanish or British, and whether they operated 
in the W est Indies or off the coast of North America. According to Swanson, writing in 
regard to the wars of the1740s, the growing cycle of sugar cane meant that
Privateering was brisk in the winter and early spring as vessels arrived to load 
the new crop. Prize actions declined during the hurricane season. August and 
September were the slowest months with privateering activity falling 120 to 140 
percent compared to the peak month of March and February. Prize actions 
picked up again in the late fall and steadily increased with the approach of the 
new season."®
While the sugar trade of France’s Caribbean colonies was well developed in the 
1740s, during the W ar of the Spanish Succession, by contrast, output was sporadic 
and homeward bound sugar convoys less frequent. As a consequence, the growing 
cycle of sugar cane was less significant to the timing of privateering cruises than was 
the case in later conflicts. Assessing the exact date of captures, through analysis of 
the data file, is a difficult task because many of the references do not give sufficient 
detail. Most of the information comes from the correspondence of colonial governors 
and government departments, such as the Council of Trade and Plantations and the 
Board of Trade. While a date is often given as to when a correspondence was written 
or when prizes were condemned, one can still not confidently use the information to 
suggest when prizes were captured. Condemnation could be a lengthy process for 
instance, while governors’ letters often referred to a wide variety of information 
suggesting that they were written on an ad hoc basis rather than to specifically report
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privateering successes. Nevertheless, despite the fact that only 76 of the 301 
references to privateering prize actions give an exact date for their completion, one 
can still make some cautious suggestions as to the best months of the year for 
making prize captures. British-colonial privateers cruised at various times throughout 
the year. Success appears to have been most likely between June and October, 
while November through to May appears to have been slowest. With the exception of 
July, August and September, which were by far the most significant months, prize 
captures appear to have been made relatively similarly throughout the year. Captures 
made by the Royal Navy reveal a similar pattern, with July through to October being 
most successful and the other months of the year at around the same level.
Prize vessels were typically small, with a cargo of varied goods. Ships, with an 
average size of 203 tons, accounted for only 50 of the 155 references to vessel type 
of privateering captures recorded in the data file. In contrast, far smaller vessels, 
such as sloops, brigantines and barques, with an average size of 43 tons, accounted 
for 99 of the total. The average size of British-colonial privateering captures overall, 
including those captures that were made by predators of undetermined status, was 
130 tons.
TABLE 3.5
Distribution of Types of Vessels Captured by British-Colonial Privateers, 1702-1713
Vessel Type N %
Barcolongo 1 0.2
Barque 10 2.4
Brigantine 17 4.0
Ketch 1 0.2
Open Shallops 2 0.5
Periaugers 1 0.2
Pink 1 0.2
Settee 1 0.2
Ship 50 11.7
Sloop 72 16.9
Unknown 271 63.5
Totals 427 100.0
•Of the 271 prize captures of undetermined vessel type, 79 were made by British vessels of uncertain status. Of the 
remaining 156 prize captures that did record a vessel type, 19 fell into the aforementioned category.
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TABLE 3.6
Mean Tonnage, Crew Size, and Ordinance for Prizes Captured by British-Colonial Privateers
1702-1713
Vessel Type Tonnage Size of Crew Number of Guns
Ship 203 (15) 104 (9) 13 (15)
Sloop 29 (8) 65 (4) 4 (4)
Other 64 (6) 0 (0) 8 (1)
Unknown 131 (14) 44 (7) 12 (15)
Grand Mean 107 (43) 50 (20) 9 (35)
•Note: The figures in parentheses include the number of cases upon which the means are based. Furthermore, those 
vessels referred to as ‘other’ included a brigantine, a barque, two open shaiiops, and a pink. Those vessels cited as 
’unknown’ included ail those references to prize captures, which provided information on tonnage, crew size, and ordnance, 
but not a vessel type.
The impression that these statistics give is that much of French colonial 
shipping was small-scale and localised in nature, transporting basic provisions and 
manufactures between its colonies. The small size of British-colonial privateers in the 
W ar of the Spanish Succession in comparison with the wars of the 1740s, where 
large transatlantic ships of 300 tons and more were far more common, seems to 
confirm this assumption.
The nature of French colonial shipping reflected the appalling condition of 
France’s colonies in the Caribbean. The development of large-scale staple agriculture 
could hardly be expected when French colonists faced starvation and the threat of 
invasion on a day-to-day basis. According to Ruth Bourne, ‘The fleets of Coetlogon 
and Chateau Renault, which had been expected to bring supplies and 
reinforcements, sailed away leaving Martinique stripped bare of food, stores and 
money in a way the English never succeeded in doing, and left behind nothing but 
plague and a starving, mutinous people.”"® Guadaloupe was in little better condition. 
The fleets of du Casse had come and gone, leaving the island short of food. The 
inhabitants had no market for their sugar and so were not able to buy the small stores 
of wine and provisions occasional ships brought in.
The majority of privateers in the W ar of the Spanish Succession were small, 
fast-sailing vessels. According to the data file, sloops and brigantines were most 
popular, accounting for 90 of the vessels involved in prize actions. Ships were rarely
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used by comparison; only 13 references were made to privateering s h i p s . N a v a l  
vessels, by contrast, were almost always ships, except when colonial sloops were 
occasionally hired as coast guards. The likely size of the enemy's shipping 
determined the most appropriate vessels to employ as privateers. Small, fast-sailing 
vessels were no match for heavily armed and manned merchantmen, for instance, 
while large, slow-sailing ships were useless against their opposites. Large privateers 
were rare in the early eighteenth century. In the wars of the 1740s, following the 
development of the French sugar islands, particularly Saint Dominique, privateers ‘of 
force’, as David Starkey describes them, were more common."® In the W ar of the 
Spanish Succession colonial commerce was relatively underdeveloped. Large 
privateers, expensive to build, fit out and man, were unnecessary for the capture of 
such commerce. Smaller privateers were far better suited to hunting small merchant 
vessels, which used speed and a shallow draught as their chief source of defence in 
ways that larger merchantmen later in the century could not.
In the same vein, the use of slow bulky ships by the Royal Navy reflected the 
fact that they were not primarily intended to concern themselves with the capture of 
localised enemy commerce. Indeed, in the view of the Admiralty, naval vessels were 
hoped to achieve two main objectives by their presence in American waters: firstly, 
the protection of trade convoys from enemy naval and privateering squadrons; and 
secondly, the capture of the Spanish treasure fleets. In both cases, it was generally 
thought that third and fourth rate ships were best suited to the task. Smaller fifth and 
sixth rate ‘frigates' were assigned to the less important task of protecting inter-colonial 
shipping. As a result of the navy’s use of large ships in American waters, the size and 
frequency of their captures contrasts significantly with those of privateering vessels; 
while the navy was able to capture larger vessels because of their size and firepower, 
privateers were able to capture far greater numbers because of their speed. In waters
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where the majority of shipping could easily outrun large ships, naval commanders 
often had to be content with trying to intercept the occasional French Atlantic convoys 
that visited their colonies in the Americas. In the wars of the 1740s, by contrast, with 
the development of Spanish, and especially French commerce, the situation changed 
slightly. According to Swanson, the average tonnage, crew size and ordnance for the 
prizes captured between 1739 and 1748 was 244, 96, 32 (Spanish) and 255, 119,26  
(French)."® This body of shipping, far greater in size and increased in strength by 
heavier armaments and larger crews, must have meant that the size and strength of 
British-colonial privateers increased compared with the W ar of the Spanish 
Succession. The work of Swanson again confirms this assumption, stating that the 
average tonnage, crew size and ordnance of British-colonial privateers between 1739 
and 1748 was 138, 89 and 30 respectively.'®® By responding in this way, privateers 
were able to maintain their superiority over the navy in the prize war, recording 762 
captures in comparison with 339.'®' Of these 339 captures, however, a greater 
proportion were likely to have been colonial vessels on route to France rather than 
the other way around, which appears to have been the case for the most part in the 
W ar of the Spanish Succession.
The best privateers in the early eighteenth century were fast, weatherly 
vessels, able to sail well In a breeze and In light airs. A heavy armament was 
relatively unimportant as privateers rarely fought stronger enemy opposition, where 
the risks to crew and ship were greater. Privateersmen were notoriously uninterested 
in glory in any case. Large crews were preferred instead of heavy armaments; 
overtaking and then overpowering smaller crews was the most efficient means of 
capturing enemy shipping. Long drawn out sea battles commonly resulted in damage 
to the prize, which reduced its resale value, and to the privateer, which led to 
expensive and time-consuming repairs. Privateers generally only fired a shot or two
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to encourage their prospective prey to surrender. Indeed, when confronted with a well 
manned privateer, few merchant crews seemed willing to fight. In 1708, for instance, 
Captain Gale was forced to surrender his ship to a French privateer with only 8 guns 
compared to his 12, because his men refused to fight against an opposition crew five 
times as large as their own. Gale noted that while his “men seemed with great 
courage to Resolve upon a vigorous defence...upon the push most of them soone 
changed their minds and basely refusing to take up arms, shrank down into the 
hold.”^^  ^ Large crews were crucial in helping privateers to overhaul colonial shipping, 
which was often of the same construction and tonnage. According to Crowhurst, “a 
large crew could handle the sails and rigging more quickly than the small crews 
normally found on merchantmen and could make the ship sail faster by making her 
more responsive to changes in the strength and direction of the wind.”^^  ^
Consequently, even when they were lightened, by throwing their cargo and guns 
overboard, merchant vessels seldom escaped a privateer. In the matter of strength, 
privateers needed only to be strong enough to withstand the strain of carrying a 
heavy press of sail, a large crew, and the recoil of a light battery. According to 
Chapelle:
Weight could be kept out of the ends of the ships, which enabled light 
construction to be used. As no great weights, such as cargo or stores, had to be 
provided for, the displacement needed only to be sufficient to support the light 
hull construction, a small battery, a small amount of provisions and stores, 
some ballast and a large crew. Because the cruise of a privateer was usually 
short and as the crew was rapidly reduced as prizes were taken and sent into 
port, the amount of provisions, water, stores and ammunition was not very 
great. And since only valuable goods were commonly of little weight and bulk, 
there was little need for cargo capacity.
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IV
Privateering adversely affected British-colonial commerce both directly and indirectly. 
It affected both the operation of British-colonial commerce, as well as Its protection. 
Privateering was an extremely popular activity. It promised a more attractive lifestyle, 
as well as the prospect of windfall profits. The chance to serve on privateers was 
eagerly sought after by sailors. Merchant seamen formed the vast majority of 
privateersmen. Only a small minority came from the navy, who kept their crews in 
prison-like conditions to ensure that they had little opportunity to desert. Privateers, 
by reducing the number of available seamen, thus directly affected the ability of 
merchant vessels to fill their complements. Furthermore, wages rose when there was 
a dearth of sailors, adding sometimes so much to the cost of transportation that 
profits were significantly reduced.
Privateers were fitted out primarily as a business investment. They were 
intended to make windfall profits for their owners and crew. In contrast to the navy, 
their role in the protection of trade was limited. Privateers were expected to aid British 
vessels under attack, according to the provisions of their commissions. However, 
there are very few instances when any assistance was given. Indeed, privateers often 
did more harm than good. According to Ruth Bourne, the privateers of the West 
Indies
...took off the islands’ sailors, stores and provisions, for which they would offer 
better and more immediate payment than the navy did. They were never under 
the control of naval officers, and might promise to join an expedition and then 
leave it when their aid was most needed.^^®
Privateers only actively pursued enemy predators when they were hired as coast 
guard ships. Private men-of-war were in the business of hunting enemy
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merchantmen, and as such, restricted their cruising to the French and Spanish 
shipping lanes. Few prizes were to be found in British-colonial shipping lanes, only 
the prospect of encountering French corsairs, or worse stiil, French naval squadrons. 
Engagements with such opponents usually resulted in damage that could not be 
easily repaired, owing to the scarcity, and consequent expense, of naval stores. 
Indeed, privateer captains were often instructed to avoid confrontation with enemy 
vessels, even merchantmen, that appeared to be well-armed.
In addition to the limited direct role privateers played in trade protection, they 
also indirectly affected the ability of the Royal Navy to protect British-colonial 
commerce. Privateers reduced numbers of available seamen and encouraged naval 
tars to desert. The navy probably lost far more men to commercial and privateering 
vessels than they gained in impressment. The likelihood of death or the loss of years 
of back pay, often years in arrears, did not seem to deter seamen from deserting. 
Seamen might desert for as little as £10 in cash and ten gallons of rum offered by a 
privateer or merchant skipper. Captain John Evans, commander of H.M.S Burford, 
stated in a letter to the Admiralty in 1707, that “though there is 15 months [pay] due to 
the men it is no hindrance to them from running away.” Evans further appealed for a 
punishment “more terrible than death, which happens so seldom to them that it is 
become no terror, and when it happens they say it is not a minutes pain."
When the navy was short of men, trade protection suffered. Cruisers, 
intended to patrol coastlines and the shipping routes of inter-colonial trade, as well as 
convoy escorts, intended to accompany the main homeward bound convoys, were 
often forced to remain in port until sufficient men could be found to enable them to 
sail. As a consequence, not only were individual inter-colonial ships and convoy 
'runners' lost for lack of cruiser protection, but markets could be missed and 
perishable cargoes ruined by delays in the departure of convoys.
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Conditions in the navy were such that large numbers of men were lost to 
illness and disease, particularly in the West Indies. Disease related deaths far 
outweighed those resulting from battle; of the 4,000 men brought by Benbow to 
Jamaica in 1701, 1,000 were soon iost to death. Losses to plague were so great in 
Admiral W ager’s squadron in 1709, furthermore, that a fifth of his men were in fact 
soldiers from Governor Handasyd’s regiment. Attempts to make good these 
deficiencies, in North American and Caribbean ports where white men sometimes 
only formed a small percentage of the population and where the majority of sailors 
were either already serving on privateers or intended to do so, was almost 
impossible. Free men and sailors in the colonies were as unlikely to enlist voluntarily 
as their English counterparts. The navy's response to this situation was to impress 
men both on shore and at sea. Merchant vessels, which were viewed by the 
Admiralty as training ships for the navy, suffered heavily from impressment. In 
peacetime, when privateering was outlawed, press gangs had a surplus of 
unemployed sailors to prey on. In wartime this situation changed dramatically, as few 
sailors were to be found unemployed on shore and pressing in the colonies was 
forbidden by the ‘America Act’.
In England, if a ship-of-war needed sailors, the press gang, armed with a 
warrant from the Admiralty, appeared in the nearest harbour to claim unfortunate 
victims from merchant vessels. Sometimes the press gang worked on shore, rounding 
up sailors in the streets, seizing some in the public houses, and even dragging others 
from their beds. While impressment had no legal grounding. Its practice in home 
waters was tolerated as a necessary means to man the navy. As such, the practice 
was restricted within accepted norms. Men were only supposed to be impressed from 
inward bound ships. Outward bound merchantmen were theoretically off limits. 
Commerce dictated this concession because outward bound vessels denuded of
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sailors might be incapable of completing their voyages, and trade wouid suffer. 
Manpower losses from nearly completed voyages, however, were not as serious for 
the owners of merchantmen. The normal method of interception, according to 
Course,
...was for the vessel engaged in impressment to fire a gun across the merchant 
ship's bow to enforce her to heave-to for the press gang to board...When the 
boarding party meet no opposition, the officer in charge, to give some 
sembiance legality, showed his press warrant to the master of the boarded ship 
and had her crew mustered for inspection. Exemption certificates were 
examined and the number of crew were checked against the number on the 
ship's Articles. Those entered as having deserted or drowned at sea were 
searched for throughout the ship. Outward bound ships were also searched and 
only the bare minimum left for their respective tonnage...A seaman impressed 
from a homeward bound ship was entitled to his wages up to the day he was 
impressed; and the master was bound to provide him with a certificate stating 
the money due to him. it was drawn on the ship-owners and payable on 
demand. The officer in charge of the press gang had to see that the certificates 
were issued to the seamen.^^^
in American waters, far removed from the restraining influence of the 
authorities in England, naval commanders were often inclined to disregard the rules 
and statutes designed to regulate the press and prevent injustice and h a r d s h i p . i n  
the late seventeenth century, while governors were instructed by royal proclamation 
to supply H.M. ships with seamen when available, commanders stationed in North 
American and Caribbean waters were only permitted to ask governors for assistance 
in manning their vessels. They were forbidden "to impress any Men from Merchant 
Ships in the Plantations without applying to, and receiving the Consent of, the
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respective G o v e r n o r s . T h e s e  instructions were habitually ignored. Complaints 
were voiced concerning virtually every squadron that was sent to the West Indies 
throughout the W ar of the Spanish Succession. Jamaicans lamented in 1701 that the 
impressment of Admiral Benbow was driving all the free men and privateers to 
Curacao. Rear-Admiral Graydon’s impressment of Peter Beckford’s son in the 
summer of 1703 heralded yet further condemnation:
If the Lord High Admirai suffers this, H.M. had better send for us all home, for 
the enemy may doe what they please with us, for they have now frighted away 
all the seafaring men, who will never come amongst us, and they were of 10 to 
1 more service to us than 10 regiments of souldiers. We have within this 8 
months lost above 1,200 seamen, and this finishing stroke has frighted all that 
were ieft.^ ^^
In 1708, Admiral W ager lost so many seamen to plague that he impressed virtually 
everyone he could get hold of, until even servants began to run away into the hills. 
Ships from the northern colonies also began to avoid the W est Indies, leading to 
provisions becoming scarce and dear. While impressment was certainly more 
widespread in the West Indies, owing to the greater numbers of naval vessels 
attending the islands, it was a problem further north as well. In 1702, for example. 
Captain Jackson of H.M. sloop Swift impressed men both in the harbour and ashore 
in Boston. In at least two instances his gang seized the entire crew, leaving vessels 
without a soul aboard.
The manning problem in the West Indies was such that captains had little 
choice but to resort to impressment. Tropical fevers, abetted by rum drinking and a 
heavy diet of salted pork, aggravated an already endemic shortage of seamen 
occasioned by desertion to the many privateers and merchant vessels that operated
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in the area. While Impressment certainly helped the navy perform its trade protection 
duties more effectively, its wider negative effect on W est Indian commerce and 
economic development was potentially extremely serious. The staple agriculture of 
the W est Indies meant that it was heavily dependent on supplies from North America. 
According to a survey of Canada in 1708:
There is no Island the British posses in the West indies that is capable of 
subsisting without the assistance of the Continet, for to them we transport their 
bread, drink, and ail the necessaryes of humane life, their cattle and horses for 
cultivating their plantations, lumber and staves of all sorts to make casks for 
their rumm, suagr and molosses, without which they could have none, ships to 
transport their goods to the European marketts, nay, in short, the very houses 
they inhabitt are carryed over in frames, together with the shingles that cover 
them, in so much that their very being, much more well-being depends almost 
entirely on the Continent.^^^
Impressment threatened this supply of provisions and manufactures as trading 
vessels avoided ports in the West Indies where they expected to meet naval press 
gangs. Indeed, the fear of service in the navy was so great, according to Ruth 
Bourne, that vessels from North America preferred to trade illegally with the French 
islands than legally with the West Indies.^^  ^ Provision ships scheduled to sail to the 
northern colonies were also affected as if a man-of-war so much as appeared in the 
offing, sailors deserted their ships without warning. When seamen could not escape, 
masters complained that their vessels were lost in storms because there were not 
enough men left to bring them home in safety.’^  In these ways, the navy frustrated 
the regular course of commerce, at best, and at worst, threatened the very survival of 
West Indian port towns.
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Merchant opposition increased as instances of illegal impressment mounted 
up. Only in 1707, however, was any kind of measure of reform achieved. Prompted 
by a petition of 150 merchants, describing the disasters to commerce resulting from 
impressment in America and the West Indies, the ‘America Act' included a clause 
forbidding impressment in the colonies. All seamen serving on privateers and trading 
vessels were spared from impressment, unless it could be proved that they were 
naval deserters. For a time, the right of governors to grant captains permission to 
impress men caused a certain amount of confusion; the general feeling was that 
governors were not denied the right to impress seamen. After 1709, however, 
following the advice of the Earl of Sunderland, the Board of Trade took action to 
reword their instructions to colonial governors. The manning problems of the navy 
were dealt with in a number of ways, most notably by a clause in the ‘America Act’ 
which provided that trading ships and packet boats should take extra seamen to 
America for the use of the Queen's ships there.
V
In opposition to the British predators were large numbers of French privateers. Like 
their British counterparts, they operated off the North American coast, as well as in 
Caribbean waters. Their numbers reflected not only the steady commercial and 
maritime growth in the late seventeenth century, which increased the number of 
available prizes, but also the French strategy of guerre de course, which encouraged 
the fitting out of private men-of-war.
Starting with the discovery in 1614-16, that Virginia could produce tobacco 
that sold readily in Europe, steady commercial and maritime expansion was 
witnessed in England's Atlantic colonial empire. The 1620s and 1630s saw the 
development of colonies in the West Indies, which through the production of
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cheapened sugar, once a luxury product of the Mediterranean, quickly established 
themselves as England’s most important overseas possession.
The value of American trade was small before the Civil War. Tobacco exports 
were negligible and the northern colonies that clustered around Massachusetts sent 
only a few furs and some timber to Europe. During the two decades of the Civil W ar 
and Interregnum, however, Atlantic colonial trade leaped suddenly from triviality into 
great importance. Statistics of the 1660s, show the colonies supplying an eighth of 
London’s imports, with the total rising rapidly year by year.
The growth of cheap tobacco from Virginia and Maryland, heralded the 
development of a new fashion, which spread down through all social classes. 
Between 1615 and 1700, English tobacco imports rose from 50 thousand to 38 
million Ibs.^^  ^W est Indian sugar also became highly desirable by the increasing use 
of fresh and dried fruits, as well as the drinking of coffee. English merchants were 
quick to capture the northern market from the Portuguese, by producing sugar more 
cheaply than Brazil. The average annual value of sugar imports, between 1699-1701, 
amounted to £630,000, while the sugar trade employed 7% of English merchant 
tonnage and constituted 11% of English overseas trade in 1700. Large sugar estates 
soon became crucial to the health of the Caribbean economy.^^® Jamaica’s sugar 
industry was particularly well established by the 1670s.
Imperial warfare in the closing decades of the seventeenth century saw a 
slowing of sugar exports to England. It recovered quickly once peace was signed, 
and by 1704 was back up to its former ievel.^^® Sir William Beeston recorded a figure 
of 13,000 hogsheads in the years immediately following 1700. This slow growth 
continued throughout the W ar of the Spanish Succession. The Manuscripts of the 
House of Lords record a figure of 15,000 hogshead for the period 1706-1710. Sugar 
was fast becoming England's second most important import behind l i n e n . B y  1700,
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England supplied Europe with a wide variety of colonial goods. Two thirds of all 
tobacco imports and half of sugar were re-exported to Europe. Indeed, while the 
Dutch were contained by the Navigation Acts, and French colonial enterprise was 
held back by internal troubles in the mid century decades, England became a great 
entrepot.
While the almost constant state of war between 1689-1713 checked the 
growth of colonial commerce, there was no sign of a decline because of such events. 
According to Paul Kennedy, "Britain’s financial sinews could take the strain of war, 
her shipping could carry on despite the depredations of privateers, her trades could 
find alternatives to closed markets, and certain industries [shipbuilding] were 
stimulated by armaments o r d e r s . T h e  rice trade of South Carolina began to rise in 
the last decades of the seventeenth century, for instance, finding new markets in 
southern Europe.
Dramatic increases in convoy size in the eighteenth century reflect the 
advances made in colonial commerce in the seventeenth century. Prior to 1700, 
convoys from the Chesapeake contained on average about 50 ships. In the following 
period there were often 150-200 ships in each one. By the standards prevailing later 
in the eighteenth century these were exceptionally large.
Large numbers of French privateers were commissioned in the W ar of the 
Spanish Succession. The development of British inter-colonial and Atlantic trade was 
central to this fact, as was the French government’s encouragement of a war on 
trade. This strategy, known as guerre de course, was primarily carried-out by 
privateers; the French navy played but a minor role. The attraction of privateering for 
the French government can be explained in a variety of ways. The cost of warfare in 
the late seventeenth century resulted in acute financial distress in France. 
Concentration on expensive campaigns in Europe left less and less available for the
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French navy; a budget of 18 million livres, which was insufficient in 1700, dropped to 
seven or eight million as the war progressed/'*^ No new naval vessels were being 
built and those already afloat frequently lacked essential materials for repairs. In 
these circumstances, France depended on private investment to utilize its naval 
resources. Only ships of the line, which might be deployed in the Brest or Toulon 
squadrons or occasional foreign operations, such as escorting home the Spanish 
treasure fleet, were maintained financially by the state.*'*'* The vast majority of smaller 
vessels, fourth rates down to light frigates and galleys, were laid up, reliant on private 
armateurs to fit them out as privateers. Often it was naval officers, whose chance of 
seeing offensive action and its potential rewards dwindled as their ships lay rotting in 
harbour, who took the initiative in proposing armaments and negotiating subscriptions 
for them.
The loan of naval vessels, of which instances are recorded as early as 1689, 
was not the mere product of financial necessity. It also implied a positive strategic 
plan for the application of naval power to the special circumstances of bringing two 
world trading powers to their knees. In a prolonged war stretching across western 
Europe, the English and Dutch were far more dependent on the profits of overseas 
trade for the continuation of the war, than were the French, whose internal resources 
could sustain her needs. The systematic destruction of Anglo-Dutch commerce was 
understandably seen as a good way to undermine the allied war effort. Powerful men 
in government were involved in privateering. Marshal Vauban invested his personal 
capital with private armateurs, as did many other French courtiers.
The French navy’s inability to maintain a mastery of the seas also helps to 
explain the periodic adoption of a privateering guerre de course. The naval defeat at 
La Hogue in 1692 proved to be a crucial turning point in Louis XlV's eyes, which had 
always been fixed on the Rhine rather than the Atlantic. Under the influence of anti-
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navalists in his ministry, notably Louvois, the Minister of War, Louis was quickly 
persuaded that military operations alone were decisive to the war effort. Thereafter, a 
belief developed that it was useless to make sacrifices to achieve sea power, which 
had little effect on the destinies of the continental state.*'*^ In the early 1690s, the 
navy built up by Colbert was a force so strong that it could meet the three other 
maritime powers on equal terms. According to E.H. Jenkins, "The ships were 
splendid, the corps of officers was skillful and spirited, the gunnery good and the 
organisation sound."*'*® After 1693, however, Colbert’s successor, Pontchartrain, 
allowed the navy to run down to a large extent. When a grain famine hit in the years 
1694-5, leading to a fall in tax revenue, the French went so far as to lay up the battle 
fleet altogether and to rely entirely on privateers. State resources were put behind the 
privateering, although Vauban’s recommendation that three naval squadrons should 
support the privateers was rendered impossible by the run-down state of the royal 
fleet.
French guerre de course had many faults. According to Nicholas Tracy, 
“Dependence upon private commercial motive reduced the strategic and macro- 
economic utility of the French guerre de course because armateurs did not cooperate 
with each other.” Tracy goes on:
...the manner in which privateers, especially those of France, came to accept 
ransoms for their prizes, indicates that very little consideration was given to the 
possibility of denying supplies to the enemy. Privateersmen earned a profit by 
taking ransoms, but the effect on the enemy of their depredations was reduced 
to the level of a war tax. The merchants’ sufferings might evoke pity, and could 
in the long-term lead to important loss in government revenue, but in the short 
term they could hardly make the enemy’s prosecution of the war impossible.*'*^
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French guerre de course did, however, inflict substantial losses on Anglo-Dutch 
shipping. According to a contemporary Venetian, in the period 1688-1695, French 
privateers captured more than 900 English and Dutch ships.*'*® The greatest disaster 
occurred in 1693 with the spectacular capture of the Smyrna convoy, causing a revolt 
in the House of Commons.*'*® As a result, a requirement that extra naval forces 
should be created for the defense of trade was tacked onto the 1694 Land Tax Bill. 
Furthermore, the privateering exploits of Jean Bart in the latter stages of the Nine 
Years War made him a source of popular adulation well into the eighteenth century.
During the years of peace after King William’s War, while the English 
strengthened their navy, France did not. Pontchartrain’s younger son, Jerome, who 
succeeded him as Minister of War, continued his father’s tight-fisted disparaging of 
the service he administered. After the inconclusive fleet action at Malaga in 1704, the 
pattern of the previous war was repeated as naval ships, their crews, the money for 
their maintenance, and naval stores from the royal arsenal, was given over to another 
guerre de course.
This wholesale change of strategy seems an odd decision. The large French 
fleet that put to sea in 1704, for instance, by compelling the English to concentrate 
their naval forces, enabled her privateers "to operate more freely than they had done 
before, or were to do later, and the Spanish treasure came home without the least 
interference."*®® The French did plan to fit out a fleet of some 70 ships in 1705. The 
run down state of royal finances and the royal arsenal, however, meant that private 
armateurs were again relied upon to continue the maritime war. This decision was 
made easier by the fact that the King stood to make a profitable return from any 
captures made. The crown agreed to provide the ship, guns, spare parts and 
munitions for a given period, as well as supply officers, seamen, soldiers, and wages. 
The armateurs were expected to pay for the fitting out of the ships, any additional
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pay, as well as provisions for the crew. The King would not expect compensation for 
any ships lost in battle or by the hazards of seafaring, nor for any consumption of 
ammunition or spare masts or sails, and the ship shouid be used entirely as the 
armateurs wished. The Crown was to receive a fifth of the profits, while if there were 
no profits the armateurs were to lose their money. *®*
With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that official indifference to the 
gradual decline of the French navy, from the early 1690s, was a long-term strategic 
mistake. As G.N. Clark has noted, attacks on shipping did not further the strategic 
purposes of either side, but were mutually war-losing:
There is a general consensus of contemporary and later judgements that, on all 
sides, the nations ended the war in part because, indecisive as the campaigns 
had been, economic resources were worn out. It would be vain to look for any 
discussion by the statesmen of that war how such a prevention of a military 
solution, couid be averted in the future...[but] it may be inferred from the 
general cause of events in the next two generations that the war on French 
trade had, in its outcome, disappointed.*®^
The British suffered less by the fact that they strengthened their navy at the same 
time as commissioning privateers. In the time of Colbert, the French navy was second 
to none. By the end of the W ar of the Spanish Succession, in contrast, the Royal 
Navy was firmly in control; every French overseas possession lay at England’s mercy.
French commerce raiding was pursued in two ways. On the one hand, small 
squadrons of naval ships, usually crack frigates accompanied by a host of privateers, 
would attack allied fleets under convoy. Naval commanders were expected to engage 
the convoy escorts, while the privateers rounded up the merchant vessels. On the 
other hand, privateers, playing a lone hand or cruising in small, loosely organised
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groups, operated in open water or near the coast for unconvoyed ’runners’ or 
stragglers from convoyed fleets. These lone raiders also frequently plunged into 
weakly defended bays and harbours in the hope of capturing fishing vessels and 
coasters.
The former of these two options was primarily restricted to the Mediterranean. 
Light frigates and galieys, between 28 and 48 guns, were principally used. The latter, 
by contrast, which consisted of a mass of wholly private and usually small 
armaments, was most notable in the damage it did to the seagoing trade of the Allies 
in the Atlantic. These privateers, of some 26 down to 6 guns or less, capable of close 
inshore sailing and nimble enough to ’wrong’ a man-of-war, were responsible for the 
more of less unremitting pressure on enemy coasts and sea-ianes. They captured 
most of the prizes, with or without the countenance of French naval squadrons.*®® 
They could be kept at sea for two months or longer; some of them returned to it 
several times a year, and year after year, without being caught. Only small naval 
frigates could hope to keep up with the speed and maneuverability of fast-sailing 
sloops and brigantines commonly used as privateers. French prisoners were often 
heard to brag that they believed it was virtually impossible for the Royal Navy to catch 
French privateers. Royal Navy commanders were often in agreement. Captain 
Constable, who cruised at Barbados in 1711, warned the governor and council of his 
inability to catch the French privateers on the coast:
...which saile so very well that in Such smooth seas as Wee generally have 
here It Is absolutely impossible for any Man of War to come up with them. And 
upon seeing any Man of War in the Latitude they only stretch farther to 
windward and continue cruising for our mercht. Vessels and often do take 
them.*®'*
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The commanders of naval guard ships often had to look on helplessly as French 
privateers captured English merchantmen right under their noses. Nicholas Smith, 
commander of H.M.S. Enterprise, reported just such an occurrence in a letter to 
Colonel Jennings, dated April 1710:
I am sorry to acquaint you that I yesterday saw a British ship taken by a Sioop 
of the Enemys’ & was so unfortunate as not to have it in my power to prevent 
it...the wind biew right in, so that I was forced to make a great many trips to 
little purpose - whilst this was doing, the Privateer comes up with the 
Merchantman...& upon the firing of a Single gun. Struck his Colours...! 
continued in pursute of them (tho’ I found I lost ground) till Ten at night, They 
then being out of sight &c.*®®
When guard ships attempted to capture enemy predators inshore, they were often 
wrecked because of their size. H.M.S Dunkirk’s Prize was lost, for instance, trying to 
chase a small French privateer into shallow water off Cape Francois on Hispaniola. 
Governors and naval commanders were in total agreement over the need to fit out 
fast-sailing frigates as guard ships that could follow enemy vessels into shoal water 
or along navigable rivers. A lack of funds nearly always put pay to these plans.
French privateers did not always operate independently, but sometimes acted 
directly in support of regular military-naval operations. The French naval squadron 
commanded by D'Iberville, that attacked Nevis in 1706, was made up of several 
French privateers. The Spanish attack on Charleston in 1707, also used the services 
of French privateers, this time as troop transports.
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VI
The French colonies In America {viz. Martinque, Guadaloupe, Saint-Dominque and 
Cayenne in the Caribbean, as well as Acadia, Placentia and Quebec in North 
America) all fitted out privateers In the W ar of the Spanish Succession. From these 
bases none of Britain’s Caribbean or mainland colonies could feel secure. French 
privateers attacked British commerce at its weakest points, along the Carolina coast 
and the capes of Virginia and Delaware, as well as in the Caribbean. The British 
Leeward and Windward Islands were a major focus for the privateers of Martinique, 
Guadaloupe, Marie Galante and Dominica. In this area, the large force of guard ships 
stationed at Jamaica could offer little assistance. The rich sugar trade of Barbados 
was worst affected. Governor Sir B. Granville complained in a letter to the Council of 
Trade and Plantations in September 1704, for instance, that "The French privateers 
infest very much our latitude and make many prizes. They are nimble saylers and the 
Queen’s ships not able to come up with them."*®® In the first eight months of 1704 
alone, French privateers captured 26 vessels from Barbados.*®^ The Windward 
Islands were at least relatively safe from invasion; Barbados was particularly 
fortunate that it had no good harbours and navigabie rivers along which enemy forces 
could mount an offensive. Smaller and less economically significant colonies in the 
Leeward Islands were far less fortunate. Not only were they far more accessible to 
the enemy, but they were afforded very little, if any, naval protection. As a result, not 
only were a great number of shipping captures made, but the very survival of many 
islands was threatened on a regular basis. The French attack on Nevis in 1706, for 
example, left the islanders desolate and defenseless. Another French force, financed 
by Versailles, and commanded by Jacques Cassard, attacked Antigua in August 
1712. Earlier in 1710, the fortuitous meeting of H.M.S Newcastle with a French 
privateering force, carrying 1,200 men, saved Antigua from almost inevitable
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capture.*®® A letter written from Antigua by Jonathan Dickenson in March 1710, nicely 
sums up the precarious situation:
The Caribbee Isles are so much troubled with the French Privateers from 
Martinico [Martinique], that no Vessel I can pass in or out for them, Monserat 
they attempted to attack with six sail of their privateers, but were repulsed on 
their Landing: They have plundered the Dutch Island named Stacia: about two 
months since a small Gaily belonging to Leverpoole [Liverpool], last from 
Dublin, intending for Antigua, the evening before she made the Island of Antigua 
a French Privateer Sioop came upwith her, lay by all night and about 5 in the 
Morning attack’d the Gaily with a Design to board her but the Leverpoole having 
provided broken Glass bottles with which he covered his Decks and retiring to 
his close quarters; as the Privateer came up, he so levelled his Chase Guns 
upon him that he made a Lane fore and aft on the Frenchmans Decks, who still 
advanced and boarded him. But finding it impossible to keep the gaily Decks by 
reason of their warm fire from their close quarters Powder Chests so they were 
obliged to retire. This is the more remarkable because almost every week since 
I have been at Antigua, we have heard of Our Vessel Is being taken and carried 
into Martinico.*®®
Jamaica, in the northern Caribbean, was principally threatened from privateers 
operating out of the harbours of Petit Guave and Leogane on Hispaniola. They 
annoyed the English fleets going through the Gulf of Florida, over to the Spanish 
coast, or up through the Windward Passage between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico on 
their way home.
French privateers, coming up from the Caribbean or down from Acadia and 
Placentia, also cruised along the North American coastline. They preyed on the trade 
of South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland and New York, safe in the knowledge that
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reprovisioning, repair, or condemnation, couid be carried at France's northern bases. 
Carolina was an important privateering target owing to its extensive trade in rice and 
naval stores. Charleston’s shortage of shipping also meant that few British privateers 
cruised in opposition to those of the French, in addition, the many capes and islands 
off the Carolina coast provided sheltered rendezvous points; enemy commanders 
sent prizes to Ocracoke Island near Cape Hatteras and Cape Lookout for 
safekeeping until they were ready to sail home. Privateers also took on water and 
slaughtered beef in the Outer Banks.
The popularity of privateering in and around the Chesapeake Bay area 
stemmed from the fact that the extensive trade of Virginia and Maryland passed 
between a narrow twelve mile channel, between Cape Charles and Cape Henry, that 
was to too wide for a fort to command, but narrow enough for merchantmen to find it 
extremely hard to escape from enemy privateers. As a result, losses of incoming 
merchant vessels carrying hardware, wine, textiles, and other European goods, and 
outgoing merchantmen laden with tobacco and wheat, were relatively common. 
Indeed, such was the effect of French captures in the first year of the war, that half 
the tobacco crop of Virginia and Maryland remained in those colonies for want of 
ships.*®® By 1705 it was reported that the colony of Massachusetts had lost 140 
vessels to French privateers.*®* Some of the more enterprising privateers also looted 
estates that lay along open rivers. The President of the Council of Virginia 
complained to the Board of Trade in 1707 that "it is easy for a privateer to land at any 
of these places in the night, and surprise people in their beds." *®^
The Delaware Capes were another popular cruising ground. Between Cape 
May, New Jersey, and Cape Henlopen, lay the entrance to Delaware Bay. The 
maritime commerce of Philadelphia passed through this narrow twelve and a half mile 
channel. These capes, like those of Virginia, funnelled British merchantmen through
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the slender passage and greatly eased cruising operations for enemy privateers. 
Pennsylvania vessels laden with bread, flour, other foodstuffs, and lumber for casks, 
bound for Europe or the West Indies, became easy targets. Philadelphia bound 
merchantmen with European and Caribbean cargoes ran this gauntlet as well. *®®
In the western Caribbean, privateers from Cap Francois on Saint-Dominque 
were ideally placed to inflict depredations on the sugar trade of Jamaica, which sailed 
through the Yucatan Channel, west of Cuba, to the Straits of Florida, or through the 
Windward Passage between Cuba and Saint-Dominque. Jamaica’s valuable 
Spanish-American trade was also raided in the vital zone between Rio de la Hacha 
and the Rio Chagre.*®'* Governor Handasyd, in a letter to Mr. Burchett, described 
Jamaica as “infested with French privateers” in December 1709. *®®
VII
Estimating the effect of French privateering in terms of captures is a difficult task; not 
only did British colonial authorities and merchants frequently overestimate shipping 
losses, but French authorities often failed to properly record captures. The Conseil 
des Prises recorded 18 prizes taken into Martinique in 1703, 75 in 1711, but strangely 
no records at all for the period 1705-6 when the prize war was at its peak.*®® A variety 
of estimates, both contemporary and modern, do exist to help the historian in 
assessing the effect of French privateering on British commerce and economic 
development. The Admiralty acknowledged in 1707 that 1146 English ships had been 
lost. Ralph Davis has calculated, furthermore, a minimum loss of 2000 ships to 
French privateers, while John Bromley puts the figure up as high as 4544 prizes, with 
a further 2118 ships ransomed. Out of a total of 4173 prizes taken by French 
privateers in the W ar of the Spanish Succession, the Conseil des Prises estimated
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only 370 to have been taken Into the French colonies in America, (viz. 260 to 
Martinique, 4 to Guadaloupe, 12 to Cayenne, 18 to Acadia, 63 to Placentia, 7 to 
Quebec, and 4 simply described as 'Amérique'. The only reference to Saint- 
Dominique is a single ransom confirmed at Cap Francois.) These figures seem low 
even when compared against the most conservative of colonial estimates. Indeed, if 
one combines captures reported by English and French colonial governors, as well as 
the condemnations registered in Valincour's Dépouillement, a minimum of 700 
colonial prizes is perfectly credible, and there were perhaps as many ransoms.*®^ My 
own data file, which must be considered extremely limited from the French 
perspective, records 132 English vessels captured by the French, with one source 
stating that 58 prizes were brought into Martinique between July 1710 and May 1712, 
when the war was undeniably winding down.
If one takes the value of colonial imports to England as an indication of the 
effect of the French privateering war, then the period 1702-6 appears to have been 
the worst years for Jamaica: average imports totaled £151,000, compared with 
£216,000 for the last six years of the war. A low of £75,000 is recorded for 1705. This 
fits in with the French resumption of guerre de course. By 1709, Jamaica's imports 
were back up to the level of 1700 - £239,000 and £238,000 respectively. The years 
1702-4 appear to have been worst for Barbados, showing an average value of 
£125,000, compared with £256,000 for the 1704-12 period. A low of £114,000 is 
recorded for 1702 .1707  was an exception to the general rise after 1704, with imports 
only totaling £197,000, compared with £303,000 for the preceding year. The effects 
of French privateering were felt far more sporadically on the colonial imports of 
Virginia and Maryland than the Caribbean colonies. The worst years were 1702, 
1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, and 1711: £72,000, £60,000, £58,000, £79,000, £80,000,
and £92,000 respectively, compared with an average of £174,000 for the five other 
years of the war. *®®
W hen comparing aggregate captures between the wars of the late 
seventeenth century and the W ar of the Spanish Succession, an increase can be 
seen over time.**"® According to Nicholas Tracy, however, comparing aggregate 
captures does not reflect their true effect, for one must remember that the size and 
relative strength of the English maritime marine and the British navy were also 
increasing. This meant that the actual losses inflicted on British shipping were 
gradually diminishing in scale. This trend can be seen throughout the eighteenth 
century. The 3000 British ships estimated by the Gentlemen’s Magazine to have been 
taken by the enemy in the wars of the 1740s did not reflect an increased loss over 
that suffered in the period 1702-12, in proportion to the expanded British merchant 
fleet. The 3386 vessels estimated to have been lost during the American 
Revolutionary War, similarly, represented a loss rate of half that suffered in 1702- 
12.*^* This fact is true for levels of colonial captures as well. Swanson’s estimate of 
736 French and Spanish captures in the wars of the 1740s, while marginally higher in 
aggregate terms than those taken in the W ar of the Spanish Succession, is in Its 
effect probably a reduction.
Martinique was by far the most active of the French Islands in privateering. Its 
privateers were a frequent source of comment In colonial correspondence. William 
Burt complained in a ietter to Mr. Dummer, in June 1703, for instance, that
...the French from Martinique and Guadaloupe have fitted out 18 sail of 
privateers chiefly man'd by their mean planters that would otherwise starve.
They are so thick amongst these Islands [West Indies], that we can't sail from 
Island to Island but with more hazard then between England and this place; 
hardly a vessel in 3 escapes.*^®
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Intelligence from former prisoners of war held on Martinique also painted a bleak 
picture. James Spencer, master of a vessel which had been captured by a French 
privateer and carried into Martinique, noted that there were 27 privateers fitted out 
from Martinique.*^'* Another English prisoner of war, writing to the Commissioners of 
Sick and Wounded in April 1705, stated that Martinique "had 23 privateers and 1400 
men wholly dependent on privateering. Since the start of the war they had taken 240 
prizes and 2,000 prisoners."**'® A number of other reports also talked of large 
numbers of captures. Charles Farnam, master of the ship S t Jacob and Philip, 
reported that whilst he was a prisoner of war on Martinique the French had captured 
130 vessels.**^® Another report in June 1704 put the number of captures at 163.**^ 
The vast majority of these captures were made in the Caribbean. In response, 
colonial authorities and merchants frequently called for the suppression of 
Martinique's privateers. This was to be achieved in two ways: firstly, by the Admiralty 
providing extra guard ships; and secondly, through the capture of Martinique. *^ ®
French privateers from the Caribbean were also active off the coasts of North 
America. Northern bases were a frequent port of call for privateers fitted out and 
commissioned elsewhere. In an official French dispatch from Acadia in January 1710, 
Subercase reported that there were two corsairs in port from Martinique; one having 
brought four small prizes into port, while the other, commanded by the notorious 
French captain, Morpain, brought in nine prizes. He further claimed that they were 
responsible for the loss of 35 New England ships alone. Taking into account the other 
privateers who harassed New England at the time, upwards of 60 vessels from New 
England and the other English colonies in North America can be estimated to have 
been captured in 1710.**'® Indeed, such was the threat from Acadia that frequent 
demands were made for its capture. In October 1709, the governors of
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Massachusetts, New England, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, sent an address 
to the Queen calling for the capture of Port Royal. Acadia was described as having 
"become the receptacle of all privateers, from Martinico [Martinique], and other 
French Isiands, being near hand to carry in their prizes taken along this shoar, even 
from Virginia, And we have suffered very heavy losses by them, in our trade, and 
Navigation, this summer."*®®
While numbers of captures were far fewer off the coasts of North America 
than was the case in the Caribbean, the effect on commerce appears to have been 
no less significant. After a visit to the northern colonies in January 1708, Colonel 
Rhett Quary, an agent of the Board of Trade, stated that "Boston hath been a place 
of great trade, but the war have [sic] extremely impoverished them, so that the trade 
is now 1/3 of what it was." The seriousness of the situation is made clear by 
considering the importance of Boston's shipping. Massachusetts was one of the 
major maritime centres of the Atlantic world in the eighteenth century. It was the 
equivalent of Bristol as a shipping centre, which was itself only second to London. 
Within Massachusetts, most of the colony’s shipping was concentrated in the Boston 
area, which claimed 76.9%  of all ships and 80.1% of all maritime tonnage. Quary 
believed that Britain had to act quickly to correct the situation. He advised that uniess 
aid from Britain was forthcoming, Boston and the whole region would be ruined 
because of the French establishment at Port Royal.*®* Further north, off the coast of 
British Newfoundland, the threat of French privateers was even more serious, as the 
relatively isolated and sparsely populated nature of the region meant that attacks 
were far more daring. The French commander La Grange, for instance, with a force 
of two barques and a hundred men, sailed into the port of Bonavista in 1704 and 
captured a ship of 24 guns loaded with a rich cargo of codfish. He also burned two 
storeships of 200-300 tons each, and sunk another small vessel.*®^ St. John’s was
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also attacked on a number of occasions. In 1705, the town was entirely destroyed by 
a force of 500 troops from Placentia, with the result that the fishery was very much 
curtailed, with only 20 ships arriving from England and only 72,000 qtls. of fish 
exported. In 1708 a similar attack had more devastating consequences, as not only 
was the town destroyed but the garrison was captured as well.
VIII
The total value of prizes captured by French privateers did not represent the whoie 
cost of the prize war. Although each belligerent lost hundreds of thousands of pounds 
sterling in cargoes and vessels, these losses were partially offset at the national level 
by captures made by their own privateers. Indeed, as Ralph Davis has argued, "it is 
far from certain...that captures, numerous as they were, inflicted as much damage on 
the shipowning community as other, less dramatic, features of war."*®'* These other 
features substantially escalated wartime business costs. They included huge 
increases in freight rates, marine insurance premiums, and seamen's wages.
As numbers of captures buiit up, and chance and insecurity came to 
characterize maritime commerce, a decrease in the volume of shipping was 
witnessed. Fewer vessels meant higher freight rates. These rates rose for both inter­
colonial, as well as transatlantic commerce. Freight rates on flour between New York 
and Jamaica rose from a rate of £6 per ton at the start of the war, to £8, 5 shillings by 
1705.*®® Freight rates on tobacco between Maryland and London rose even more 
violently. This reflected the double jeopardy of having to escape predators in 
American, as well as in the European waters.*®® From a rate of £6, 5 shillings per ton 
in 1697, by 1705, the cost had reached £15, rising to a high of £16 in the period 
1707-9, then falling to around £12 for the remainder of the war.*®  ^Homeward freights
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from Barbados never reached a similar level. Bromley notes a high of £10 per ton in 
1708. ®^®
Higher premiums for marine insurance accompanied rising transportation 
costs. French privateers increased the risks of maritime commerce. As a result, more 
merchants sought insurance for their cargoes. The increasing demand for policies, 
and rising incidence of claims, inevitably escalated marine insurance rates. These 
rates while certainly higher in wartime, did not reach exorbitant levels except during 
periods of extreme threat, when the cost of insurance might even swallow up the 
normal profits on the goods If prices could not be pushed up above peacetime levels. 
William Stout, a Virginian merchant, wrote in his journal in 1707, for instance," 
Though at the height of the war, no insurance was then made, which if it had, would 
have exceeded the profit."
Early eighteenth century insurance was neither a serious threat to the 
continuation of trade or a particularly secure means of safeguarding it. While ship­
owners might have to pay higher premiums during wartime, they were able to raise 
the cost of freight rates to compensate for their added expenses. When ships were 
lost at sea, insurance was not such a complete and satisfactory safeguard as it is 
nowadays. Before 1720, the owners would have had to meet 10-20% of the loss 
themselves. They were also likely to find the underwriters when faced with the loss, 
dilatory, obstructive and even at times fraudulent.
Seamen's wages were another business cost that soared during warfare. 
Peacetime rates from the late 17th century, averaged around 24-25 shillings a month. 
In the spring of 1702, by contrast, wages rose to 30 shillings and climbed gradually to 
reach 45-50 shillings in 1708.^^  ^ Higher wages were expected as compensation for 
the risk of being captured by the enemy, as well as impressed into the navy. When 
one considers that the navy was chronically short of seamen and that losses from
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disease and desertion worsened this situation, one can appreciate the risk merchant 
seamen took.
IX
The British navy held a variety of responsibilities in colonial waters. They were 
required to provide guard ships to patrol coastlines and protect inter-colonial trade, as 
well as ensure that transatlantic trade was safely convoyed back to England. The 
distribution of naval resources was determined by the mercantile value of the various 
colonial colonies. The West Indies, therefore, as Britain’s most valuable overseas 
possession, took the lions share of available ships. More northerly coasts, by 
contrast, were usually only given one or two vessels, normally a sixth rate or a sloop- 
of-war. The Chesapeake Bay area was assigned only one cruiser throughout the war. 
This cruiser was intended to protect 'runners' and the sloops and schooners engaged 
in inter-colonial t r a d e . T o  augment these forces, colonial vessels were sometimes 
fitted out on an ad hoc basis to cruise for enemy privateers reported to be off their 
coastlines. Rhode Island was particularly successful in protecting itself in this manner. 
In June 1706, for instance:
A sloop loaded with provisions was taken by a French privateer near Block 
Island. The news reached the governor the next day. Proclamation for 
volunteers was forthwith issued, two sloops were taken up for the expedition, 
and within two hours’ time were manned by a hundred and twenty men, under 
the command of Capt. John Wanton, and in less than three hours afterward 
captured the privateer, retook her prize, and brought them into Newport. The 
promptness and success of this gallant adventure astonished and delighted 
the country, and added fresh laurels to the naval glory of Rhode Island.^ ®^
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Caribbean colonies, such as Jamaica and Barbados, had less need for similar 
measures as a large force was annually sent to the area. This squadron was 
necessary for two reasons. Firstly, the sugar trade was of far greater value than that 
of North American products, such as tobacco or timber. In 1699-1701, the average 
annual value of sugar imports to England amounted to £630,000, while imports of 
Virginia and Maryland produce amounted to £317,000.^®'^ The development of rice 
production in South Carolina from the late seventeenth century, reduced this 
disparity, but not significantly until the 1720s. The defence and preservation of 
Jamaica’s trade was seen as particularly important. The Lords committee appointed 
to investigate the conduct of Vice-Admiral Graydon, stated in its report that:
Their Lordships...think It highly incumbent upon them, at this time, to 
represent of what importance the defense and preservation of Jamaica is to 
England Itself, by its situation, as well for the trade as for the convenience It 
affords of offending our present enemies the French and Spaniards, as it lies 
in the centre of the most valuable part of the West Indies, at an easy distance 
from the Spanish settlements; and more particularly is in the neighbourhood of 
the Havana, which hath been hitherto the rendezvous of the Spanish gal lions 
and flotas. This island produces the best sugar, Indlco, cotton, wool, dying 
wood, etc; and may be yet made more beneficial to England, by being a 
staple of our English and European product and manufactures, and a mart for 
negroes, upon a peace or friendship with the Spaniards; which advantage is 
now enjoyed by the French; who do not only furnish the Spaniards with all 
their negroes for working In their mines, but almost entirely supply them with 
all necessaries from Europe, for which they are paid In pieces of eight, or 
other the richest commodities; which benefit might accure to this king 
dominions, to the great discouragement of her Majesty’s subjects, who on their 
part, forboe such trade with the Spaniards.^ ®®
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Secondly, Britain’s West Indian colonies were scattered over a thousand miles of 
sea. They could do little to support each other in emergencies. Communications 
between the islands were only practical from east to west, using the trade winds. The 
journey from Barbados to the Leeward islands and on to Jamaica could be completed 
in just over a week, while from Jamaica to Barbados, in contrast, the journey took at 
least seven w e e k s . P e t t y  jealousies and recriminations between the islands also 
ensured that help was rarely sent, even when It was practicable. According to Ruth 
Bourne, the governors of Barbados were loath to order any ships to help the Leeward 
Islands when even the slightest threat existed on Barbados.
At the beginning of the war, the West Indies was afforded nearly a third of the 
total cruiser and convoy vessels of the navy. This can be explained by the 
employment of large squadrons under the command of Vice-Admiral Benbow, Vice- 
Admiral Whetstone, Sir Hovenden Walker, and Rear-Admiral Graydon. Their failure 
to prevent depredations on trade, to capture the Spanish treasure fleet, or to add to 
British territory, saw a dampening of home government support for West Indian 
enterprises, and never again were so many warships sent out. From time to time, 
naval reinforcements were sent to augment the vessels on West Indian duty, but 
such additional commitments seldom produced results commensurate with the costs. 
Between 1703-5, Jamaica normally had four small warships for its protection. 
Afterwards there were normally six or seven men-of-war stationed at the island. 
Barbados, by contrast, had only one small cruiser for the first part of the war. Reports 
of the French squadrons under Coetlogen and Chateau Renault saw a fourth rate 
added to this cruiser later in the war. Other islands, such as the Bahamas, had no 
protection at all. Explanation for this disparity again centered on the economic 
importance of different islands, as well as an underestimation of the threat posed by 
the French to islands other than Jam a ica .R ear-A d m ira l Graydon, who stopped at
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Barbados on his way to Jamaica in 1703, for instance, assured the Admiralty that the 
island was in little danger and a naval squadron need not be sent to protect it.
Despite the fact that many islands were left almost totally unprotected for 
much of the war, when one combines numbers of guard ships with those additionally 
sent as convoy escorts, it is clear that British North America and the Caribbean 
received a generous proportion of naval resources. Of the entire strength of the navy, 
between a third to a half were stationed across the Atlantic.^®® Merchants, however, 
still demanded more. As early as 1703, merchants trading to Barbados asked for a 
convoy of two ships to sail twice a year, the first pair to leave England in January and 
return in May, the second to leave England in April and return in August. They 
specified that two fourth rates, one fifth, and one sixth would be needed as escorts. 
The merchants also wanted the convoys to return directly to England without sailing 
to the Leeward Islands and asked for a further small frigate and a fourth rate to guard 
against Martinique privateers. Merchants trading to the Leeward islands made a 
similar request, although their crops were far less valuable; three warships to guard 
their trade and to return with the convoy after 60 days, and a fourth rate and two sixth 
rate ships to form a permanent guard. Jamaica, on the other hand, asked for only 
one convoy to leave the Island before the hurricane season in the fall, but demanded 
six ships to guard the coast. Virginia and Newfoundland, similarly, asked for a yearly 
convoy. Official requests for convoy escorts, while nearly always effective with the 
Board of Trade, made little impression on the Admiralty, ever conscious of its lack of 
ships. Merchant demands amounted to twice the number the Admiralty had been 
prepared to send to the West Indies in the previous war.^°  ^ The allocation that was 
eventually decided upon centered around two annual convoys, one departing from 
the Chesapeake, involving the shipping of the Maryland, Virginia and Jamaica, and a 
second convoy, departing from the Windward Islands, involving the trade of
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Barbados and the Leeward Islands, These convoy arrangements were a source of 
much delay as the growing cycles of the various crops did not coincide. Throughout 
the war, the Maryland ships had to wait for the Virginia trade and the Virginia ships 
for the Jamaican convoy. The Barbados ships had to go up to the Leeward Islands, 
which assembled in the roads of Nevis.
Sailing without convoy was strictly forbidden unless special permission was 
granted. This prohibition was first ordered in 1690, as a means to protect the tobacco 
trade of Virginia and Maryland.^°^ This action was thought sufficient to render secure 
a branch of commerce that was enormously valuable to the kingdom; the annual 
tobacco fleet consisted of nearly 150 ships, carrying 70-80,000 hogsheads, which 
produced a revenue approaching £300,000.^°^ Only vessels of exceptional armament 
or speed were granted permits to sail without c o n v o y S m a l l  groups of vessels 
going home without convoy from the West Indies were escorted through the danger 
zones of the Caribbean by naval cruisers. The cruisers at Jamaica organised two 
local convoys, one up the Campeche Coast and the other through the Windward 
Passage. This service was only feasible over short distances, owing to the time 
needed to come back to Jamaica against the winds and, furthermore, because the 
Islanders objected to being left without protection for any length of time.
The performance of naval guard ships and convoy escorts was far from 
perfect. A variety of problems reduced their effectiveness. Guard ships were rarely 
relieved in less than fourteen months for instance. Commodore Wager's squadron 
began to fit out for the W est Indies in the fall of 1706 and returned home at the end 
of 1709. As a result of these extended periods, many ships spent a good deal of time 
in port, short of naval stores needed for repairs. This problem was worst in the West 
Indies because of the tropical climate. Intense heat and frequent rain rotted and 
rusted cordage, cables, canvas, even anchors, while parasites, known as shipworm,
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decayed hulls, making it necessary to careen every three months. Tropical storms, 
furthermore, frequently sprung masts and broke shrouds and spars. Damage to 
mainmasts was especially problematic, as none of the islands could supply suitable 
trees for replacements.
The cold and windy climate of the northern colonies also often resulted In 
damage to ships that were usually unfit for service on their arrival in the colonies. In 
1701, Rear Admiral Graydon wrote from Newfoundland, for instance, that his ship 
“was built at first with great faults and rebuilt with greater, and was no better than a 
fifth rate ship." He reported a sprung mainmast and four broken main shrouds and 
warned that his ship was so fragile that no sail could be carried in a blow.^°® The loss 
of vessels at sea because of poor construction or repair was relatively common; 
H.M.S Seahorse, Dunkirk’s Prize and Chiid’s Play were lost due to one fault or 
another. Other vessels such as the Lewis Hulk, H.M.S Coventry, Canterbury Prize 
and the Medway Prize had to be sold out of the sen/ice or sank due to damage 
sustained in bad weather and the inability of the navy board to supply stores for their 
repair.
Shortages of naval stores were a constant and ever-present problem, for even 
when ships were relieved, those going home usually had to borrow stores of all kinds 
from those just arriving, leaving the fresh cruisers crippled in the performance of their 
duties. The financial instability of the Admiralty also meant that when stores were 
available, captains were often afraid of drawing bills on the Navy Board in case they 
were not honoured on their arrival back home. Captain Norbury, for instance, 
commander of the H.M.S Larke, which served in the Leeward Islands, was ruined on 
his return to England as the Victualling Board refused to pay his repair bills. He was 
later discharged the service and had his back pay withheld.
99
Extended periods in port were also caused by shortages of men and 
disagreements over the control of men-of-war, in general, and prize adjudication, in 
particular. Service in the navy, despite the higher prospect of windfall profits, held 
little attraction for seamen. Indeed, if it were suspected that the West Indies was the 
destination of a squadron in harbour, the men fled from the vicinity and the seamen 
already abroad tried to run away or mutiny. The chief reason for this, as explained in 
the last chapter, was the disagreeable nature of the lifestyle that awaited seamen 
once they were recruited into the navy. Confinement, starvation and death from 
disease were a common experience of naval tars, especially when serving on foreign 
stations. Seamen were exposed to a wide variety of deadly diseases, such as 
malaria, yellow fever, dysentery, dropsy, leprosy, yaws, hookworm and elephantiasis. 
With every new squadron that arrived out from England, many hundreds, even 
thousands, of seamen would quickly perish from the tropical, disease-ridden climate. 
Manpower losses on this scale were almost impossible to replace in the colonies.
Frequent arguments between land and sea officers over the question of 
prize condemnation encouraged captains to linger in port when they should have 
been out protecting trade. In the early part of the war, it was not clear whether 
colonial Vice-Admiralty courts had the authority to condemn naval prizes. In the latter 
part of the war, it was not clear what was the role of colonial governors in prize 
affairs. The ‘America Act' had to some extent clarified the issue by stripping 
governors of their responsibility for the administration of prize affairs. The Board of 
Trade, however, soon afterwards directed governors to supervise the condemnation 
of naval prizes.^^^ Governors were extremely zealous in obeying these instructions, 
for although they received no share of the prizes captured, they claimed a third of the 
value of ships and goods seized for illegal trading. Therefore, while governors 
insisted that all prizes should be brought into port, so as to ascertain their status.
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captains protested that under the new laws all ships they captured were to remain in 
their hands until they were condemned. The upshot of these disputes was that the 
protection of trade became a secondary consideration behind the accumulation of 
wealth. Both governors and captains were quick to forget grandiose ideas of military 
glory, concentrating, instead, on the more available advantages of being stationed in 
the colonies. Governor Parke, for instance, after discovering that the people of the 
Leeward Islands could not even defend themselves let alone attack the enemy, 
resorted to misappropriation of funds, excessive fees for government services, and 
smuggling, as a means to make a quick fortune.^®® Parke was ruthless in punishing 
those who got in his way. For the seizure of a flag of truce going to Martinique to 
trade, John Carnaragan was exposed upon the forecastle of his ship for four days 
and nights without food or water.
Convoys were expected to return to England within sixty days of their arrival in 
the colonies. Very rarely did they meet this target, however, as delays were common. 
These delays were a combination of late crops and bad weather, as well as the 
conduct of the navy. Occasionally the organisation of ad hoc expeditions against the 
enemy saw the confiscation of escort ships. Following the successful attacks of 
d'Iberville on Montserrat and Nevis in 1706, for instance. Commodore Kerr was 
ordered to assemble a squadron to protect any possible attempt on Jamaica. This left 
the Leeward Islands without ships to convoy their trade home. Once at sea, bad 
weather was by far the greatest risk to merchant fleets. Virtually all the merchantmen 
under the protection of Captain Wavell, commander of H.M.S Colchester, were lost at 
sea due to storms off the American coast in 1703. Similarly, the Jamaican fleet 
convoyed by Captain Huntinton, met a storm in the Gulf of Florida, resulting in the 
loss of every ship except one. French privateers were only a threat in the initial 
stages of the voyage, as they were normally only provisioned for short periods. When
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privateers were encountered, the attending cruiser would chase them away, although 
they seldom captured their prey. In 1708, while convoying home 36 Leeward Island 
vessels, Captain Gray was attacked by two enemy privateers, "but finding us ready to 
receive them...they clapt close upon a wind and made what sail they could to the 
northward."^^° When attacked by a large squadron of men-of-war or privateers, 
convoy escorts could offer little resistance. Once merchantmen fell behind the main 
fleet they were also easily picked off by the enemy. Despite these facts, American 
colonists insisted upon convoys for their fleets.
Because of its responsibility to protect colonial trade, the blame for shipping 
losses was laid at the Admiralty's door. As early as 1704, Lord Haversham stated in 
an attack on the mismanagement of the navy;
Your disasters at sea have been so many that a man scarce knows where to 
begin. Your ships have been taken by the enemies as the Dutch take your 
herrings, by the shoal, upon your own coasts...Your merchants are beggared, 
your commerce is broken, your trade is gone, your people and your 
manufactures ruined, while the Queen has lost her customs and Parliament 
must make good the difficiency; while in the meantime our Allies [the Dutch] 
have an open and flourishing trade and our enemies make use of both our own 
ships and seamen against us.^ ’^
On the whole, however, while the conduct of the navy was by no means perfect, few 
serious complaints were made until 1707. Merchants were usually over anxious for 
the safety of their vessels and exaggerated the danger from privateers. So too did 
colonial governors and agents whose information was regularly passed to the 
Admiralty and the Board of Trade. Reports of French vessels in the West Indies were 
habitually followed by hysterical rumours of impeding attacks by powerful enemy
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squadrons. The vast majority of convoyed vessels completed their voyages 
unmolested. The increased size of Atlantic convoys during the W ar of the Spanish 
Succession, is in itself an indication of the greater feeling of security that they gave to 
commerce. Those merchants that sent their ships independently before 1700 took 
advantage of the convoy system thereafter. ’Runners’, stragglers from the main 
convoys, and those vessels involved in inter-colonial trade, were far more vulnerable 
to enemy attack.
From 1705 an intensification of the French privateering war was witnessed. 
Smarting after the stalemate at Malaga in 1704, the French resorted to another 
guerre de course, embodied principally by the depredations of d’Iberville’s squadron 
in the W est Indies, but also by the increased numbers of privateers fitted out from the 
French colonies, especially Martinique and Acadia.^^^ As a consequence, English 
shipping losses increased in the middle years of the war and merchant dissatisfaction 
with naval protection intensified.
The conduct of Commodore Kerr in the West Indies took this dissatisfaction to 
boiling point. He was alleged by the merchants of Jamaica to have refused to grant 
convoys for their ships to the coast of New Spain, as well as demanding between 
£1500 -  2000 from Thomas Wood, a Jamaican merchant, for the said service. In 
addition to these bribes, Kerr was alleged to have demanded a share in the profits of 
those trading ships that received convoy escorts. This controversy caused an outcry 
in the House of Commons, not least because it affected the Spanish trade, which 
was much esteemed by the government.
This attack on a senior naval commander became a signal for other 
complaints to be raised about convoy arrangements. Sir Gilbert Heathcote and Sir 
Bartholomew Gracedieu, merchants interested in the Jamaica trade, complained in 
May 1707, for instance:
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...the following yeares being not able to procure the convoy to salle till April or 
May, our ships arrived there In the hott, sultry, rainy, sickly season, and our men 
being fresh out of Europe, it destroy’d all most halfe of 'em, that our ships came 
out halfe man’d and when they gott through the Gulph of Florida, they alwayes 
mett with such storms (and will always do so after the last of August), that what 
by floundering and what by the enemy...we lost halfe of our ships. By these 
disasters occasion’d by the ill timeing of our convoys, we are quite discouraged 
and all dépendance on promises lost. And these are the reasons why the 
Spanish trade has been neglected, the vent of so much of our manufactures 
lost, besides the disappointment of much treasure, which we should have 
received in returne thereof to our owne as well as the Nations great losse.^ '^^
A petition presented to the House of Lords on behalf of all merchants involved in 
Atlantic trade in November 1707, was even more damning, complaining of
...the total lack of convoys for some trades; the insufficient number of 
warships appointed for each convoy; the late start from both England and the 
colonies with resulting losses from sickness, bad weather, and the cost of 
prolonged journeys; the neglect of merchant ships by convoys; the draining of 
seamen from the merchantmen by impressment; the disasterous extortions 
and misconduct of commanders; the lack of cruisers in home waters, and 
finally the general extravagance and inefficiency of the naval administartion. '^*
Impressment was a particular cause of merchant anger. Men lost through desertion 
and death were frequently replaced with merchant seamen. Impressment was often 
carried out in a high-handed manner. Merchants could only replace their losses by 
paying exorbitant wages, encouraging naval desertion, and even using French
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prisoners of war. Many times masters could not replace men lost in this way and had 
to set sail for England with weak or elderly crews. Such ships were sometimes lost at 
sea; the Florida Strait and the North Atlantic were especially perilous in autumn and 
early winter. To emphasise this point, merchants gave the House of Commons three 
examples of the ships lost as the result of naval impressment in the Caribbean in 
1705: the Roundburst Gaily, the Somerset Frigate, and the Walthamstow Galiy^^^
The navy’s responsibility for protecting colonial trade grew far more difficult 
after 1700, for although there were few extra ships available, seaborne commerce 
had grown not only in size, but also in complexity. The Chesapeake convoy, which 
annually contained 150-200 ships, was extremely difficult to control, and it is in fact to 
the credit of naval commanders that they were able to bring so many of their charges 
safely to port. The Admiralty had foreseen the problems that this growth in trade 
would produce as early as December 1701, when it protested against ministers 
demands for the Virginia and St. Helena convoys. The Admiralty was also justified in 
claiming that it could not spare ships to suppress the Martinique privateers, as "there 
was no small want of proper ships at home to guard the c o a s t . I n d e e d ,  while the 
Admiralty admitted the scale of shipping losses complained of by merchants in 1707, 
the blame for the weakness of convoys was laid on the small number of ships 
available and the superior strength of enemy squadrons in the Atlantic. To ease 
these shortages, naval commanders were often ordered to hire colonial vessels to act 
as temporary guard ships. The Admiralty instructed the captain of H.M.S. Reserve, 
which attended on the government of New England to:
...hyre a vessell of ten or twelve guns, either there or in New York, and to 
cause her to be manned and equipped in all respects in a war-1 Ike manner, 
and then to send her to cruise within the capes of Virginia, to protect the trade 
passing In and out from the small Privateers of the Enemy
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The Admiralty also saw the closure of Spanish ports to British shipping as another 
explanation for the scale of French captures, claiming that
During the last war, we had the parts of Spain, as well as those in the Spanish 
West Indies, always open, to secure our merchant ships and vessels, not only 
from the enemy, but from bad weather; whereas, during the whole course of 
this war, our trade hath been entirely debarred from that so essential a 
countenance and protection.^^^
In 1708, following the petitions, investigations, and inquiries of 1707, two 
pieces of legislation were enacted which were intended to improve the defence of 
trade. The ‘Cruisers and Convoys Act' was primarily intended to increase the number 
of naval ships stationed In home waters. It laid down that “over and above the ships 
of the war for the line of battle and for convoys to remote parts at least 43 ships of 
war be employed in proper stations” [viz. 6 third rates, 20 fourth rates, 13 fifth rates, 
and 4 sixth r a t e s ] . O f  these, 15 were specifically allotted to guard the coast and 
trade in the north-eastern and north-western coasts, though the Admiralty might join 
any of these ships to the main fleet if occasion arose. A second piece of legislation, 
the ‘America Act', was of far more significance to trade protection in North America 
and Caribbean waters.^^^ Little change was made to the numbers of vessels provided 
for convoy duty, but a variety of measures were enacted to improve the manning 
difficulties of the navy. Masters of merchant ships and commanders of privateers 
were required to make exact lists of all men belonging to their respective vessels. 
These lists, which contained detailed descriptions of their crew, were to be given to 
the chief officer of the custom-house in all ports sailed to or from, as well as produced 
on the request of commanders of Her Majesty’s ships in port or at sea. Any men 
found to be naval deserters were to be confiscated and owners /  commanders of the
106
said vessels would be prosecuted. In another clause of the act, merchant ships and 
packet boats going to the West Indies were required to carry a number of men above 
their complement, which were to be delivered over to Her Majesty’s ships on arrival. 
Privateers and merchantmen were further permitted to man their vessels with a 
greater number of foreigners, thus easing the pressure on the services of English 
sailors. To encourage foreign seamen, naturalisation was offered after two years of 
continuous service. Another important result of the ‘America Act’ was an increase in 
the profitability of the prize war. This not only helped improve the appeal of the navy 
to prospective recruits, but also encouraged greater investment in privateers who 
would hunt down enemy predators that might othenwise molest trade.
X
In the closing years of the war there were no more serious complaints against the 
navy or requests made for special protection. While the Caribbean trade had 
slumped between 1702-7, a slight recovery was witnessed thereafter. Tobacco 
imports also remained, in general, fairly high, and differences from year to year were 
the result of crop variations rather than losses at sea.^^  ^The relative success of naval 
protection in the closing years of the war is all the more significant when one 
considers that after 1708, an increase in numbers of French privateers in American 
waters was witnessed. This can be explained by their exodus from European waters 
after the failed invasion attempt of England in March 1708, which occasioned a large 
build up of troops and cruisers intended to blockade Dunkirk and St. Malo. Additional 
encouragement was also given to French privateering by Louis XIV’s decision in 1709 
to give up not only the royal warships and all their stores, but also his share of the 
profits.
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French guerre de course in the war of the Spanish Succession, was marked 
by its use of privateers. According to G. N. Clark, between 1702 and 1713, “French 
privateers reached a zenith, a higher point in strength and numbers than they ever 
attained a g a i n . T h e  French navy played but a minor role, especially in colonial 
waters. Virtually all the French colonies in the Americas commissioned privateers. 
Martinique and Arcadia developed as France's principal privateering bases. Their 
effect on British commerce and economic development was substantial, but not 
crippling. The British navy’s responsibility for protecting trade, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, meant that it could only spare limited resources to any one area, unless, like 
the W est Indies, the trade was of particular importance. Consequently, French 
privateers were able to cruise relatively unmolested in search of potential prizes. 
Growth in British trade and shipping while providing a target for enemy predators, 
also lessened the effect of their success. Captures made by British privateers, 
likewise, offset those made by the enemy. The navy, furthermore, by concentrating 
shipping into organised convoys, was able to bring home a sizable proportion of 
colonial produce, despite the limited resources at its disposal. As a result of these 
facts, the growth of colonial trade was merely slowed by the W ar of the Spanish 
Succession rather than destroyed by it. Indeed, once peace was signed, colonial 
output continued to grow at its former rate.
Britain’s colonies in the West Indies, particularly Jamaica, fitted out the 
majority of privateers and captured the majority of prizes. The Involvement of North 
American colonies was small in comparison, although the trade of Acadia and 
Newfoundland did encourage investment in privateering from New York and Rhode 
Island. Small provision ships, supplying France’s West Indian islands with goods that 
they could not produce themselves, formed the vast majority of prize captures. Larger 
merchant vessels, transporting more valuable produce, such as sugar, back to
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France, were almost exclusively the prey of the navy, whose ships were unsuited to 
the capture of localised shipping. The navy enjoyed considerable success throughout 
the war in capturing the valuable trade of the French Guinea Company.
The start and middle of the war saw the most prizes taken by privateers. 
Captures made in the remaining years varied widely, until 1712, when a significant 
downturn was witnessed. This pattern suggests that it took several years for high 
numbers of shipping captures to be replaced. Information provided by the data file, 
on the monthly distribution of prize captures, also makes it possible to suggest when 
privateers were most active. As captures were greatest between June and October, 
for instance, one can suggest that the summer and autumn appear to have been the 
best time for privateering cruises. The winter and spring, by contrast, appear to have 
been worst. Prize captures were consistently less frequent between November and 
May. Distribution of monthly and yearly captures by the Royal Navy mirrored those of 
privateers, adding further weight to the patterns detailed above.
British colonial privateering did not only affect French commerce and 
economic development, for by reducing numbers of available seamen, privateering 
adversely affected both the operation of British-colonial commerce, as well as its 
protection. Merchant vessels were often required to sail with elderly or under-strength 
crews, for instance, because privateers absorbed all the young and skilled sailors. 
Naval coast guard vessels and convoy escorts, similarly, were forced to stay in port 
until sufficient men could be pressed from the local inhabitants or transferred from 
replacement forces. In the meantime, French privateers were able to cruise 
unmolested, while delayed convoys meant that markets could be missed and produce 
spoiled.
Despite traditional academic skepticism concerning the significance of 
privateering, it is clear that during the W ar of the Spanish Succession, privateering
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can be confidently said to have had an important impact on both French and British 
commerce and economic development. This mirrors more recent colonial and naval 
historiography, which has emphasised the importance of privateering in the wars of 
the eighteenth century. Declining French trade statistics suggest that the combined 
efforts of privateers, and to a lesser extent the British navy, were effective at 
disrupting French maritime commerce and colonial development. It was not until the 
1720s, two or three decades after the British, that the French sugar islands started to 
produce a sizeable crop. The French, furthermore, lost the right to supply the Spanish 
Empire with slaves. The capture of French shipping and territory, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, sufficiently undermined Spanish confidence in the stability of the French 
Empire that the Asiento contract was granted to the English South Sea Company. 
The importance of this transfer was huge. English involvement in the W ar of the 
Spanish Succession was primarily based on the need to eliminate French influence in 
Spain. The acquisition of the Asiento contract and the enormous opportunities it 
offered for illicit trade went a long way towards this end, striking a damaging blow to 
French influence, both in the West Indies, as well as in the Spanish-American trade.
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Conclusion
British-colonial privateering in the years before the American Revolution is extremely 
difficult to study because many of the necessary sources have been lost or 
destroyed. This fact has led many historians to erroneously assume that privateering 
was a modest business of little significance, employing few merchants, mariners and 
vessels. If one takes the trouble to delve a little deeper, however, it Is clear that 
privateering played the leading role in America's war effort in the colonial period. 
Indeed, to properly understand the nature and impact of imperial warfare on colonial 
America, an examination of privateering is essential.
The W ar of the Spanish Succession marked a crucial turning point in the 
history of British privateering. A whole host of instructions from the Crown, as well as 
legislation enacted by Parliament, increased regulation and made privateering far 
more financially attractive for Investors and seamen. Vice-Admiralty courts, officially 
established in the colonies in 1702, were responsible for implementing these new 
regulations and laws. They helped create an effective, uniform system of control over 
colonial privateering, which represented an unprecedented extension of Crown 
authority to British North America and the Caribbean. The greater number of officially 
condemned prize vessels in Queen Anne's W ar compared with previous conflicts, 
provided government with higher duty revenue, while at the same time ensuring that 
the rights of captors and captives were respected.
Greater government control and financial appeal significantly enhanced the 
impact of privateering on the war effort and colonial society. Where once privateering 
had been a disreputable enterprise, existing on the margins of piracy, during the W ar 
of the Spanish Succession it became a crucial means by which government was able 
to augment naval forces in the achievement of mercantilist objectives. By capturing
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large numbers of enemy vessels and indirectly protecting colonial shipping, privately 
financed warships helped improve Britain’s balance of trade by increasing her 
proportion of foreign trade, while simultaneously weakening the commercial lifelines 
of her enemies. They also helped ease the demanding responsibilities of the Royal 
Navy. Privateering reflected the weakness of the state in this context, for despite 
increases in governmental power, investment in private warships was encouraged in 
every inter-colonial war of the eighteenth century; the Royal Navy was simply not able 
to safeguard Atlantic commerce on Its own at this time.
Captures by private men-of-war far outweighed those of the navy. This 
reflected not only the fact that large numbers of British-colonial privateers were 
commissioned in the W ar of the Spanish Succession, but also the circumstance that 
they could play a far more proactive role in the war effort than the navy, who were 
barely able to fulfil their responsibilities in protecting trade. As a result, privateers 
were able to make a marked impact on inter-colonial and Atlantic commerce. The 
sporadic development of the French sugar Islands in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century was in no small part due to the effect of privateering captures and 
the feeling of insecurity that they fostered in the minds of Caribbean colonists and 
European investors.
Because privateers could spend all their time chasing prizes, they were an 
attractive employment prospect. Thousands of seamen risked their lives in the hope 
that they might make their fortune. These seamen were for the most part young and 
highly skilled. The navy and the merchant service, offering a far less appealing 
package, were often left to fight over landsmen and elderly seamen. The financial 
appeal of privateering also persuaded many of the most affluent and respected 
members of colonial society to invest thousands of pounds sterling in the business. 
Merchants saw the prize war as an alternative to normal business activities, which
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were made more difficult, if not impossible, by the effects of enemy commerce 
raiding. The prize war was a useful way to diversify investment of spare capital.
British-colonial privateering did not only benefit those directly involved, for 
colonial society can be argued to have profited as well. At the most basic level, the 
fitting out of private men-of-war provided business for a whole host of tradesmen in 
colonial ports, while prize goods and money provided a means to replace captured 
provision ships and much needed hard currency. Looking more in the long term, the 
profits of privateering can be said to have underpinned the continuing development of 
staple agriculture in the Caribbean. Without this additional source of revenue the 
effect of French captures would surely have been felt far more severely, and the 
recovery of British-colonial trade following 1713 would surely have been far more 
sporadic.
While British-colonial privateers in the W ar of the Spanish Succession can be 
confidently argued to have played a more important role in imperial warfare than ever 
before, one should not overestimate the fact. As a means to decisively win wars, for 
instance, privateering remained a disappointment. Explanation centres on the fact 
that privateering captures were for the most part cancelled out by those of the 
enemy. In this situation wars tended to end because the belligerents were 
economically worn out, rather than because defeat was forced on one side. Only by 
devastating military or naval campaigns could one side prematurely end hostilities. 
Queen Anne’s War, therefore, like King William’s W ar before it, and the wars of the 
1740s after it, ended because, despite the efforts of privateers in European and 
colonial waters, military and naval campaigns were inconclusive and financially 
neither Britain or France could continue. Indeed, it was mainly because Britain 
strengthened her navy during the W ar of the Spanish Succession that she came out 
on top following the diplomatic negotiations of 1713. France, by allowing her navy to
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run down in favour of a privateering guerre de course, enabled the British to appear 
as the stronger nation. Successful naval expeditions against Port Royal and Quebec 
late in the war had after all put Britain in firm control of North America. Economically 
speaking, the British islands in the Caribbean were also far more developed than 
their French counterparts. As a consequence, the British were able to wrest from the 
French the Spanish Asiento contract - arguably the principal reason why Britain went 
to war in the first place.
In the same way that one should not overestimate the strategic importance of 
privateering for government, one should also be wary of overestimating the financial 
returns of privateering for investors and seamen. The small scale and 
underdeveloped nature of French colonial commerce in the early eighteenth century 
meant that windfall profits could not be guaranteed for everyone. As a result, 
investment in privateering was relatively small and short term in Queen Anne’s W ar 
compared with later wars, when enemy shipping was more abundant. This is not to 
say that large numbers of privateers were not commissioned, but rather that they 
were fitted out on the cheap, on a fairly ad hoc basis. Privateers ‘of force’, which 
became more common in the wars of the 1740s, were extremely rare in the early 
eighteenth century, when the size and value of French colonial commerce made the 
costs unjustifiable.
While colonial privateering had existed in the seventeenth century, it was not 
until Queen Anne’s W ar that it began to be properly regulated. The importance of this 
change was huge. By placing the prize war firmly within an international maritime 
code of proper conduct, government helped improve privateering’s image and 
financial appeal to potential investors and seamen, while at the same time ensuring 
that it became a useful tool of war rather than a costly nuisance. In this context, with 
government actively encouraging the fitting out of privateers, and its popularity
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growing for investors and seamen, one can understand its continuing growth. Indeed, 
the disruption of an enemy’s maritime commerce continued to dominate European 
and American naval thinking until 1857 when privateering was outlawed.
115
Appendix 1
THE PRIVATEER DATA FILE
The principal evidential base for this study Is a data file containing references to prize actions. 
These references have been drawn primarily from four sources: firstly, Colonial Office 
manuscripts; secondly, the Calendar of State Papers, America and the West Indies; thirdly, the 
Calendar of Treasury Books; and fourthly, Howard M. Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The 
First Century of American Colonial Privateering, 1625-1725.^ By recording the correspondence 
of a wide variety of colonial figures with important bodies and persons in England, these 
sources provided a wealth of information concerning the prize actions of British-colonial 
privateers, as well as the Royal Navy and enemy predators.
A prize action is defined as an encounter between a predator and an enemy craft. 
Success was achieved when the latter was captured, whether by armed struggle or by the 
surrender at the approach of the warship. Each prize action is as far as possible recorded 
individually in the data file. Each case in the file contains a series of variables pertaining to 
prize actions.  ^ These variables provide information about the most important aspects of 
privateering.
While my privateer data file provides a reasonably detailed account of the British- 
colonial maritime prize war, in the period 1702-1713, it has its limitations. Because the file was 
confined to British sources, it is more complete for British-colonial privateers and the Royal 
Navy than it is for enemy prize actions. The file has more valid observations on the names of 
privateer vessels and commanders, for instance, than their enemy counterparts. This is not to 
say that missing data was only a problem for French and Spanish prize actions, because 
British sources are far from comprehensive themselves. As a result of the ensuing gaps in my 
information, it became more difficult for me to record my information on spread sheets, which 
would have been a more preferable means of representing the data. Access to colonial 
records, available in North America and the Caribbean, would help fill in these gaps and allow 
more sophisticated data base analysis.
The following is a complete copy of my data file. It will list references to the captures 
of British-colonial privateers, first, the Royal Navy, second, British colonial predators of 
uncertain status, third, and enemy predators thereafter. The references are not an exact 
transcription of the sources they have been drawn from, but rather a summary of the useful 
information. Where additional information has been added to the references from other 
sources, square brackets have been used. Where a source makes reference to a prize capture 
that has been already recorded, notification will be given. This of course can only be done for 
those references that offer enough information to be sure that they are talking about the same 
prize capture. Unfortunately, owing to limitations of the data file, as outlined above, it is 
Inevitable that a certain amount of references to prize captures will not be recognised as 
repeats. As a consequence, my tabular analysis of British-coioniai and Royal Navy prize 
activity in the War of the Spanish Succession should not be treated as accurate figures, but 
rather as rough estimates.
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CAPTURES OF BRITISH-COLONIAL PRIVATEERS
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies {C.S.P. Col.)
as .P . Col.. 1702-1703. no. 30 (\)
Letter from Colonel Dudley of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire to Thomas Newton, 10 
Oct. 1702.
“Refers to French ships captured by Captain Wanton, acting under a commission from 
Governor Cranston of Rhode island, condemned Rhode Island.
as .P . Col.. 1702-1703. no. 315
Letter from Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 11 Feb. 1703.
-Reports that a privateer from Boston had recently captured a French sloop trading to the 
nearby Indians.
C.S.P. Col.. 1702-1703. no. 1158
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett of Bermuda to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 19 Oct.
1703.
-Reports that privateers from Jamaican had captured three Dutch vessels for trading with the
Spanish, laden with pieces of eight and other ’rich goods’.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 39 (\)
Letter from J. Warters to Mr. Popple, 20 Jan. 1704, enclosing a letter describing the prizes
condemned at the Vice-Admiralty court at Antigua, 19 Aug. 1702.
-Refers to various prizes taken in 1702. Firstly, the sloop Diligent of Mary Gallant [20 tons] 
captured, near Martinique, on the 19 August 1702, by the [privateer sloop] Seaflower of 
Barbados, Captain Pied commander, sank in the harbor of St. Johns. Secondly, the Mary of 
Martinique [20 tons]captured, near Guadeloupe, in July, by Seaflower\as above]. Also sank 
after cargo of goods, money and slaves were taken off. Thirdly, the Margaret of Martinique [10 
tons] and another sloop [10 tons] captured near St. Dominique by the [privateer sloop] 
Margaret and Anne of Barbados, Captain Hilary Roe commander. Proceeds divided equally 
between captain and crew. Fourthly, the Diligent of St. Christopher captured by the [privateer 
sloop] Dispatch [Despatch] of Barbados, Captain John Smith commander, said to be worth 
£3,000. Fifthly, the Jean of Bordeaux [20 tons] and Fortune of Martinique [40 tons] captured by 
the [privateer sloop] Marygold of Barbados, Captain John Gill commander. Cargoes of claret 
and brandy divided equally between captain and crew. Sixthly, two small shallops captured by 
the [privateer] Weymouth of Antigua, Captain Valientine Norris commander, condemned 
Antigua.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 39 fih
Letter from J. Warters to Mr. Popple. 20 Apr. 1704, enclosing a letter from a prize agent, 10 
Aug. 1703.
-Refers to three barques captured off Newfoundland and brought into Barbados by Captain 
John Halsey, [commander of Rhode Island privateer brigantine Charles, 100 tons, 8 guns], 
vessel and cargo value at £1,800.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 257 (\\\)
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to Mr. Popple, 20 Apr. 1704.
-Account of the capture of the French [ship] St. Lawrence the Victorious [from Rochelle, 120 
tons, 6 guns, 23 men, captain Pierre Dibon commander], in October 1703, by the Adventure of 
Antigua [condemned Bermuda, valued at £120].
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 436
Letter from Roger Mompesson to the Earl of Nottingham, 4 July 1704.
-Refers to Captain Tongerlon [commander of New York privateer New York Galley, ISOmen, 
20 guns] having captured five or six Dutch trading vessels from Curacoa.
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C.S.P. CoL. 1704-1705. no. 455
Letter from Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 13 July 1704.
-Reports that Captain Lawrence [commander of Boston privateer Charles, 40 men] had to date 
captured five French prizes.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 566
Letter from Governor Handasyd of Jamaica to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 17 Sept.
1704.
-Refers to [a Jamaican privateer of 60 men and 4 guns, commanded by] Captain Charles 
Gandy as having captured two French sloops and disabling a third.
C.S.P. CoL 1704-1705. no. 902
Letter from Governor Handasyd to Sir Charles Hedges, 27 Feb. 1705.
-Reports that Jamaican privateers had taken three prizes (two French and the other Spanish) 
since his last correspondence.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 1018
Letter from Governor Sir B. Granville of Barbados to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 
Apr. 1705.
-Reports the capture of a small French privateer of 4 guns and 50 men, on the 1 April 1705, by 
the privateer sloop Anne of Barbados.
C.S.P. CoL 1704-1705. no. 1262
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 18 July 1705.
-Reports the capture of a French trading vessel of 24 guns by a Jamaican privateer.
C.S.P. CoL. 1704-1705. no. 1274
Letter from Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 25 July 1705.
-Refers to the capture of a Spanish prize by the Charles Galley, a brigantine of 100 tons and 8 
guns, commissioned by Governor Cranston of Rhode Island, Captain John Halsey 
commander. Briefly refers to another prize captured by Captain Morrlsse.
C.S.P. CoL 1704-1705. no. 1407 fii and viih
Governor and Company of Rhode Island to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 24 Oct.
1705, enclosing a copy of a privateering commission, 8 May 1703.
-Refers to the appraisement of the condemned Spanish prize Jesus de Nazareno [150 tons, 8 
guns, cargo of varied goods] captured and brought into Rhode Island for condemnation by the 
[privateers] Hanna and Mary [of Boston], Captain John commander, the Charles [of Jamaica], 
Captain Peter Lawrence commander [40 men], and the Tyger [of Rhode Island], Captain 
Jeremiah Burrows commander. Prize valued at £1,681,15s, 3d.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 162
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 11 Mar. 1706. 
-Reports the capture of a French ship of about 90 tons, 4 guns and 17 men by a small 
privateer from Bermuda, laden with sugar.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 277 (\)
John Graves to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 19 Apr. 1706, enclosing a petition of the 
Inhabitants of the Bahamas to John Graves, 30 Nov. 1704.
-Refers to capture of two Spanish prizes by Captain Thomas Williams [commander of a 
privateer sloop] operating under a commission from Governor Sir N. Johnson, condemned 
Bahamas.
C.S.P. CoL. 1706-1708. no. 424 fiih
Lt. Governor Bennett to Mr. Popple, 9 July 1705, enclosing proceedings of the Court of Vice- 
Admiralty at Bermuda, 11 and 14 Jan. 1706.
-Refers to the condemnation and appraisement of the French ship A/exander captured, on the 
29 December 1705, by the privateer Dolphin Bermuda, Captain John Evans commander.
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C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 511 fil
Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 2 Oct. 1706, enclosing a disposition 
from John Colman, Nov. 25 1706.
-Refers to a prize brought into Newport, Rhode Island, by Captain John Blew [commander of 
Boston privateer Hanna and Mary\.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 526
Letter from Governor Dudley to Mr. Secretary Hedges, 8 Oct. 1706.
-Reports that Boston privateers had recaptured five of the prizes that the French buccaneer 
d’Iberville had carried from Nevis.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 868
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 21 Apr. 1707.
-Reports the capture of a French ship of 200 tons by a Jamaican privateer.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 1128
Letter from Captain Chadweil to Robert Holden, 3 Oct. 1707.
-Reports that a privateer of 20 tons and 35 men. Captain Walker commander, fitted out from 
the Bahamas in January, has to date captured five vessels, each man making about £50.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708, no. 1250
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 30 Dec. 1707. 
-Reports the capture of a small Spanish sloop, in mid December, by a Jamaican privateer, 
laden with dry goods.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 1423
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations  ^31 Mar. 1708. 
-Reports the capture of a French prize of 150 tons by a Jamaican privateer, laden with wine, 
brandy and dry goods.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 1487
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 19 May 1708. 
-Reports the capture of two French ships by a Jamaican privateer, one, laden with wine and 
brandy, and the other, laden with salt.
-Also reports the capture of seven prizes from a convoy of fourteen sail of brigantines and 
sloops by another privateer sloop of 100 men. Captain Coleby commander, laden with 
valuable goods form the galleons of Portobello.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 10
Letter from Governor Lord Cornbury of New York to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 
July 1708.
-Reports that [a privateer sloop] Captain Fane [commander] captured a prize which he carried 
into New York.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 142
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 24 Sept. 1708. 
-Reports the capture of a French prize by a Jamaican privateer, in addition to burning of 
another three or four prizes which the said privateer was unable to bring into port.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 150
Letter from Governor Parke of Antigua to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 Oct. 1708. 
-Reports the capture of a Dutch sloop by a privateer, condemned St. Kitts.
C. S. P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 174
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 27 Oct. 1708. 
-Reports that privateers from Jamaica had captured and brought in two Spanish vessels with 
cargoes of cocoa and 'other goods'. Took several more prizes off Campeachy, which were 
burnt.
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C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 202
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 23 Nov. 1708. 
-Reports the capture of a barcolongo off Havana, Cuba [In October 1708], by two privateers 
(ship and a sloop), laden with between £30,000-40,000 in gold and silver.
C.S.P. CoL. 1708-1709. no. 445 (h
Letter from Mr. Dummer to Mr. Popple, Nov. 4, 1709, enclosing another letter from William 
Bignall to Mr. Dummer, Jan. 17,1708.
-Reports the capture of a Spanish vessel by a privateer sloop [Captain Morgan commander], 
laden with a 'good sum of money'.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 451
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 6 Apr. 1709.
-Reports the capture of a French privateer by a Jamaican privateer.
C.S.P. CoL. 1708-1709. no. 649
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 18 July 1709.
-Reports that a French ship of 160 tons was captured, on the 10 July 1709, by a privateer from 
Jamaica, Captain Pinckerman commander, cargo of dry goods.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 720
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 Sept. 1709.
-Reports that the Islands privateers had captured and brought in three prizes since his last 
correspondence. Another French vessel of 28 guns sank due to damage sustained during 
battle.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 785
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 20 Oct. 1709. 
-Reports the capture of two Spanish ships by Jamaican privateers. The former of these prizes 
was laden with wine and olives, while the latter was laden with hides and tallow.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 831 fill
Letter from Mr. Burchett to Mr. Popple, enclosing another letter from Peter Holt to Captain 
William Billton, 26 Oct. 1709.
-Reports the capture of a brigantine that was already the prize of a Jamaican privateer by 
Captain Stone, commissioned by the governor of Carolina, condemned and sold Carolina.
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 170
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 25 Mar. 1710. 
-Reports the capture of five French privateers, as well as two or three other small prizes by 
Jamaican privateers, laden with cocoa and tobacco.
C.S.P. Col.. 1710-1711. no. 186
Letter from Governor Handasyd to Mr. Popple, 9 Apr. 1710.
-Reports the capture of a French sloop, on the 3 April 1710, by a Jamaican privateer, laden 
with tobacco, tallow, hides, sugar and wine.
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 253
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 4 June 1710.
-Reports the capture of seven vessels by the Islands privateers: two French sloops, laden with 
hides and tallow; two French privateers; two sugger drovers; and finally, a large Spanish ship 
of 250 tons and 157 men, laden with brandy, vinegar, olives, sweet meats and dry goods.
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 415
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 3 Oct. 1710.
-Reports the capture of two French privateers by Jamaican privateers.
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C.S.P. Col.. 1710-1711. no. 487
Letter from Governor Hunter of New York to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 14 Nov.
1710.
-Refers to the capture of a prize by Jamaican privateers, condemned New York.
C.S.P. CoL. 1710-1711. no. 530
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 4 Dec. 1710.
-Reports the capture of three or four French merchantmen by Jamaican privateers, carried into 
New York for condemnation.
C.S.P. Col. 1710-1711. no. 538 l\)
Council of Trade and Plantations to Lord Dartmouth, 8 Dec. 1710, enclosing a letter from St. 
Christopher relating to Guadeloupe, Sept. 16, 1710.
-Reports the capture of a small vessel coming from Guadeloupe by a privateer from St. 
Christopher.
C.S.P. Col.. 1710-1711. no. 567 fi-vh
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 7 May 1711.
-Refers to condemnation of various vessels in the court of Admiralty at Bermuda: sloop 
Margaret (March 1708); brigantine Industry (February 1709); French ship Three Friends [letter 
of marque, 2 guns, Captain Giles Davis commander, captured by Bermudan privateer Rose, 
laden with indigo and skins](November 1709); Sloop Isabella (September 1709); Sloop Happy 
Return (August 1710); Sloop Diligence [4 guns, 23 men, captured, off Hispaniola, by the 
Bermudan privateer Rose, laden with indigo, tobacco, silk cloth and 1400 pieces of eight](July
1710).
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 824
Letter from Lt. General Hamilton of the Leeward Islands to Lord Dartmouth, 26 Apr. 1711. 
-Reports the capture of two ships by privateers from Jamaica.
C.S.P. Col.. 1710-1711. no. 832 fiih
Governor Hunter to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 7 May 1711, enclosing another letter 
from Governor Hunter to the Commissioners of Customs, May 7,1711.
-Reports the capture of a large ship by two privateers, sloop Kingston, Captain John Marshall 
commander, and ketch Samuel, Captain Charles Pinketham commander, laden with cocoa, 
brought Into New York for condemnation.
C.S.P. Col.. 1711-1712. no. 18
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 16 July 1711.
-Reports the capture of four rich prizes by a Jamaican privateer [Charles of 16 guns], Captain 
[Wiiliam] Tempest commander, condemned Boston.
C.S.P. CoL 1711-1712. no. 75
Letter from Governor Lord Alexander Hamilton of Jamaica to the Council of Trade and 
Plantations, 15 Aug. 1711.
-Reports the capture of four small prizes by privateers from Jamaica.
C.S.P. CoL 1711-1712. no. 82
Letter from Governor Lord Alexander Hamilton to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 29 
Aug. 1711,
-Reports the capture of a French privateer sloop from Petit Guavas (120 men) by a Jamaican 
privateer.
C.S.P. CoL 1711-1712. no. 125
Letter from Governor Lord Alexander Hamilton to the Earl of Dartmouth, 18 Oct. 1711.
-Reports the capture of a Spanish vessel bound for Havana, Cuba, by a Jamaican privateer.
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C.S.P. CoL. 1711-1712. no. 418
Letter from Lt. Governor Spotswood of Virginia to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 15 
May 1712.
-Reports that the Sec/forc/galley had captured a French merchant ship laden with sugar, indigo 
and cocoa, which was condemned on Virginia.
C.S.P. Col.. 1712-1714. no. 44
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett of to the Earl of Dartmouth, 15 Aug. 1712.
-Reports the capture of a French ship of 100 tons, 8 guns and 20 men, off Bermuda, on the 19 
July 1712, by a Bermudan privateer.
Calendar of Treasury Books {€. T.B.)
C.T.B.. 1702. XVII. part I. 213
Account by John Perrle, Register of the Admiralty court at Antigua, of prizes taken and 
condemned at Antigua between 19 Aug. 1702 and 6 Feb. 1703.
-Seaflower of Barbados, Captain Pied commander, captured and had condemned two small 
French sloops, Diligent of Mary Galant (20 tons) and the Mary of Martinique (20 tons) - July 
1702, (REPEAT REFERENCE -  CSP.Col., 1704-1705, no. 39 (i))
-[Privateer Marygold of Barbados] Captain John Gill brought into the port of St. Johns a small 
corvet or barque, the Jane of Bordeaux (20 tons), laden with claret and brandy, and a sloop 
called the Fortune of Martinique (40 tons), laden with Negroes - July 1702. (REPEAT 
REFERENCE — as above)
-Privateer sloop Despatch of Barbados, Captain John Smith commander, brought in and had 
condemned the sloop Diligent of St. Christopher (25 tons), cargo of Negroes and provisions - 
July 1702. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-Privateer sioop Margaret and Ann of Barbados, Captain Hilary Roe commander, brought In 
and had condemned two sloops or open shells, the Margaret and the Ann (10 tons each), laden 
with cattle and horses Intended for Martinique - July 1702. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as 
above)
-[Privateer Weymouth of Antigua] Captain Valentine Morris commander, brought in and had 
condemned two open French shallops, the American (8 tons) and the Weymouth, laden with 
sugar -  Aug. 1702. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
C.T.B.. 1703. XVIII. 301
Royal Warrant to John Dodd, Receiver General of the Rights and Perquisites of Admiralty, 15 
June 1703.
-Refers to the capture of a French banker ship Benediction of Havre de Grace, France.
C.T.B.. 1704. XIX. 215
Account of the Lord High Admiral's tenths on Prizes brought into Nevis since the start of the 
war, 28 Apr. 1704.
-[Bermudan] privateer sloop Rose [Captain Lewis Middleton commander] captured on the 28 
July 1702 a sloop called Mary, laden with a cargo of claret and Negroes, valued at £653, 3s, 
3d.
-Privateer sloop Content captured the sloops Francis and Mary, laden with a cargo of sugar 
and slaves, sold for £312, 5s, 7d.
-Two privateers, the brigantine Tryall and the sloop Ruby, captured, on the 17 September 
1702, a barque St. John the Baptist from Guadeloupe, laden with a cargo of sugar and cotton, 
sold for £1183, 18s, 8d.
-Privateer sloop Restoration captured off Newfoundland, on the 27 March 1703, a ship called 
Hope, laden with a cargo of fish and French salt, sold for £697.
C.T.B.. 1708. XXII. 331
Letter from J. Taylor to the Principal Commissioners for Prizes, 22 July 1708.
-Refers to a prize captured by the New York Galiey [150 men and 20 guns], Captain Reyner 
Tongrelon commander.
122
C.T.B.. ?708. XXII. 434
Warrant by Treasurer Goldolphin to the Receiver of the Rights and Perquisites of Admiralty 
and the Comptroller thereof, 12 Nov. 1708.
-Refers to the capture of a French vessel St John Baptist by a Newfoundland privateer Grand 
Canary, Captains Moxham and Hayman commanders.
Colonial Office Manuscripts (P.R.O. C.O.)
P.R.O. C.Q.. 28/7. no. 33 (W)
List of Prizes condemned at Barbados, accounted for by James Hannay, received 5 Aug. 
1704.
-Sloop Mary Rose of 25 tons captured by a privateer [sloop] from Barbados [Dispatch / 
Despatch], Captain John Smith commander [condemned 19 August 1702].
-Ship Phenie of 140 tons and 4 guns captured by a privateer [Adventure] from New England, 
Captain John Halsey commander, laden with salt fish [condemned 6 December 1702].
-Lady Rosario of 100 tons and 4 guns captured by a privateer [sloop Seaflower] from 
Barbados, Captain Alexander Forrester commander, laden with liquors and dry goods 
[condemned 8 August 1702].
-Margaritta of 140 tons and 2 guns captured by a privateer [Adventure] from New England, 
Captain John Halsey commander, laden with salt fish [condemned 6 December 1702].
-Louis oi 150 tons and 2 guns captured by above, laden with salt fish.
-Ship Duke de Berry ot 120 tons and 10 guns captured by above, laden with iiqours.
-Small sloop captured off the coast of Martinique by above.
-Sloop Charies II captured off the coast of Caracas in the Spanish Dominions by two 
privateers, one, a privateer [Dragon] from Barbados, Captain William Read [Peade] 
commander, the other, a privateer [Adventure] of New England, Captain John Halsey 
commander, laden with cocoa and dry goods [condemned 25 August 1702].
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/7. 272-4.
Account by Nick Sayers of prizes condemned at Barbados from the start of the war to 4 Feb. 
1704.
-French sloop Mary Rose of 25 tons captured by privateer sloop Dispatch [Despatch] of 
Barbados, Captain John Smith commander, condemned on the 19 August 1702. (REPEAT 
REFERENCE -  P.R.O. C.O., 28/7, no. 33 (i))
-Spanish ship Lady of Rosario St. Peter and St. Joseph of 100 tons, 4 guns and 12 patteroes 
captured by privateer sloop Seafiower of Boston [Captain William Pied commander], 
condemned on the 8 August 1702. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-French ship [Phenie] of 140 tons and 4 guns captured by a privateer sloop of Boston 
[Adventure], Captain John Halsey commander, condemned on the 6 December 1702.
-French ship Margaritta of 140 tons and 2 guns captured by above, condemned as above. 
-Spanish sloop Charles the second captured off the coast of Caracas by the privateer 
brigantine Dragon, Captain William Peade commander, and the privateer brigantine Adventure 
of Boston, Captain John Halsey commander, laden with a cargo of dry goods, condemned 25 
August 1703. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  P.R.O. C.O. 28/7, no. 33 (ii))
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/13. 596-7
List of Prizes brought into Barbados between July 1711 -  Mar. 1712.
-The French ship Uunique captured by the privateer ship the Ambuscade, Captain Robert 
Summers commander, laden with beef, claret, Nantes wine, brandy, butter, candles, flour, 
linen cloth and shoes [condemned 3 Mar. 1712].
P.R.O. C.O.. 137/6. no. 42 N)
List of prizes condemned at Jamaica between 4 May 1702 and 30 Jan. 1704.
-Sloop St. Patrick of St. Thomas captured near Curracoa, on the 16 February 1703, by the 
privateer ship from Barbados Paradox, Captain Forrester commander, condemned for illegal 
trading, valued at £456.
-Sloop Lady Leah of Curracoa captured off the coast of Curracoa, on the 27 March 1703, by 
the privateer sloop Francis and Sarah, Captain Francis Johnson commander, condemned as 
above.
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-Sloop Cotana of above, captured by above, on the 27 March 1703, condemned as above. 
-Sloop Catherina of above, captured by above on 29 March 1703, condemned as above.
-Sloop North Lion of St. Thomas captured by above, on 26 August 1703, condemned as 
above.
-Sloop Cousyns of above, captured by above, on the 26 August 1703, condemned as above. 
-Sloop Young Dorothy of above, captured by above on the 26 August 1703, condemned as 
above. (Condemned value of last six prizes captured by Francis and Sarah amounted to 
£2330, 6s, 8d.)
-Spanish sloop Good Success of Porto Rico captured, on the 5 December 1703, by the 
[privateer] sloop Edward and Sarah [100 men]. Captain Thomas Coleby commander, valued at 
£450, 3s, 6d.
-Sloops Hope and Patience of Curracoa captured off the coast of Curracoa on the 26 and 29 
September 1703 by the [privateer] sloop Edward and Sarah [100 men], Captain Thomas 
Coleby commander, condemned for illegal trading, valued at £284, 6s and £648, 17s, 9d 
respectively.
-French ship St. Refer of Rochelle captured near Hispaniola, on the 6 December 1703, by the 
[privateer] sloop Neptune, Captain Samuel Lyddell commander, valued at £538, 2s, Id. 
-Spanish sloop Nuestra Senord de Rosaria of Nicaragua, captured off Puerto Velo captured, 
on the 2 December 1703, by the Jamaican sloop Francis and Sarah, Captain Francis Johnson 
commander, valued at £89, Is, 9d.
P.R.O. C.Q.. 137/8. no. 24 01
List of French and Spanish vessels condemned at Jamaica between July 1708 and Sept. 
1708:
-Spanish vessel Paradera captured, on 18 July 1708, by the sloop Thompson, Captain Samuei 
Lyddell, condemned on the 31 July 1708.
-Spanish vessel Nuestra Senora dell Rossario San Joseph y' San Antonio captured, on 17 July 
1708, by above, condemned 10 August 1708.
P.R.O. C.O.. 152/5. no. 50 fllh
List of Prizes condemned at Nevis between the 28 July 1702 and the 27 Mar. 1703.
-Sloop Mary captured by privateer sloop Rose, laden with claret and 20 Negro slaves, valued 
at £653, 3s, 3d.
-Sloop Francis and Mary captured by privateer sloop Content, laden with cargo of fifteen casks 
of sugar, three casks of cocoa, three Negro slaves, parcel of turtle shells, valued at £312, 5s, 
7d.
-Bark St. John the Baptist from Guadeloupe captured, on the 17 September 1702, by two 
privateers, a brigantine called Tryail and a sloop called Ruby, laden with a cargo of sugar and 
cotton, valued at £1183,18s, 7d.
-Ship Hope captured off the banks of Newfoundland, on the 27 March, by the privateer sloop 
Restoration, laden with wet fish and salt, valued at £697.
Howard M. Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The first Century of American Colonial 
Privateering, 1625-1725.
Chapter IX. Massachusetts privateers in Queen Anne’s War.
-The Charles privateer of Boston (40 men). Captain Peter Lawrence commander, owned by 
Charles Chambers and Samuel Philips, while cruising off the coast of Cuba, captured several 
prizes.
-The Charles later, whilst cruising in consort with the brigantine Hannah and Mary of Boston 
and the Tyger of Bermuda, Captains John Blew and Burrows commanders respectively, 
captured off the coast of Cuba a Spanish Ship called the Jesus de Nazareno. This ship of 150 
tons and 8 guns, which was bound for Havana and laden with 100 pipes of Malmsey, 30 casks 
of Brandy, almonds, raisons, money, plate and silk, was valued at £1681, 15s, 3d and 
condemned Rhode Island. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  C.S.P. Col., 1704-1705, no. 1407 (ii))
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-A Massachusetts privateer [the Charles of 60 tons, 90 men and 6 guns]. Captain Thomas 
Larrimore commander, captured, in July 1702, a prize and sent her into Boston for 
condemnation (arrived late August).
-In December 1702, Governor Dudley wrote that Captain Larrimore had captured ‘five good 
ships’.
-The privateer brigantine Adventure of Boston [Captain John Halsey commander] captured 
three French banker ships, the Phoenix (140 tons and 4 guns), the Margaritta (140 tons and 2 
guns) and the St. Louis (150 tons and 2 guns), all laden with salt fish. These three prizes were 
carried into Barbados and condemned on the 6 December 1702. (REPEAT REFERENCE - 
Second two prize captures - P.R.O. C.O., 28, 7, no. 33 (ii))
-The Adventure [Captain John Halsey commander], later, cruising in consort with the privateer 
brigantine Dragon of Barbados, Captain William Pead [Peade] commander, captured the 
French sloop Charies //for whale trading with the Spanish, condemned Barbados in April 1703. 
(REPEAT REFERENCE - P.R.O. C.O., 28, 7. no. 33 (ii); and P.R.O. C.O., 28/7, 272-4)
-A Boston privateer captured the French ship Canada Magazin, whilst cruising in the Bay de 
Vert at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, in the summer of 1704.
-A Boston privateer sioop. Captain Harris commander, recaptured a former privateer sloop 
from the French, Captain Blin commander.
-Three privateers, the Boston galley (24 guns and 60 men). Captain Michael Gill commander, 
the Neptune galley (16 guns and 54 men). Captain Henry Penny commander, and finally, the 
Whetston galley (14 guns and 90 men), Captain Henry Green comrriander) captured a ship 
and a ketch in the harbour of St. Pierre, in August 1702. These two prizes were laden with salt 
and wine.
-On the 13 August 1702, the above privateers recaptured an English ship the Michael Galiey, 
laden with tobacco, formerly commanded by Captain Johnson.
-On the 14 August 1702, the above privateers captured a sloop as she sailed into St. Pierre.
-On the 15 August 1702, the above privateers recaptured the sloop Arkoi Salem as she sailed 
out of St. Pierre.
-Earlier, in July 1702, in latitude 48', 8’, N, the Boston galley captured a French banker ship of 
21 men and 6 guns, ransomed for 350 pistoles In gold.
-The privateer sloop Adventure of Antigua, Captain William Ball commander, captured on the 
Banks of Newfoundland, in October 1703, the French ship St. Lawrence the Victorious of 
Rochelle (120 tons, 6 guns and 23 men). Captain Pierre Dibon commander. Prize ship and 
cargo valued at £120, condemned Bermuda. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  C.S.P. Col., 1704- 
1705, no. 257
-The Boston privateer ship King of Spain (57 men). Captain William Rows or Rouse 
commander, fought and captured, in October 1712, the Spanish man-of-war Gardie Course 
(216 men, 20 guns and 8 pateraroes). Captain De Goe Flurintin commander, prize was 
eventually burnt as there were insufficient men to man her.
Chapter X: The Massachusetts provincial navv.
-A privateer sloop. Captain Jacob Fowle commander, while cruising aiong the coast of Acadia, 
in early 1705, captured a French prize, arrived Boston on the 20 April 1705.
-The Province Gaiiey, a snow of 14 guns, Captain Southwark commander, hired as a coast 
guard, captured, in August 1703, three small vessels from the Indians in Casco Bay.
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-A second purpose-built Province Galiey of 18 guns and 160 tons, launched on the 2 July 
1705, while cruising in consort with the sloop Flying Horse, Captain Calley commander, 
captured, in the summer of 1706, a French sloop of 60 tons, laden with stone and timber for 
the French forts.
Chapter XI: The Seaflower and other Rhode Island privateers.
-The privateer brigantine Greyhound of 100 tons, 12 guns and 100 men, commissioned by 
Governor Cranston on the 6 July 1702, Captain William Wanton commander, captured while 
cruising in the Gulf of St. Lawrence three French vessels. The first of these was a privateer of 
260 tons, 20 guns and 48 men, while the second and third were merchantmen, one of 300 tons 
and 16 guns and another of 160 tons and 8 guns. All three vessels were laden with dried fish.
-The Charles privateer sloop of 60 tons, 6 guns and 90 men, formerly of Boston, now 
commissioned out of Rhode Island, Captain Peter Larrimore commander, captured two prizes 
off the banks of Newfoundland. These prizes consisted of a pink of 130 tons and 8 guns, as 
well as a square stern ship of 240 tons. Both vessels were laden with codfish and condemned 
at Newport, Rhode Island, on the 12 November 1703.
-The sloop Seaflower, commanded by Lieutenant Tongerlou, after Captain Stevens had been 
captured along with a proportion of the crew whilst attempting to raid a Mexican town, captured 
off Curacao a French sloop of 76 men, 8 guns and 8 pattereroes, Captain Larew commander.
-The Seaflower captured a further five vessels belonging to Curacao, laden with cocoa, 
tobacco and liqueurs. One of these prizes, laden with 10 tons of cocoa, five to six thousand 
weight of tobacco, eight tea res of dry goods and thirty cases of liquor, was condemned at 
Newport on the 22 April 1704. Another prize, a Dutch brigantine of 90 tons, captured for 
trading with the Spanish, was condemned at Newport on the 30 Juhë 1704. A third prize, 
another iilicit trader, laden with 600 pounds of cocoa, 40 barrels of flour and some hides, was 
condemned at New York in September 1704.
-The brigantine Charles [100 tons, 8 guns], Captain John Halsey commander, commissioned 
on the 7 November, owned by the Boston merchants Nicholas Raise, William Clarke, 
Benjamin gallop and John Coleman, captured a Spanish ship of 130 tons and 8 guns, laden 
with brandy, wine, sugar, paper, snuff and oil. This capture which was made in company with 
two privateers from New York and one from Carolina, condemned Rhode Island on the 27 
June 1705, valued between £4000-25000.
-The Charles, in October 1705, while cruising off the banks of Newfoundland, captured a ship 
of 130 tons and 4 guns.
-The Charles also captured a Spanish ship of 24 guns from Havana, Cuba, which was sent into 
Madeira for condemnation.
-Two Rhode Island privateer sloops, commanded by John Cranston and Benjamin Cranston, 
carrying 120 men in total, captured a French privateer and her prize, three leagues south of 
Block Island, condemned Rhode Island, on the 6 June 1706.
-Two sloops, commanded by Major William Wanton and Captain Ward, carrying 130 men in 
total, commissioned out of Rhode Island, captured, on the 8 September 1707, in Vineyard 
Sound, a French privateer from Placentia which had been molesting shipping off Block Island.
-The privateer Charles of Jamaica [Captain William Tempest commander, 16 guns] captured 
three prizes in the late spring / early summer of 1711. The first of these was the sloop Santa 
Rosa of 50 tons, followed by the ship La Paix of 150 tons and 12 guns, both laying at anchor in 
Port Mahon, laden with sugar, indigo and hides. The final capture was sloop Nostra Senors del 
Rosario of 40 tons captured off the coast of Cuba, laden with snuff. Iron and steel. All three 
prizes were condemned at Rhode Island in June 1711.
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Chapter XII: Bermuda in Queen Anne’s War.
-The Bermudan privateer Fame, Captain Henry Pulline commander, captured, off Tenerife, a 
prize laden with corn, arrived at Bermuda for condemnation on the 21 July 1703.
-The Bermudan privateer sloop Dolphin of 20 tons, Captain John Evans commander, captured, 
on the 29 December, in latitude 27*, 40', N, the French ship Alexandre of 90 tons, 4 guns and 
17men, Captain Jacques Pacquiet commander, bound from Martinique to Bordeaux. Ship and 
cargo of sugar, ginger and cassia were condemned at Bermuda in January 1706, valued at 
£1717, 14s, 8d.
-The Bermudan privateer sloop Rose of 40 tons and 6 carriage guns. Captain Lewis Middleton 
commander, captured a Spanish launch, in the Bay of Matanzan, on 7 July 1709, laden with 
silver and silk.
-The Bermudan privateer sloop Rose captured off the north keys of Cuba, in August 1709, 
another two Spanish launches, laden with candles, sugar, hides, tallow, wax, guns, cables and 
salves.
-The Bermudan privateer sloop Rose later captured, in October 1709, a French letter of 
marque sloop Three Friends of 2 guns, Captain Giles David commander, bound for Rochelle, 
laden with indigo and skins, condemned Bermuda. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  C.S.P. Col., 
1710-1711,567 (i-vi))
-The Bermudan privateer sloop Rose, operating under a second commission, dated 18 March 
1710, captured the sloop St James of Barbados, about a league to the windward of the castle 
of St. Dominique, on the 2 June 1710. Condemned for illegal trading of iron and steel with the 
Spanish at Porto Rico.
-The Bermudan privateer sloop Rose also captured off Hispaniola, on the 14 June 1710, the 
sloop Diligence of Martinique of 4 guns and 23 men, laden with a cargo of sugar, indigo, 
tobacco, silk, cloth and 1400 pieces of eight, condemned Barbados July 1710. (REPEAT 
REFERENCE -  C.S.P. Col., 1710-1711, 567 (i-vi))
-The Bermudan privateer sloop Rose, captain Middleton commander, operating under a third 
commission, dated 28 September, captured another French ship Jean et Joseph of Nantes, 
France (4 guns and 24 men), Captain Henri Guiilet commander, which was bound from 
Martinique to Nantes. Ship and cargo of sugar, cotton, cocoa and indigo was condemned at 
Bermuda.
-The Bermudan privateer brigantine Industry of 35 tons and 8 guns, Captain Benjamin Aster 
commander, commissioned for a second time on February 13 1712, captured, three leagues 
off Point Spandoe, the French privateer sloop St. Joseph of 3 guns and 39 men from Santo 
Domingo, condemned Bermuda July 1712.
Chapter XIII: The New York Gallev and the Southern privateers.
New York:
-A New York privateer of 18 guns and 120 men. Captain Adrian Claver commander, captured, 
off the coast of New Spain, in the spring of 1704, two Spanish vessels (a sloop and a settee), 
laden with brandy, wine, oil, dry goods, silks and Negroes, condemned New York in July 1704.
-A New York privateer barque, probably the Castle del Rey, Captain Claver commander, 
captured within sight of Havana, Cuba, a large Spanish ship of 300 tons and 20 guns, bound 
for Cadiz, laden with wine, brandy, oil, raisons, anchovies, olives and dry goods, condemned 
New York in August 1704.
-A New York privateer sloop of 70 men. Captain Thomas Peniston commander, captured off 
Guadeloupe a French privateer of 8 guns and 40 men, condemned Nevis.
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-Later, off the coast of Caracas, in February 1705, the New York privateer Revenge captured 
several peviavgers, laden with cocoa, and a France ship of 150 tons, bound from Martinique to 
France, laden with sugar, indigo and cocoa, prizes condemned Bermuda.
-In the summer of 1705, the New York privateer Revenge captured, off the coast of New 
Spain, a small sloop laden with cocoa, condemned New York on the 31 August 1705.
-In the autumn of 1705, the New York privateer Revenge captured another two sloops, laden 
with wine and brandy, condemned New York throughout September and October 1705.
-In May 1706, the New York privateer Revenge, cruising in consort with a Dutch privateer, 
captured a French sloop, bound from Martinique to St. Dominique, cargo of cocoa, arrived in 
New York for condemnation on the 4 June 1706.
-The New York privateer Revenge captured a Spanish privateer of 4 guns and 30 men.
-In June 1706, the New York privateer Revenge captured, off Cape Francois, a small French 
ship of 60 to 70 tons, which was bound for Petit Guavas, laden with sugar.
-The New York privateer Cettey or Setty of 100 men, Captain Albert Defrees commander, 
captured, off Newfoundland, a French vessel of 100 tons, laden with codfish, arrived New York 
for condemnation in mid-August 1705.
-The New York Galley of 200 tons and 18 guns, formerly the prize ship Cole and Bean, 
captured a brigantine of 150 tons, bound from Hispaniola to France, cargo of sugar and indigo
-The New York Galley later captured another vessel, bound from France to Hispaniola, laden 
with claret, glass and earthenware, burnt after cargo was moved to aforementioned brigantine.
-The New York Galley captured later still a small sloop, which was converted into a tender of 6 
guns and 27 men, placed under the command of Nathaniel Burdett.
-Aforementioned tender forced a west-bound Spanish ship from the Canaries of 600 tons, 24 
guns and 250 men, to surrender her cargo, after she had run aground about a league from 
Baracoa, Cuba.
-The New York Galley, in consort with two Jamaican privateers and a brigantine from Curacoa, 
attacked a fleet of French vessels, off Cape Francois. The Jamaican privateers captured three 
vessels, the Curacoa vessel, one, and the New York Galley, the largest of the French vessels, 
the ship Montserrat Merchant of 170 tons, laden with sugar, indigo, raw hides and cotton, 
arrived New York for condemnation on the 19 September 1706.
-The New York Galley of 150 men and 20 guns captured two Spanish armed sloops (fitted out 
to catch him) while cruising off the north coast of Cuba.
-The New York Galley captured another Spanish vessel bound from Vera Cruz to Havana, 
laden with money and goods. This vessel and the two previously mentioned, arrived at New 
York for condemnation on the 16 July 1707.
-A privateer sloop from New York, Captain Zacharias commander, captured, within sight of 
Cartagena, a Spanish sloop, laden with sugar, arrived at New York for condemnation on the 29 
June 1706.
-The New York privateer ketch Samuel, Captain Charles Pinkethman commander, in consort 
with a privateer sloop from Kingston, Jamaica, Captain John Marshall commander, captured a 
large Spanish ship, laden with cocoa, sent into New York for condemnation September 1710.
-Privateer Hunter of New York, while cruising in the West Indies in 1712, in company with a 
Jamaican privateer, Captain Lewis commander, attacked and captured a French Guineaman
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of 30 guns and 207 men (formerly H.M.S Sweepstakes taken by the French off the Guinea 
coast). Captured cargo consisted of cocoa, elephant teeth, £15-16,000 in gold and silver and 
10 guns in her hold.
-New York privateer Hunter later, on the same cruise, recaptured from the Spaniards a New 
England built brigantine, laden with gunpowder and scrap. This and aforementioned prizes 
arrived at New York for condemnation on the 29 September 1712.
Pennsylvania:
-A privateer sloop belonging to Philadelphia, Captain Hurst commander, captured, on the 17 
September 1706, In St. Mary’s Bay, a French ship of 120 tons bound for France, laden with dry 
fish.
South Carolina:
-A small sloop, fitted out by the merchants of Charleston, Captain Thomas Williams 
commander, captured several Spanish prizes, condemned New Providence, Bahamas.
-A privateer from Carolina captured a French privateer, in January 1705, laden with cocoa and 
11,000 pieces of eight, carried into St. Thomas for condemnation, each man sharing £150
-A Bermudan sloop. Colonel Rhett commander. In consort with the Flying Horse, Captain Stool 
commander, captured a French ship in Seway Bay, arrived Charleston for condemnation on 
the 6 September 1706.
-A privateer, commissioned out of Carolina, Captain Stone commander, captured. In the Bay 
of Honduras, a Vessel, Captain Peter Holt commander, for Illegal trading.
-Captain Stone later captured a brigantine already the prize of a Jamaican privateer, 
condemned and sold at Carolina.
Chapter XIV: Notes on the West Indies.
The Bahamas:
-A privateer commanded by Captain Thomas Williams, commissioned by the Governor of 
Carolina, captured several prizes and sent them into New Providence for condemnation in 
November 1704.
-A privateer of 20 tons and 35 men. Captain Walker commander, fitted out by the inhabitants 
of New Providence, in January 1707, captured five small prizes off the Cuban coast, each man 
sharing £50.
Jamaica:
-A Jamaican privateer captured the French privateer St. Denis and the merchant ship St. Jean 
of Nantes, France, in October 1702.
-Jamaican privateer barque Francis and Sarah, commissioned on the 31 August 1703, Captain 
Francis Johnson commander, captured the Danish barque Robert and Mathews, Christopher 
Akers master, and the Danish sloop Jean and Mateuwes for illegal trading.
-A Jamaican privateer [100 tons, 100 men]. Captain Thomas Coleby commander, captured 
three barques, a periauger, and several Dutch iilicit traders.
-A Jamaican privateer of 4 guns and 60 men. Captain Charles Gandy commander, captured 
two French privateers. In early 1704.
-A Jamaican privateer captured a Danish sloop called the Schutburg, In 1704, laden with 
contraband goods for Fort Louis, condemned Jamaica.
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-A Jamaican privateer brigantine of 12 guns and 110 men, Captain Balling commander, whilst 
cruising off Vera Cruz, in late 1704, captured a brigantine and a sioop fitted out by the Spanish 
to hunt him. Balling burnt the brigantine and sent the sloop to Jamaica for condemnation.
-Another Jamaican privateer captured two rich prizes and sent them into Jamaica for 
condemnation on the 1 March 1705.
-A privateer brigantine from Jamaica, in consort with a Dutch privateer sloop, captured four 
French merchantmen, one a ship of between 200 and 300 tons, laden with brandy, wine and 
dry goods, condemned at Jamaica, on the 20 August of 1706.
-A Jamaican privateer captured a Spanish sloop. In early December 1707, laden with dry 
goods, condemned Jamaica.
-In May 1708, Governor Handasyd reported that Jamaican privateers had recently captured 
two French ships, one laden with wine and brandy, and the other with salt.
-A Jamaican privateer sloop of 100 tons [and 100 men], Captain Coleby commander, attacked 
14 sail of brigantines and sloops, as well as the Duke of Anjou’s guard sloop carrying 70-80 
men. Coleby captured the guard ship and six of the merchantmen, ransomed two of them and 
sent the remaining five into Jamaica for condemnation.
-A Jamaican privateer captured a French prize of small value, in early 1708.
-A Jamaican privateer sloop captured a French vessel, in the autumn of 1708, condemned 
Jamaica. Another four prizes were burnt at sea.
-Two Jamaican privateers captured, off Campeachy, four Spanish vessels (two of which were 
burnt as they could not be brought to windward), laden with cocoa and various other 
merchandize.
-A Jamaican privateer ship and sloop captured a barcolonga with between £30,000 - 40,000 on 
board, whilst cruising off Havana, Cuba, arrived Jamaica for condemnation on the 2 
November 1708. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  C.S.P. Col., 1708-1709, no. 202)
-A Jamaican privateer captured a French prize, in the spring of 1709.
-A Jamaican privateer captured a Spanish trading sloop and recaptured an English sloop, in 
the spring of 1709
-A Jamaican privateer captured a Spanish brigantine, laden with corn and earthenware, in the 
spring of 1709.
-Governor Handasyd reported, on the 8 September 1709, that three French prizes were 
brought into Jamaica for condemnation. A fourth French vessel of 28 guns sank due to 
damage sustained during its capture.
-A Jamaican privateer captured the French ship Vigilant of 160 tons. Captain Charles 
Pinckerman commander, laden with dry goods, condemned Jamaica in July 1709.
-Jamaican Privateer Charles of 18 guns, Captain William Tempest commander, captured a 
French vessel bound from Petit Guavas to France that was riding at anchor at Port Maria, 
laden with sugar and indigo.
-The Charles also captured, off the Cuban coast, the Spanish sloops Nostra Senora del 
Rosario, laden with Iron, steel and snuff, and the Santa Rosa, on which Captain John Lewis 
was placed as prize master. Captain Lewis arrived with his charge on the 30 May 1711, while 
the Charles arrived with another two prizes on the 2 June 1711.
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-A Jamaican privateer of 130 men, Captain Cook commander, captured, in late 1711, a 
French privateer from Petit Guavas, condemned Jamaica.
Barbados:
-Privateer sloop Dispatch, commissioned out of Barbados, Captain John Smith commander, 
captured the French sloop Marie Rose of 25 tons, condemned at Barbados, on the 19 August
1702.
-The Barbados privateer sloop Seaflower, Captain Alexander Forrester commander, captured 
the Spanish vessel Lady of Rosario St. Peter and St. Joseph of 100 tons, 4 guns and 12 
pattereroes, laden with liquors and dry goods, condemned Barbados, on the 28 August 1702. 
(REPEAT REFERENCE -  P.R.O. C.O., 28/7, no. 33 (i))
-In 1703, Captain Forrester [this time as commander of the Barbados privateer sloop Paradox] 
captured the St. Patrick of St. Thomas for illegal trading, condemned Jamaica.
-The Barbados privateer brigantine Curtney or Courtney, in consort with H.M.S Warwick, 
captured a French sloop, which arrived at Barbados for condemnation, on the 2 November 
1704.
Antigua:
-In the summer of 1708, a privateer from the Leeward Islands captured a brigantine, laden with 
ginger and sugar, ship and cargo valued at £700.
- A privateer from Antigua called the Virgin Queen, Captain Joseph Hall commander, captured 
a prize.
-Two privateer sloops, owned and fitted out by Governor Parke of Antigua, captured a 
brigantine bound for France, laden with sugar and ginger, and a small sloop of no great value, 
which was subsequently converted into a privateer.
St. Kitts:
-In 1710, a privateer from St. Kitts captured a small vessel from Guadeloupe.
-A privateer sloop called the Francis and Mary of St. Christopher, Captain Wiliiam Coventry 
commander, recaptured an English brigantine.
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CAPTURES BY THE ROYAL NAVY
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West indies {C.S.P. Col.)
C.S.P. CoL 1702-1703. no. 123
Letter from Vice-Admiral Benbow to the Earl of Nottingham, 11 Sept. 1702.
-Refers to captures made by the naval squadron under the command of Benbow: firstly, a ship 
in the Gulf of Logan, which was later destroyed - July 1702; secondly, four ships (two of 16 
guns, one of 30 and a brigantine of 6) in the harbor of the town of Logan, laden with wine, 
brandy and sugar - August 1702; thirdly, recapture of the Ann galley - August 1702; and finally, 
a French man-of-war of 70 guns, which was later destroyed - August 1702.
C.S.P. CoL 1702-1703. no.319
Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 11 Feb. 1703.
-Refers to the capture of three ships by H.M.S. Gosport [32 guns]. Captain Smith commander, 
while cruising off the coast of Jamaica.
C.S.P. Col.. 1702-1703. no.737
Copy of Commodore Walker’s journal relating to the expedition to Guadeloupe, 5 Mar. to 25 
May 1703.
-Refers to the capture of a small sloop from Martinique by H.M.S Yarmouth.
C.S.P. CoL. 1702-1703. no. 1190
Letter from Sir Thomas Lawrence to Council of Trade and Plantations, 25 Oct. 1703.
-Reports the capture of a ship from St. Dominique by H.M.S. Oxford, Captain Josiah Moore 
commander, laden with 700 hogsheads of sugar, valued at £3,000.
C.S.P. CoL 1702-1703. no. 1320
Letter from Commissioners of Prizes to Mr. Popple, 26 Nov. 1703.
-Reports the capture of the Neptune by H.M.S. Kinsale [135-155 men, 32-36 guns. Captain 
Follambe / Foigeambe commander], condemned and sold at Barbados.
C.S.P.. Col. 1702-1703. no. 1329
Letter from Governor Sir B. Granville to Mr. Popple, 27 Nov. 1703.
-Reports that H.M.S Blackwell, Captain Martin commander, had captured and burnt, on the 22 
October 1703, three sloops off the coast of Martinique.
-On the 27 October 1703, H.M.S Blackwell further captured a French merchantman Duke de 
Berry of 130 tons and 10 guns, laden with sugar from Martinique.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 884
Letter from Mr. Byfield to Mr. Secretary Hedges, 22 Feb.
-Refers to the capture of a French privateer of 41 guns and 200 men by H.M.S. Advice [226 
men, 48 guns], laden with a quantity of bullion and 60 slaves, condemned Boston.
C.S.P. CoL 1704-1705. no. 1264
Letter from Rear-Admiral Whetstone to the Secretaries of State, 18 July 1705.
-Reports that H.M.S. Suffolk had captured a French man-of-war of 46 guns, 10 leagues off 
Cartagena, as well as a French privateer from Martinique and its prize, a Jamaican sloop.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 1343
Letter from General Sir B. Granville to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 15 Sept. 1705. 
-Reports that H.M.S Weymouth [226-280 men, 48-54 guns. Captain Mitchell] had captured a 
French merchant ship of 20 guns and 80 men, cargo of wine and dry goods, condemned 
Barbados.
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C.S.P. CoL. 1704-1705. no. 1352
Letter from Merchants interested in the Jamaican trade to the Queen, 23 Sept. 1705.
-Refers to the recapture of the Richard and Sarah (30 guns and 20 men) by H.M.S Rochester.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 1459
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 20 Nov. 1705. 
-Reports the capture of two French prizes by H.M.S. Hector [Captain Grey commander], 
brought into Jamaica for condemnation on the 18 November 1705.
C.S.P. Co/.. 1704-1705. no. 1478
Letter from Governor Lord Cornbury to Sir Charles Hedges, 28 Nov. 1705.
-Reports the capture of a vessel by H.M.S. Jersey [Captain Edward Vernon commander], for 
illegal trading.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 667
Letter from Mr. Dummer to Mr. Popple, 14 Dec. 1706.
-Reports the capture of a French privateer of 24 guns from Havana, Cuba, by H.M.S. 
Assistance [226-250 men, 48-50 guns], laden with various provisions.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 754
Letter from Colonel Cleland to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 10 Feb. 1707.
-Reports that H.M.S Kinsale [135-155 men, 32-36 guns. Captain Follambe / Foigeambe 
commander] had captured two prizes.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 868
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 21 Aug. 1707. 
-Reports the capture of a Spanish prize by H.M.S. Dun/f/r/c [332-365 men, 60-64 guns. Captain 
George Purois commander].
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1706. no. 1050
Letter from Governor Lord Cornbury to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 20 July 1707. 
-Reports the recapture of a Virginian ship by H.M.S Trinton's Prize, Captain Davis commander, 
70 leagues off the capes of Virginia.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 1180
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 9 Nov. 1707.
-Refers to the capture of four vessels by ships under the command of Commodore Wager.
C.S.P. CoL. 1706-1708. no. 1330 fviih
Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 10 Feb. 1708, enclosing a copy 
of the proceedings of the Council of Bermuda, 7 Aug. 1707.
-Refers to the seizure of the vessel Rose for illegal trading by H.M.S Trinton's Prize [Captain 
Davis commander].
C.S.P. CoL. 1706-1708. no. 1368
Letter from Mr. Burchett to Mr. Secretary Boyle, 3 Mar. 1708.
-Reports the capture of a Dutch ship by H.M.S. Guernsey [Captain William Harriot], 
condemned and sold at Jamaica.
C.S.P. CoL. 1706-1708. no. 1423
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 31 Mar. 1708. 
-Reports the capture of a homeward bound French ship of 200 tons which was laden with a 
cargo of sugar, as well as a French privateer (formerly the Queen Anne packet boat) by 
H.M.S. Scarborough[^35 men, 32 guns].
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 1482
Letter from Governor Crowe of Barbados to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 18 May 
1708.
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-Reports the capture of a French prize from Guadeloupe of 120 tons by H.M.S. Lowestoffe 
[135-145 men, 32 guns], Captain Fane commander, and H.M.S Greenwich, laden with sugar.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 69
Letter from Mr. Dummer to Mr. Popple, 2 Aug. 1708.
-Refers to Commodore Wager’s destruction of the Spanish man-of-war El Conde le Cassa 
carrying 54 brass guns and reportedly a ‘very rich cargo’.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 88
Letter from Council of Trade and Plantations to Governor Crowe, 13 Aug. 1708.
-Reports the capture of a French prize by H.M.S Greenwich.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 174
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 27 Oct. 1708.
-Reports that H.M.S Severn had recaptured from the French an English ship bound from 
Barbados to Virginia.
-Further reports that H.M.S Dunkirk’s Prize [Captain George Purois] had captured a French 
ship, laden with wine, brandy and dry goods.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 180
Letter from Governor Crowe to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 2 Nov. 1708.
-Reports that H.M.S Weymouth [226-280 men, 48-54 guns. Captain Mitchell commander] 
captured, off Martinique, in early October, a French ship of 120 tons, which was laden with 
beef, pork, flower, wine and brandy, condemned and sold at Barbados.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 279
Report of a committee of the Assembly of Jamaica to the governor of Jamaica, 3 Jan. 1708. 
-Refers to the capture of the French brigantine St. Nicholas by H.M.S Roebuck, condemned at 
Jamaica.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 339
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 Feb. 1709.
-Reports that H.M.S. Jersey [Captain Edward Vernon commander] had recaptured a Guinea 
ship of 300 tons from two French privateers, who had captured the said vessel on her way to 
Jamaica.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 396
Letter from Governor Crowe to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 2 Mar. 1709.
-Reports that H.M.S Trinton’s Prize [Captain Davis / Richard Girlington commander] had taken 
a French vessel of 80 tons, off Martinique, laden with wine, beef, pork, bread and linings.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 451
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 16 Apr. 1709. 
-Reports that H.M.S Portland, Captain Hutchins commander, had captured two French ships, 
off Portobello, one of 50 guns, formerly the English man-of-war Coventry, and another vessel 
of 30-40 guns, laden with a cargo of 75 chests of money (£75,000).
-Further reports that another man-of-war stationed at Jamaica captured a snow and three 
sloops.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 483
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 May 1709.
-Reports that H.M.S Port/and [Captain Hutchins commander] had captured a ship with 400,000 
pieces of eight on board.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 542
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 25 May 1709. 
-Reports the capture of a French Guinea ship, off Portobello, by H.M.S Portland [Captain 
Hutchins commander], as well as a sloop, on-route to Cartagena from Cuba, by H.M.S 
Roebuck.
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C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 597 fh
Letter from Governor Parke to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 26 June 1709, enclosing 
Governor Parke's answer to 22 articles of complaint against him,
-Reports the capture of a neutral vessel for illegal trading by H.M.S Hector [Captain Grey 
commander].
C.S.P. CoL. 1708-1709. no. 720 (\)
Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade of Plantations, 8 Sept. 1709, enclosing another 
letter from Pedro Joseph Delaranza, June 20, 1709.
-Reports the capture of seven 'frigates' of great value and several other small vessels by an 
English squadron of seven ships.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 748
Letter from Governor Crowe to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 25 Sept. 1709.
-Reports that the men-of-war stationed at Barbados had captured a French sloop, which was 
condemned at Antigua, as well as recaptured an English sloop, laden with lumber from New 
England.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 909 fi^
Order of the Queen in Council, 15 Dec. 1709, enclosing correspondence form Martinique to 
the Queen.
-Refers to the capture of the French Flag of Truce Society by H.M.S Hector, Captain Grey 
commander, condemned Antigua.
C.S.P. CoL. 1710-1711. no. 313
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 22 July 1710.
-Reports that H.M.S Crowne had captured a French prize, laden with wines and dry goods.
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 857
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 27 May 1711. 
-Reports that H.M.S Jersey, Captain [Edward] Vernon commander, captured and brought into 
Jamaica, a French merchantman of 30 guns and 120 men, for trading on the Spanish coast.
C.S.P. CoL. 1710-1711. no. 891
Letter from Mr. Littleton to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 20 June 1711.
-Reports that H.M.S. Sweepstakes [Captain Thomas Jacobs commander] had captured a 
French Guinea ship with 160 slaves on board.
-Further reports that H.M.S Ruby captured another French Guinea ship.
C.S.P. Col.. 1711-1712. no. 42
Letter from Lt. Governor Spotswood to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 25 July 1711. 
-Reports that H.M.S Enterprise, Captain [Nicholas] Smith commander, captured, off the Capes 
of Virginia, a French privateer from Petit Guavas carrying 88 men.
C.S.P. Col.. 1711-1712. no. 46 i\)
An exact from Colonel King's journal, May to June 1711.
-Reports that H.M.S Dunkirk, Captain Butler commander, captured, on the 27 June 1711, a 
French sloop.
-Further reports the a man-of-war captured, between Cape Britton and Newfoundland, a 
French vessel of 14 guns and 120 tons, laden with wine, brandy and bale goods.
-Further reports that H.M.S Chester [Captain Thomas Mathews commander] took a French 
sloop belonging to Placentia.
C.S.P. CoL. 1711-1712. no. 61
Letter from Brig. General Hill to Lord Dartmouth, 31 July 1711.
-Reports that H.M.S Cbesfer [Captain Thomas Mathews commander] had captured a prize on- 
route from France to Quebec, on the 25 June 1711.
C.S.P. CoL 1711-1712. no. 77
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Letter from Governor Lowther of Barbados to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 20 Aug.
1711.
-Reports that H.M.S Sweepstakes, Captain Thomas Jacobs commander, captured the Cupid 
of 48 men.
C.S.P. CoL 1711-1712. no. 85
Letter from Mr. Bridger to Mr. Popple, 31 Aug. 1711.
-Refers to a ship captured by H.M.S Weymouth [226-280 men, 48-54 guns. Captain Mitchell 
commander] and H.M.S Windsor [Captain Tudor Trevor commander].
C.S.P. CoL. 1711-1712. no. 145
Dudley Woodbrldge, judge of H.M court of Admiralty at Barbados, to the Earl of Dartmouth, 27 
Oct. 1711.
-Refers to the capture of the French ship Camwood Merchant by H.M.S Angiesea, Captain 
Thomas Legg commander, and H.M.S Joy, Captain Robert Chadwich commander, 
condemned at Barbados.
C.S.P. Col.. 1711-1712. no. 216
Letter from G. Vane to the Earl of Dartmouth, 16 Dec. 1711.
-Refers to the capture of a small French privateer sloop, in August 1711, by H.M.S Mountague. 
C.S.P. Col.. 1711-1712. no. 251
Letter from Governor Hunter to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 Jan. 1712.
-Reports the capture of St. John the Baptist for illegal trading with the French by H.M.S 
Lowestoffe [135-145 men, 32 guns]. Captain Gordon commander, cargo valued at £8,000.
C.S.P. Col.. 1711-1712. no. 418
Letter from Lt. Governor Spotswood to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 15 May 1712. 
-Reports the capture of a French privateer of 180 men by H.M.S Severn, brought into New 
York for condemnation.
C.S.P. CoL 1712-1714. no. 114
Letter from Commodore Sir Nicholas Trevanion to the Earl of Dartmouth, 29 Oct. 1712. 
-Reports that in the latter part of September, the men-of-war under his command, took five 
prizes of considerable value.
C.S.P. Col.. 1712-1714. no. 291
Letter from Governor Lord Alexander Hamilton of Jamaica to the Earl of Dartmouth, 5 Mar. 
1713.
-Refers to the capture of a Spanish trading vessel by H.M.S Centurion [226-280 men, 48-54 
guns], laden with cocoa and money.
Calendar of Treasury Books (C.T.8.)
C.T.B.. Y702. XVII. part II. 213
Account by John Perrie, Register of the Admiralty court at Antigua, of prizes taken and 
condemned at Antigua between 19 Aug. 1702, and 6 Feb. 1703.
-H.M.S Maidstone, Captain William Fairborn commander, captured, on the 29 September 
1702, a small sloop Dove of Martinique, condemned Antigua.
-H.M.S Maidstone, Captain William Coney commander, captured a privateer corvett Victory of 
Martinique of 50 tons, 4 guns, 49 men, condemned on the 11 June, valued at £116,13s, 4d. 
-H.M.S Sheerness, Captain Thomas Mitchell commander, captured, to the windward of 
Antigua, the French privateer sloop La Tripone of Martinique (140 tons, 4 guns and 69 men). 
Also recaptured, on the 22 October 1703, the Bridgewater of London, Captain Joseph Powis 
commander, which was the prize of the said privateer. Both prizes condemned on the 27 
August, the latter consisting of 226 slaves, which were valued at £130.
-H.M.S Sheerness, Captain [Thomas] Mitchell commander, captured, on the 5 December 
1702, out of Basse Terre Road on Guadeloupe, a ship Little Marrian of Nantes, France (75
136
tons), laden with brown sugar, cotton and ginger, condemned on the 15 December 1702, ship 
and cargo valued at £1600.
C.T.B.. y/Oa XVIII. 322
Letter from William Lowndes to the Prize Commissioners, 30 June 1703.
-Refers to three prizes captured last summer by H.M.S Oxford [Captain Josiah Moore 
commander].
C.T.B.. 1703. XVIII. 477-8
Letter from William Blathwayt, Auditor General of the Plantations, to William Lowndes, 13 
Dec. 1703.
-Refers to the capture of a French prize by H.M.S Oxford [Captain Josiah Moore commander], 
condemned at Maryland, ship and cargo estimated to be worth £6,000.
C.T.B.. 1704-1705. X\X. 137
Report from William Blathwayt, to treasurer Goldolphin, 15 Feb. 1704.
-Refers to the capture, in September 1703, of a prize by H.M.S Oxford, Captain [Josiah] Moore 
commander, carried into Maryland for condemnation, valued at 1600.
C.T.B.. 1704-1705. X\X. 266
Letter from William Lowndes to the Prize Commissioners, 7 June 1704.
-Refers to the capture of the French ship St. Paul of Rochelle by H.M.S Oxford, Captain 
[Josiah] Moore commander, condemned and sold at Maryland.
C.T.B.. 1704-1705. X\X. 318
Order by Treasurer Goldolphin to the Receiver of the Rights and Perquisites of the Admiralty, 
24 June 1704.
-Refers to the capture, in May 1702, of the vessel St. Nicholas by H.M.S Oxford, Captain 
[Josiah Moore] Morris commander.
C.T.B.. 1704-1705. X\X. 512
Letter from William Lowndes to the Commissioners of Prizes, 16 Feb. 1705.
-Refers to an extract of a letter from Governor Handasyd, which reports that, in early
November 1704, H.M.S Mairmaid, Captain Ryddal commander, captured the French ship Point 
Chateronof 320 tons, 20 guns, 9 patteroes and 130 men, condemned at Jamaica.
-Lowndes letter also refers to another letter from Sir William Matthew to Secretary Hedges, on 
the 15 November 1704, which reports that since his arrival and appointment as prize agent for 
Antigua, three prizes have been brought in and condemned. These prizes consisted of one 
captured by H.M.S Sherness, Captain [Thomas] Mitchell commander, another by H.M.S Lynn, 
Captain Martin commander, and lastly, by a New York privateer.
C.T.B.. 1705-1706. XIX. Dart III. 771
Letter from J. Taylor to the Customs Commissioners, 27 Sept. 1706.
-Refers to four prizes captured by H.M.S Speedwell [115-125 men, 26-28 guns], Captain
[George] Comocke [Cammock] commander, condemned Leeward Islands.
C.T.B.. 1708. XXII. introduction, cdlxviii to cdlxix
Declared Accounts: Navy: Prize Ships: General Account, 24 June 1707 to 14 June 1708. 
-H.M.S Nonsuch reported to have captured St. William of Nantes, condemned Newfoundland. 
-H.M.S Kinsale (135 /  155 men, 32 /  36 guns) [Captain Follambe / Foigeambe commander, 
reported to have captured St. William of Nantes, condemned Newfoundland.
-H.M.S Centurion (226 / 280 men, 48 / 54 guns) reported to have captured Siren or Mermaid, 
condemned New England.
-H.M.S Advise (226 men, 48 guns) reported to have captured the St. John the Baptist, 
condemned New England.
C.T.B.. 1708. XXII. 82
Letter from William Lowndes to the Prize Commissioners, 13 Jan. 1708.
-Refers to the capture, off Jamaica, of a French prize called Aquilon by H.M.S Mountaque.
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C.T.B.. 1708. XXII. 455
Warrant by Treasurer Goldolphin to the Customs Commissioners, 8 Dec. 1708.
-Refers to the capture, off Newfoundland, of a Portuguese prize called St Stephen (Lisbon) by 
H.M.S Hastings, cargo of fish.
C.T.B.. 1708. XXII. 458
Treasury reference to the Customs Commissioners, 13 Dec. 1708.
-Refers to the capture of the French prize St. John Baptist by H.M.S Plymouth, laden with fish. 
C.T.B.. 1709. XXIII. part 1. cclxvto cclxvi
Declared Accounts: Navy (Prize ships), 24 June 1708 to 23 Mar. 1709.
Sold and disposed by Robert Gibbs, Prize Agent Barbados:
-H.M.S Kinsale (135-155 men, 32-36 guns), Captain Follambe [Foigeambe] commander, 
reported to have captured Neptune of Nantes, condemned Barbados.
-H.M.S Kinsale [as above] reported to have captured La Marguise, condemned at Barbados. 
-[H.M.S Blackwell], Captain Samuel Martin commander, reported to have captured Duke de 
Berry, condemned Barbados.
-H.M.S Lowestoffe (135-145 men, 32 guns). Captain John Stuckley commander, reported to 
have captured Suzannaor dogger ketch, condemned Barbados.
-H.M.S Weymouth (226-280 men, 48-54 guns). Captain [Thomas] Mitchell commander, 
reported to have captured L’Amozan, condemned Barbados.
-H.M.S Kinsale [135-145 men, 48-54 guns], Captain Francis Cassella commander, reported to 
have captured St Jermain and La Maria, condemned Barbados.
Sold and disposed by Edward Perrie, Prize Agent at Antigua:
-H.M.S Greyhound {190 men, 42 guns), Captain William Harriot commander, reported to have 
captured a small sloop, condemned Antigua.
-H.M.S Medway (346 / 365 men, 60 / 64 guns). Captain Thomas Hughes commander, reported 
to have captured the Chance sloop, condemned Antigua.
-H.M.S Speedweii (115 / 125 men, 26 /  28 guns), Captain George Cammock [Camocke] 
commander, reported to have captured the Tortelle, condemned Antigua.
C.T.B.. 1710. XXVI. Dart 1. clxxvii to clxxxvi
Declared Accounts: Navy and Victualling (Prize Ships and Goods), 18 Mar. 1709 to 29 Sept. 
1715.
Sold and disposed by Alexander Hamilton and Andrew Brown, Prize Agents at Jamaica.
-H.M.S Experiment {135 /145  men, 32 guns), Captain Robert Bowler commander, reported to 
have captured Jesus Nazareno de Nostra Signiora de Rosario sloop, condemned Jamaica. 
-H.M.S Kingston [Captain Barrow Harris commander] and H.M.S Portland [Captain Hutchins 
commander, reported to have captured Elgavillion, condemned West Indies.
-H.M.S Dunkirk (332 / 365 men, 60 / 64 guns) [Captain Butler commander] reported to have 
captured Nostra Signore de Candad le Brave, condemned West Indies.
-H.M.S Assistance (226 / 250 men, 48 / 50 guns) reported to have captured Jesus Maria 
Joseph, condemned West Indies.
-H.M.S Scarborough (135 men, 32 guns) reported to have captured Cousin Mary Ruyter 
galley, condemned West Indies.
-H.M.S Suffolk (440 /440 men, 70 guns) reported to have captured Mayflower, condemned 
West Indies.
C.T.B.. 1710. XXIV. part 1. clxxvi to clxxxvii
Declared Accounts: Arrears of Prizes: Cash Account, 18 Mar. 1710 to 29 Sept. 1715.
Ships reported to have been taken by Royal Navy ships but no name given.
-S t Hubert, condemned Jamaica 
-Dragon, condemned Jamaica.
-Chartreuse, condemned Jamaica.
-Young John of Flushing, condemned Jamaica.
-Bonadventure, condemned Jamaica.
-Acquillon, condemned Jamaica.
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-S t Peter, condemned Jamaica.
-L’Herreux, condemned Jamaica.
-Superbe, condemned Jamaica.
-La Hardy, condemned Jamaica.
-Royal Angelica, condemned Jamaica.
-Jolly, condemned Jamaica.
-Mathew, condemned Jamaica.
C.T.B.. 1710. XXiV. part II. 436
Treasury warrant to the Receiver of Salvage Money, 5 Sept. 1710.
-Refers to the recapture from French privateers of the English merchant ship Ruth by H.M.S 
Speedwell [115-125 men, 26-28 guns, Captain George Comocke commander].
C.T.B.. 1710. XXIV. part II. 483
Custom Commissioners report on the petition of Simon Francis of London, 11 Oct. 1710. 
-H.M.S Oxford (274 / 280 men, 54 guns), Captain Joshua Moore commander, reported to have 
captured the St Paul of Rochelle, condemned Maryland.
Manuscripts of the House of Lords {H.L.M.)
H.L.M.. 1706-1708. 293
Account of the prizes captured by Commodore Underdown’s Squadron in the French fisheries 
at Newfoundland, Aug. 1707:
-Duke of Orleans of St. Malo (360 tons, 110 men and 30 guns) captured on the 3 August 1707. 
-La Pine of St. Malo (120 tons, 71 men and 20 guns) captured on the 3 August 1707.
-Marina of St. Malo (340 tons, 120 men and 32 guns) captured on the 4 August 1707. 
-Margaret of St. Malo (200 tons, 100 men and 26 guns) captured on the 4 August 1707. 
-Dicouge of St. Malo (300 tons, 110 men and 30 guns) captured on the 5 August 1707.
-Victoryof Granville (150 tons, 100 men and 20 guns) captured on the 5 August 1707.
-Palm Prize of Granville (150 tons, 100 men and 20 guns) captured on the 5 August 1707. 
-Palm of Granville, ISOtons (100 men and 20 guns) captured on the 6 August 1707.
-Margaret and Francis of Benik (110 tons, 45 men and 12 guns) captured on the 7 August 
1707.
-Marlborough of Brest (400 tons, 120 men and 38 guns) captured on the 7 August 1707.
-Julie of Benik (100 tons, 50 men and 10 guns) captured on the 7 August 1707.
-Roberts of Brest (100 tons, 36men and 10 guns) captured on the 7 August 1707.
-Mourpau of Norleig (380tons, 150 men and 36 guns) captured on the 7 August 1707.
Colonial Office Manuscripts (P.R.O. C.O.)
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/7. no. 33 (\\)
List of Prizes condemned at Barbados, accounted for by James Hannay, received 5 Aug.
1704.
-Neptune of Nantes (180 tons, 16 guns) captured by a Royal Navy ship, laden with wine, dry 
goods and provisions, value 33616, 9s, 5d, Queen’s share £1242,17s, Id, Lord High Admiral's 
tenths £361,12s, l id , captors share £1242, 17s, Id, charges and fees £613,10s, Id. 
-Marchionese of Rochelle (50 tons, 2 guns) captured by a Royal Navy ship, laden with sugar, 
value £1025, 14s, 3d, Queen's share £361, 6s, Id, Lord High Admiral's share £102, 11s, 5d, 
captor's share £361, 6s, Id, charges and fees £200.
-Privateer brigantine Conquesant of Martinique (60 tons, 7 guns) captured by H.M.S Blackwell, 
Captain Samuel Martin commander.
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/7. 272-274.
Account of prizes condemned at Barbados from the start of the war to 4 Feb. 1704. Signed by 
Nick Sayers.
-French ship Neptune of Nantes captured by H.M.S Kinsale [135-155 men, 32-36 guns]. 
Captain Foigeambe [Follambe] commander, condemned as above. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  
P.R.O. C.O., 28/7, no. 33 (i))
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-French ship Marchioness of Rochelle (50 tons and 2 guns) captured by above, condemned on 
the 6 February 1703. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-French privateer brigantine Conquérant of Martinique (60 tons, 8 guns and 106 men) captured 
by H.M.S Blackwell, Captain Samuel Martin commander, condemned on the 13 September 
1703. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-French sloop captured off the coast of Martinique by above, condemned on the 5 November
1703.
-French dogger ketch the Susannah (80 tons and 7 guns) captured off Tenerife by H.M.S 
Lowestoffe, Captain Charles Fane commander, brought to Barbados by John Clarke (chief 
mate of said ship), condemned on the 1 January 1704.
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/12. no. 53 fxh
List of Prizes condemned at Barbados between October 1708 and August 1709. Signed by 
Stephen Alexander, 1 Sept. 1709.
-The French ship L'vergo de Grace of Nantes (90 tons, 10 guns and 33 men), Peter Fowey 
master, captured by [H.M.S Angiesea], Captain Thomas Legg commander, laden with French 
goods and merchandise, condemned on the 2 October 1708.
-The French ship St. Louis of Nantes (80 tons, 8 guns and 24 men), captured, off Martinique, 
by H.M.S Trinton's Prize, Captain Richard Girlington commander, laden with French goods and 
merchandise, condemned on the 18 February 1709.
-The French sloop Maria of Martinique, captured off the island of Tabago by H.M.S Dolphin, 
Captain Cesar Brooke commander, condemned on the 23 February 1709.
-The French sloop St. Michael, captured by a sloop commissioned a vessel of war, John wells 
commander, condemned 2 June 1709.
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/13. 596-7
List of Prizes brought into Barbados between July 1711 and Mar. 1712.' '
-The French ship Cupldong captured by H.M.S Sweepstakes, Captain Thomas Jacobs, laden 
with Negroes, flour and gunpowder [condemned 14 July 1711].
-The French sloop Hazardous of Bonye, captured by H.M.S Panther, Captain Charles 
Constable commander, laden with wine, flour, beef and pork.
-The French ship Cesar of Nantes captured by H.M.S Angiesea, Captain Thomas Legg 
commander, and H.M.S Joy, Captain Robert Chadwick commander, laden with provisions 
[condemned 10 October 1711].
-The French ship St. Refer captured by H.M.S Exper/menf [135-145 men, 32 guns], Captain 
Mathew Elford commander, iaden with sugar, cotton and ginger [condemned 21 November 
1711].
-The French ship Four Sisters captured by above, laden as above [condemned 21 November
1711].
-The French ship Galathee captured by H.M.S Panther, Captain Charles Constable 
commander, and H.M.S Experiment [135-145 men, 32 guns], Captain Matthew Elford 
commander, laden with flour [condemned 12 February 1712].
-The French ship L’Terese captured by H.M.S Chester, Captain Thomas Mathews 
commander, laden with various goods, such as beef, flour, pork, hoops, bread, butter, 
gammons, olives etc[condemned 28 February 1712].
-The Spanish ship Rosario captured by above, laden with beef, sugar, pork and sole leather 
[condemned 28 February 1712].
-The French ship St. John captured by H.M.S Enterprise, Captain Nicholas Smith commander, 
laden with various goods, such as beef, pork, butter, flour, loose casks, hoops, brandy, red and 
white wine etc [condemned 6 March 1712].
-The French ship St. Andrew captured by H.M.S Shoreham, Captain Charles Hardy 
commander, laden with ciaret, beef, pork, flour, thread for nets, nails, soap, linen [condemned 
6 March 1712].
-The French ship St. James captured by H.M.S Enterprise, Captain Nicholas Smith 
commander [condemned 12 March 1712].
-The French ship Marie Galete captured by H.M.S Experiment [135-145 men, 32 guns], 
Captain Matthew Elford commander, laden with various goods, such as beef, cheese, soap, 
bread, flour, butter, oatmeal, claret, brandy and whit wine [condemned 17 March 1712].
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-The French ship Victorious captured by H.M.S Hector, Captain Wiiliam Grey commander, 
laden with various goods, such as claret, beef, pork, butter, candles, hoops, candles, flour, 
linen for bags, brandy, cheese, canvas, glasses, and white wine [condemned 17 March 1712]. 
-The French ship La Loire captured by H.M.S Enterprise, Captain Nicholas Smith commander, 
laden with claret, white wine, beef, candles, butter, flour, cotton, bread and cordage 
[condemned 19 March 1712].
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/14. no. 2 fvi)
Account of prizes condemned at Barbados between 14 July 1711 and 28 June 1712:
-The French ship Cupidong captured by H.M.S Sweepstakes, Captain Thomas Jacobs 
commander, and H.M.S Guernsey, Captain William Harriot commander, condemned on the 14 
July 1711. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  P.R.O. C.O., 28/13, 596-7)
-The French ship Cesar captured by H.M.S Angiesea, Captain Thomas Legg commander, 
condemned on the 10 October 1711. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-The French ship Experance captured by above, condemned as above.
-The French ship Camwood Merchant captured by above, condemned as above
-The French ship St. Peter captured by H.M.S Experiment, Captain Matthew Elford
commander, condemned on the 21 November 1711 (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above).
-The French ship Four sisters captured by above, condemned as above (REPEAT 
REFERENCE - as above).
-The French ship Gaiathee, captured by [H.M.S Panther] Captain Charles Constable and 
[H.M.S Experiment] Captain Matthew Elford, condemned on the 12 February 1712. (REPEAT 
RFERENCE -  as above)
-The French ship Ferese captured by H.M.S Chester, Captain Thomas Mathews commander, 
condemned on the 28 February 1712. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-The Spanish ship Rosario captured by above, condemned as above. (REPEAT REFERENCE 
-  as above)
-The French ship St. John captured by H.M.S Enterprise, Captain Nicholas Smith commander, 
condemned on the 6 March 1712. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  P.R.O. C.O., as above)
-The French ship St. Andrew captured by H.M.S Shoram [Shoreham], Captain Charles Hardy 
commander, condemned as above. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  P.R.O. C.O., as above)
-The French ship St. James captured by H.M.S Enterprise, Captain Nicholas Smith
commander, condemned on the 12 March 1712. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-The French ship Victorious captured by H.M.S Hector, Captain William Grey commander, 
condemned on the 17 March 1712. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-The French ship Marie Galete captured by H.M.S Experiment, Captain Matthew Elford 
commander, condemned as above. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-The French ship La Louere captured by H.M.S Enterprise, Captain Nicholas Smith
commander, condemned on the 19 March 1712. (REPEAT REFERENCE -  as above)
-The French ship Reutoutre captured by H.M.S Panther, Captain Charles Constable
commander, condemned on the 28 June 1712.
P.R.O. C.O.. 137/6. no. 42 M
List of prizes condemned at Jamaica between 4 May 1702 and 30 Jan. 1704.
-French ship Queen of Angells, belonging to Bordeaux, captured, near Leoganna, on the 28 
July, by H.M sloop Recovery, Captain Thomas Longridge commander, value £1200.
-French ship Generous, belonging to Port Louis, captured, near Cape Mayees, on the 14 July, 
by H.M.S Pendennis, Captain Thomas Hudson commander, value £424, 5s.
-French sloop St. Anthony captured near. Cape Alta Vella, on the 2 August 1702, by H.M.S 
Kingston, Captain Barrow Harris commander, value £40.
-French sloop Spey, belonging to petit Guavas, captured, on the 14 July 1702, by H.M.S 
Bredah, Captain Christopher Fogg commander, value £45.
-French ship Imprudent, belonging to Port Louis, captured, on the 3 July 1702, by H.M.S 
Colchester, Captain Redman commander, value £1689, 4s, 7d.
-French pinch St. Nicholas, belonging to Deipe, captured, near Grand Guiavas, on the 9 July 
1702, by above, value £206, 4d.
-French ship Queen Mary captured, on the 29 July, by H.M.S Windsor, Charles Constable 
commander, value £406.
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-Spanish brigantine of unknown name, belonging to Cuba, captured, in the harbour of 
Barracoa, on the 16 November 1702, by H.M sloop Recovery, value £376, 9s, Sd.
-French sloop St Peter, belonging to Petit Guavas, captured, near Cape Mayees, on the 17 
November 1702, by H.M.S York, Captain Smith commander, value £140.
-French privateer ship of unknown name, captured, near cape Fiberoon, on the 15 May 1703, 
by H.M.S Canterbury, Captain Robert Thompson commander, value £4069,15s, 6d.
-French privateer ship called the Eagle, captured, near Guanaboa, on the 24 March 1703, by 
H.M.S Colchester, Captain Hartnoll, near Guanaboa, value £40.
-Spanish sloop St Anothony of Soul of Pirgatory, French sloop and ship, Vigilent Dogger and 
Ressourse, belonging to Petit Guavas, captured, near Guanaboa, on the 16 June and the 18 
September 1703, by H.M.S Nonsuch, Captain Andrew Douglas commander, value £568, 9s, 
6d, £40 (last 2).
P.R.O. C.O.. 137/8. no. 24 fh
List of French and Spanish vessels condemned at Jamaica between July 1708 and Sept. 
1708:
-Spanish vessel Santa Cruz y ’ Nuestra Senera de Atocha captured, on 29 May 1708, by
Admiral Charles Wager, condemned on the 17 of July 1708.
-Spanish brigantine Nuestra Senora de la Chandad y ’ San Joseph captured, on the 16 July 
1708, by H.M.S Windsor, Captain Tudor Trevor commander, condemned on the 24 July 1708. 
-Unknown French vessel captured, on the 12 August 1708, by H.M.S Jersey, Captain Edward 
Vernon commander, condemned on the 19 August 1708.
-Two French vessels Gaily of Rochelle and ship Le IVarechali de Chammiily captured, on the 
27 August 1708, by H.M.S Dunkirk’s prize. Captain George Purois commander, condemned on 
the 16 September 1708.
P.R.O. C.Q.. 138/12. 201
List of the Prizes captured by Commodore Wager’s squadron, 26 Feb. 1708.
-Jesus Maria Joseph of 160 tons, 60 men and 14 guns, bound to Campeachy, captured by
H.M.S Ass/sfance [226-250 men, 48-50 guns], iaden with cocao.
-Young John of Flushing (120 tons and 18 guns) captured, on the Spanish coast, by H.M.S 
Severn, laden with diverse contraband goods.
-Santa Rosa from the canaries, bound to Campeachy (250 tons, 160 men and 20 guns), 
captured by H.M.S Kingston [Captain Barrow Harris] and H.M.S Portland [Captain Hutchins 
commander], laden with wine, brandy, iron, steel, and sundry goods, burnt by accident in the 
keys of Port Royal.
-El Gravelein from Canaries, bound to Havana (150 tons, 129 men and 10 guns), captured by 
above, laden as above.
-Le Brave of Rochelle, bound to Leogan (200 tons, 60 men and 18 men), captured by H.M.S 
Trinton's Prize, laden with wine and other goods.
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CAPTURES MADE BY BRITISH PRDATORS OF UNCERTAIN STATUS
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies {C.S.P. Col.)
C.S.P. CoL. 1704-1705. no. 160
Letter from Governor Seymour of Maryland to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 Mar. 
1706.
-Refers to capture of Francois oi Rochelle, France, by Edward Ratchdale in the Elizabeth. 
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 164
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 5 Mar. 1704.
-Reports the capture of three French privateers attempting to land and take off Negroes, 
condemned Jamaica.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 585 (m)
Letter from Governor Seymour to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 29 Sept. 1704.
“Refers to the French bark L’Ortolant (70 tons) by Captain Johnson and his crew, after they 
had been captured and were being transported to France, condemned at Maryland.
C.S.P. CoL 1704-1705. no. 605
Letter from Colonel Robert Quarry, Surveyor General of Customs In America to the Council of 
Trade and Plantations, 15 Oct. 1704.
-Reports that, last August, a small ship was brought into Maryland as prize, cargo consisted of 
150 hogsheads of brown sugar, 36 hogsheads of white sugar, and a parcel of ginger.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 1007
Letter from Council of Trade and Plantations to Governor Handasyd, 26 June 1707.
-Refers to two prizes brought into Jamaica.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 1230
Letter from Governor Lord Cornbury to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 July 1705. 
-Refers to the capture of a French privateer by a brigantine bound from Jamaica to Virginia.
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 287 (\)
Letter from Thomas Mackley to his father, John Mackley, 8 May 1710.
-Reports the capture of one of two French privateers that had attempted to board his vessel 
the Alexander gaWey.
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 897
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 22 June 1711. 
-Reports that the sloop St. James was seized and condemned at Bermuda for illegal trading.
Calendar of Treasury Books{C.T.B.)
C.T.B.. 1704-1705. XIX. 382
Letter from William Lowndes to the Commissioners of Prizes, 19 Oct. 1704.
-Refers to Viscount Dursley’s capture, off Newfoundland, of a ship called Sardlnacluos.
C.T.B.. 1705-1706. XX. part II. 234
Treasury Reference to the Prize Commissioners of the Petition of Captain Andrew Douglas, 26 
Apr. 1705.
-Refers to Captain Douglas’s capture of two prizes in the West Indies, condemned Jamaica. 
C.T.B.. 1705-1706. XX. Dart II. 575
Warrant by Treasurer Goldolphin to the Receiver of the Rights and Perquisites of Admiralty 
and the Comptroller of the same, 13 Feb. 1706.
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-Refers to the capture of the ship Vigilant, in Gnavas Lake in Mounts Bay, by the Mary galley, 
Captain John Cuthbertson commander, and the Barnstead galley, Captain George Morris 
commander.
C.T.B.. 7707. XXI. part II. 396
Warrant by Goldolphin to the Customs Commissioners, 30 July 1707.
-Refers to the capture, off Newfoundland, in August 1704, of a French vessel called the Boon 
Allyance by the Greyhound galley, Joseph Triggs commander, cargo consisted of 13,800 
couple of wet fish.
C.T.B.. 1710.XX\V, part II. 483
Custom Commissioners report on the petition of Simon Francis of London, 11 Oct. 1710. 
-Refers to the FIdelle Fanary captured by the Grandler galley of London, on the banks of 
Newfoundland, ship and cargo ransomed.
Colonial Office Manuscripts (P.R.O. 0.0.)
P.R.O. C.O.. 137/7. no. 24 fh
List of prizes condemned at Jamaica between 4 May 1702 and 30 Jan. 1704.
-Spanish barquelonga L’Esprlto Sancto Neustro Sonora de Soladade from Cuba, captured, on 
the 18 August 1702, by the sloop Phoenix, Captain Francis Johnson commander.
-French ship St. Dennis at Nantes, captured, on the 2 September 1702, by the sloop Neptune, 
Captain Watkins commander.
-French ship Jeane of Nantes, captured, on the 26 September 1702, by above, condemned 
because French, valued at £958, 5s.
-Spanish sloop Nuestra Sonara de la Soladade y'las Animas, captured, near Cape Cateecho, 
on the 17 September 1702, by the sloop Royal Mary, Captain Edward James commander, 
valued at £113,10s.
-Spanish sloop of St. Jago from Cuba, captured, near Jamaica, on the 31 October 1702, by 
the sloop Sfess/ng Captain Simon Tristand commander, valued at £564, 8s.
-French sloop Royal Mary captured, near St. Mark, on the 11 November 1702, by the sloop 
Blenhole, Captain William Stone commander, value £520,12s.
-Spanish sloop St. Francisco captured, on the 10 December 1702, by the sloop Diamond, 
Captain Ramsey commander, valued at £20.
-Spanish sloop captured, on the 17 August 1702, by the sloop Mary Gaily, Captain Edward 
James commander, valued at £90.
-Yatch Princess (formerly belonging to the Royal Africa Company) recaptured, near 
Hispaniola, on the 19 January 1703, by the sloop Neptune, Captain Watkins commander, 
valued at £288,10s.
-Spanish ship from Lavera Cruz, captured, near Cameachy, on the 10 September 1702, by the 
sloop Mary Gaily, Captain Edward James commander, valued at £439.
-British-colonial sloop Schutburgh of St. Thomas, captured, off the Isle of Ash, on the 16 
September 1703, by the Gold Frigate, Captain Josias Doivell commander, condemned for 
illegal trading with the French, valued at £224,14s.
-Sloops Susan Providence and New Marriage of Curracoa, captured, off the coast of Curracoa, 
on the 5 and 7 of December 1703, by the sloop Port Royall, Captain Charles Pinkethman 
commander, condemned for illegal trading, value £332, 7s, 9d and £169, Is, 6d.
-French sloop Marguarltte of Martinique, captured, off Porto Rico, on the 30 January 1704, by 
the ship Lever Poll Merchant, Captain Thomas Lace commander, valued at £141, 2s.
P.R.O C.O.. 323/7. no.23 fiii)
List of Prizes which have been captured and carried into North America and the Islands 
thereunto belonging which have been accounted for to the Prize Office;
In Newfoundland by Colin Campbell, prize agent:
-Victory, produce valued at £149 
-Thersa, produce valued at £366,10s 
-Prudence, produce valued at £150 
-Infanta, produce valued at £169,12s, 6d.
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-Sovereign Medicine, produce valued at £121,15s
-Bon Voyage, produce valued at £148
-S t John Baptist, produce valued at £163
-Joshua, produce valued at £199
-Esperance, produce valued at £135, 7s, 6d
- Vigilant, produce valued at £105
-Queen of Angels, produce valued at £9, 7s, 6d.
In Newfoundland by Giles Wheeler, the succeeding prize agent:
-James of Nantes, produce valued at £126
-Vanquisher, produce valued at £191
-Catherine or Fortunate Catherine, produce valued at £204
-Duke of Orleans, produce valued at £594
-Hopes of Peace, produce valued at £903, 3s
-Little St John, produce valued at £462,15s
-Prize Palm, produce valued at £466
-William Prize, produce valued at £27
-St William, produce valued at £474,16s, 8d.
In Virginia by Nathaniel Harrison, prize agent there:
-Jesus or Name of Jesus, produce valued at £2664,14s, lid .
In Newfoundland by John Coleman, prize agent there:
-Siren or Mermaid, produce valued at £367, 5s 
-St John Baptist, produce valued at £1364, 10s 
-Sloop Jolly, produce valued at £146, 8s, 11d
In Maryland, colonel George Plater disposed of a prize called:
-St Pauloi Rochelle, produce valued at £3253, 6s, Id.
P.R.O. C.O.. 324/10. 32-4
Account of prizes taken during Queen Anne’s War, 1 Apr. 1713. 
Condemned at Newfoundland by Archibald Cummings, prize agent: 
-Constant of Honne,
-Adventure,
-Mary Protection,
-Michael of Sable of Honne,
-Virgin’s Grace,
-Consent of Boston (recapture),
-Sister of Three Brothers,
-Bien Almee or Wellbeloved,
-William of St. Malo,
-William of Nantes,
-S t Martin,
-Mary Anne,
-Villeoi Granville,
-Roy David,
-Elizabethof Rochelle,
-La Palx,
-Prophet Elle,
-Cretot,
-Le Cerse Couronne of Bayon,
-S t Hllarion of Nantes,
-Marquis de la Bertreches,
-Elizabeth of Nantes,
-King David,
-L’Amltie of Rochelle,
-Angélique,
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-Columbier,
-Mary of Nantes,
-Seahorse,
-St. Peter,
-St. Anthony of Padua,
-Happy Return,
-Sage of Sable of Honne,
-Williamof Granville,
-Fontarable,
-Mary Heureuse or Blessed Mary,
-Fleece of Liverpool (recapture),
-Sf. Martin de Ollonne,
-St. John of St. John de Luz,
-Providence Gaily (recapture),
-St. Anne of St. John de Luz,
-St. Christopher of Plaisance,
-St. Anthonie,
-Arkof Salem (recapture),
-St. John Baptist of Bayon (condemned as perquisite of Admiralty), valued at £401
Condemned at Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York and Connecticut, James and Hercules 
Coûter, prize gents:
-Francis of Rochelle,
-Orto/anf (condemned as a perquisite of Admiralty) valued at £1688, 17s, 2d.
Condemned at Carolina and Bahama Islands, Nicholas Trot, prize agent;
-Sf. M/c/7ae/(condemned as a perquisite of Admiralty), valued at £214, 6s, 6d.
Howard M. Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The first Century of American Colonial 
Privateering, 1625-1725.
-Letter of Marque ship Reward, commanded by Captain Benjamin Gillian of Boston, captured, 
in June 1704, a French pink of 80 tons, bound for Newfoundland, laden with 40 tons of salt, 
arrived Boston for condemnation on the 4 August 1704.
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ENEMY CAPTURES: FRENCH
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies {C.S.P. Co/.)
C.S.P. Col.. 1702-1703. no. 899
Letter from Robert Livingston to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 9 July 1703.
-Reports the capture, in the Atlantic, of the Thetis sloop (11 men and 2 guns) by a French 
privateer of 50 men and 6 guns from La Rochelle, France, Captain Francis La Marque 
commander.
C.S.P. CoL. 1702-1703. no. 1014
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 9 Aug. 1703.
-Reports the capture of a vessel from Bristol, Captain Bennet commander, near Nevis, bound 
for Antigua, by two French privateers, on the 16 May 1703.
-Further reports that a French privateer captured a brigantine in the harbor of St. Christophers, 
laden with sugar.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 380
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 10 June 1704. 
-Reports that the Granville of 16 guns and 50 men, Captain Holden commander, was captured, 
at Exuma, whilst collecting salt by a French privateer of 4 guns and 60 men, on 4 May 1704.
C.S.P. CoL. 1704-1705. no. 685 (6)
Evidence of several spies sent to Placentia and deserters therefrom, enclosing a deposition of 
Francis Andrew and John Evans of the Richard and Mary, 28 Nov. 1704.
-Describes their capture by the French, in April 1704, whilst on-route from Barbados to Bristol. 
Ship, crew and cargo of sugar and molasses carried to Placentia.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 1185
Letter from Colin Campbell to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 15 June 1705.
-Reports that the sloop Friendship of Boston commissioned for H.M service. Captain Wain 
commander, was captured by a French privateer and ransomed for 100 guineas.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 1230
Letter from Governor Lord Cornbury to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 July 1705. 
-Reports that a French privateer took a Bermudas sloop, which was going from New York to 
Jamaica. Further reports that this French privateer then captured a brigantine that was bound 
from Jamaica to Virginia.
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 1352
Merchants interested in the Jamaica trade to the Queen, 23 Sept. 1705.
-Refers to the capture of the Richard and Sarah (20 guns and 30 men) by a French privateer 
by a French privateer of 20 guns and 166 men.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 116
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 16 Feb. 1706. 
-Reports the capture of a packet boat carrying mail and a considerable sum of money by a 
French privateer.
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 323
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to Mr. Popple, 16 May 1706.
-Reports the capture of five merchantmen, bound for Virginia, by 2 large French privateers. 
C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 517
Letter from Governor Lord Cornbury to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 3 Oct. 1706. 
-Reports the capture of two sloops, belonging to New York and bound for Jamaica, by French 
privateers.
Letter from Colonel Jenings of Virginia to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 26 June 1707. 
-Reports the capture of five vessels, in late May 1707, by a French privateer.
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C.S.P. Col.. 1706-1708. no. 1199
Letter from the merchants of Jamaican to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 17 Nov. 1707. 
-Refers to the capture of three or four trading sloops - one of which was sunk with 176,000 
pieces of eight on board.
C.S.P. CoL 1706-1708. no. 1573
Letter from Colonel Jenings to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 24 June 1708.
-Reports that a privateer sloop from Martinique of 4 guns and 70 men, commanded by 
(Captain) Crapeau, captured a ship from Liverpool and a sloop from the West Indies, to the 
southward of the Capes of Virginia.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 10
Letter from Governor Lord Cornbury to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 July 1708. 
-Reports the capture of a merchant ship on-route to Philadelphia from Barbados, commanded 
by (Captain?) Jones, by a small French privateer from Martinique, in early May.
-Further reports that the same privateer, about three leagues off Sandy Hook, took another 
small sloop from New York, and two ships bound from Liverpool to Philadelphia.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 230
Letter from Governor Cranston of Rhode Island to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 5 
Dec. 1708.
-Reports that a privateer from France captured a sloop and chased a brigantine aground.
C.S.P. CoL. 1708-1709. no. 472
Deposition of Captain Edward Holmes, 20 Apr. 1709.
-Reports the capture of his sloop, off Harbor Island, by a French privateer, commanded by 
Captain Martell.
C.S.P. Col.. 1708-1709. no. 529 fiih
Letter from Governor Parke to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 24 May 1709.
-Account of the capture, on the 1 March 1709, of H.M.S Adventure (44 guns, 194 men) 
Captain Robert Clarke commander, by the French man-of-war Valeur (36 guns, 286 men), 
Captain Du Clair commander.
C.S.P. CoL 1708-1709. no. 691
Letter from Governor Dudley to Mr. Popple, 16 Aug. 1709.
-Reports that French privateers had captured several of New England’s coasting vessels, this 
summer.
C.S.P. Col.. 1710-1711. no. 47 (\)
Circular letter from the Council of Trade and Plantations to the Governors and proprietors of 
Plantations, 19 Jan. 1710, enclosing extracts from three memorials, 26 Dec. 1706.
-Refers to the capture of the Tempest sloop by French privateers, 12 leagues to the leeward of 
Cartagena, cargo valued at 270,000 pieces of eight.
C.S.P. Col.. 1710-1711. no. 263
Letter from Colonel Jenings to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 10 June 1710.
-Refers to various captures by French privateers: (1) The William and Mary of London which 
was bound to Virginia. (2) The ship Lark of Falmouth, Edward Poor master, burnt after cargo of 
goods to the value of £600-700 had been taken off. (3) The James of Plymouth (9 guns) sent 
to Petit Guavas. (4) A sloop from Bermuda captured by a privateer from Martinique (30 guns). 
(5) Two sloops belonging to North Carolina captured, off the Virginia coast, laden with 
provisions. (6) Another two vessels reported to have been captured and burnt at sea.
C.S.P. CoL 1710-1711. no. 849
Letter from Mr. Dummerto Mr. Popple, 22 May 1711.
-Reports that the Frankland packet boat had been captured by three French privateers and 
carried into Brest, France.
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-Also reports the capture of H.M.S Gosport [Captain Smith commander] of 32 guns, while
going to Jamaica, by a French ship of 54 guns, on the 28 July 1706.
-Also reports the capture of H.M.S Serpent (bomb ketch, 4 guns), while coming from the West 
Indies, by a French privateer of 24 guns, on the 25 October 1703.
-Also reports the capture of H.M.S Swift (sloop, 10 guns), while coming from New England, by
a French privateer of 18 guns, on the 18 August 1702.
C.S.P. Col.. 1711-1712. no. 143
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to Lord Dartmouth, 26 Oct. 1711.
-Reports the capture of several vessels by a French privateer of 10 guns and 120 men.
Calendar of Treasury Books (C.T.B.)
C.T.B.. 7703. XVIII. 132
Royal Warrant to Richard Crawley, Receiver of Salvage Money and other Droits and 
Perquisites of the Admiralty, 5 Feb. 1703.
-Refers to the capture of the ship Expedition of Boston, Henry Lowder master, by a French 
privateer.
C.T.B.. 1705-1706. XX. part 11. 398
Royal Warrant to Treasurer Goldolphin, 27 Aug. 1705.
-Refers to the capture by French privateers of a sloop called the Friendship of Boston, bound 
from Newfoundland to England.
C.T.B.. 7707. XXI. part II. 412
Warrant by Treasurer Goldolphin to John Dodd, Receiver of the Rights and perquisites of 
Admiralty, 18 Aug. 1707.
-Refers to the capture of the brigantine Betty, Richard Johnson master, by a French privateer, 
cargo valued at £3,500.
Manuscripts of the House of Lords (H.L.M.)
H.L.M.. 1702-1704. 98
Report of the Council of Trade and Plantations to the House of Lords, 30 Nov. 1704.
-Refers to the capture of a vessel. Captain Nathaniel Cary commander, going from New 
England to England, by a French privateer, goods valued at £300.
H.L.M.. 1702-1704. 189-90
Papers presented to a House of Lords select committee appointed to consider the state of the 
fleet and the sea service, 4 Jan. 1703.
-Memorial of Captain Benjamin Edward, stating that his merchant ship was captured, In 
September 1703, off Antigua, by two French privateers and carried into Martinique.
Colonial Office Manuscripts (P.R.O. C.O.)
P.R.O. C.O.. 28/13. no. 72 01
List of Prizes brought in to Martinique between July 1710 and May 1711. 
-Ship the Thomas of Boston.
-Sloop the Dragon.
-Sloop the Portto Curasseau.
-Sloop the Elizabeth of Bermuda.
-Sloop the Elizabeth of Boston.
-Sloop the Two Brothers of Montserrat.
-The Five Sisters of Plymouth.
-Ship the Somersett of Bristol.
-Sloop the St. Christopher of St. Christopher.
-Sloop the Elizabeth of St. Christopher.
-Snow the St James of Monserrat.
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-Sloop the Tryali for the Proof oi Bermuda.
-Sloop the Bansbough of Road Island 
-Sarah and Rebecca of Philadelphia.
-Brigantine Our Lady of Consumption.
-Sloop the Richard oi Pennsylvania.
-Sloop the Honest Endeavour oi Bristol 
-Sloop the Hope of Bermuda.
-Brigantine the Four Brothers oi Bristol.
-Ship the Success of London.
-Sloop the Barbuda of Antigua.
-Ship the Dolphin Gaily oi London.
-Sloop the Deborah of the Dutch.
-Ship the Exchange of Philadelphia,
-Ship the Levan of New York
-Sloop the Mary Rose of St. Christopher.
-Sloop the Reger of Antigua.
-Brigantine the Henry oi Bristol.
-Ship the Henry oi Boston.
-Brigantine the Salisbury.
-Ship the Wharton Gaily oi Dublin.
-Sloop the Light Foot oi Boston.
-Ship the Dolphin oi Boston.
-Sloop the Constantine oi Pennsylvania.
-Brigantine the Tryall for Proof oi Road Island.
-Sloop the Egg of Boston 
-Sloop the Benjamin 
-Brigantine the Dolphin oi London.
-Sloop the Hope of Antigua.
-Ship and Sloop captured by Captain 
-Snow the Mary Gaily.
-Ship the Spy of Dublin.
-Ship the Happy Return of
-Ship the Tryall oi
-Brigantine the Leopard oi Boston.
-Sloop the Elizabeth and Maryoi Antigua.
-Ship the Strong of New York.
-Sloop the Elizabeth and Sarah oi New York.
-Sloop of Antigua.
-Ship the Ablchaeloi London.
-Sloop the Catherine of London.
-Ship the Friendship of Glasgow.
-Brigantine the Robert oi Liverpool.
-Ship belonging to Portugal.
-Ship belonging to London.
-Brigantine the Mary Ann, Captain Jones commander.
-Brigantine, Captain Levan commander.
Howard M. Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The first Century of American Colonial 
Privateering, 1625-1725.
-The privateer sloop Phoenix, Captain John Miles commander, hired by the colony of 
Massachusetts to hunt a French privateer, seen off cape Cod, In February 1709, was captured, 
in the spring of 1709, by said French privateer.
-The sloop Hector, John Pickett commander, was captured by the French, in 1711, whilst 
serving In the expedition against Canada.
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-A Sloop, John Walker commander, laden with provisions from Boston to Connecticut, was 
captured, on the 1 June 1706, in Long Island Sound, by a French privateer of 30 tons and 37 
men. Captain Charles Ferret commander, commissioned out of Petit Guavas.
"A French privateer sloop of 45 men and 4 guns, captured two coasters, on the 9 August 1712, 
one commanded by Adam Hardin from Pennsylvania and the other by John Picket from New 
York, both bound for Canada. Another sloop, laden with grain, was captured on the 10 August 
1712
-A brigantine. Captain Michael Hicks commander, returning from Antigua to Rhode Island with 
a cargo of rum, molasses, cotton and wool, was captured by a French privateer of 4 guns and 
125 men. Captain Clement commander, within sight of Block Island. This privateer, while 
cruising in Vineyard Sound, took a further four prizes.
-A French privateer ship of 150 tons, 10 guns and 120 men. Captain Crapo commander, lay 
off Sandy Hook, in June 1705, intercepting New York’s shipping. Said privateer reported to 
have captured several vessels.
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ENEMY CAPTURES: SPANISH
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies (C.S.P. Col.)
C.S.P. Col.. 1704-1705. no. 134
Certificate of owners of Portsmouth galley, 27 Aug. 1705.
-Report, that whilst loading salt at Exhuma, the said ship was captured by a Spanish privateer, 
on the 4 April, and condemned at Havana.
C.S.P. Col.. 1710-1711. no. 897
Letter from Lt. Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 22 June 1711. 
-Refers to the capture, off the Bahamas, of a Bermudan vessel by a Spanish privateer from 
Barico, Cuba.
C.S.P. CoL. 1711-1712. no. 544 fh
Letter from Lt. Governor Pulleine to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 9 Jan. 1714.
-Refers to the capture of the sloop Samuel, Samuel Sherlock commander, by a Spanish 
privateer. Captain Lewis Martell commander, under commission from Governor of Santiago. 
Captured cargo consisted of 700 bushels of salt.
C.S.P. Col.. 1712-1714. no. 513 fih
Address of the Governor, Council and Assembly of Massachusetts Bay to the Queen, Dec.
1713.
-Reports the capture of the ship Marlborough, Captain Daniel Frizelt commander, by privateer 
sloop from Spain, Captain Monsr. Nell commander, under commission from the Governor of 
St. Dominique, cargo of salt, condemned St. Dominique.
C.S.P. Col.. 1712-1714. no. 544 fih
Letter from Lt. Governor Pulleine to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 9 Jan. 1714.
-Refers to the capture, off Bonaire, on the 18 October, of a Bermudan sloop called the Swan, 
Francis Jones owner, by a Spanish privateer, cargo of 7 bags of cocoa, condemned Porto 
Rico.
Howard M. Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The first Century of American Colonial 
Privateering, 1625-1725.
-A brigantine, purchased by the colony of Barbados as a guard ship, was captured by the 
Spanish and sent out as a privateer.
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ENEMY CAPTURES: UNKNOWN
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies {C.S.P. Col.)
C.S.P. Col. 1704-1705. no. 1213
Letter from Mr. Dummerto Mr. Popple, 3 July 1705.
-Reports that the sloop Cotton of Barbados was captured by an enemy vessel off Nevis.
C.S.P. Col. 1706-1708. no. 431 fi^
Letter from Governor Parke to Captain Kerr, 15 July 1706.
-Reports the capture of two vessels, belonging to Antigua, by several privateers.
C.S.P. Col. 1706-1708. no. 1551
Letter from Governor Handasyd to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 17 June 1708. 
-Reports the loss of the Neptune sloop and a Guinea ship.
C.S.P. Col. 1708-1709. no. 150
Letter from Governor Parke to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 Oct. 1708.
-Reports the capture of a sloop, belonging to Mr. Chester, agent for the Royal Africa Company.
C.S.P. Col. 1708-1709. no. 870
Extracts of letters to Colonel Rhett by his wife, 24 Nov. 1709.
-Reports the capture of a sloop, off the Bahamas, Adrian Wilson master, laden with provisions, 
bound for Jamaica, by a privateer sloop of 4 guns and 70 men. Captain Pasqueau 
commander.
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Appendix 2
ANALYSIS OF ROYAL NAVY PRISE ACTIVITY IN 
COLONIAL WATERS, 1702-1713
The statistics in the following tables are drawn from my data file. They have been compiled to 
act as a comparison to the tabular analysis of British-colonial privateer prize activity, 1702- 
1713, contained in the third chapter of this thesis.
TABLE A. 2.1
Distribution of Royal Navv Prize Nationality, 1702-1713
Nationality N %
French 82 31.4
Spanish 13 5.0
Other 6 2.3
Recapture 12 4.6
Unknown 148 56.7
Total 261 100.0
‘ Category described as ‘other’ refers to the capture of vessels for Illegal trading with the French and Spanish (includes 5 
British and 1 Dutch).
‘Of the 261 prize captures, 71 were made by British vessels of uncertain status (5 French, 1 British, and 65 unknown).
TABLE A 2.2
Distribution of the Condemnation of Royal Navy Prize Captures, 1702-1713
Colony N %
British West Indies:
Antigua 16 6.1
Barbados 25 9.6
Jamaica 33 12.6
British North America:
Carolina 1 0.4
Maryland 5 1.9
Massachusetts 2 0.8
New England 2 0.8
Newfoundland 67 25.7
Virginia 1 0.4
Unknown log 41.7
Total 261 100.0
‘ Of the 261 references to naval prize captures, 109 did not refer to a place of condemnation.
‘ Of the remaining 152 prize captures, whose place of condemnation was noted, 70 were made by British vessels of 
uncertain status (67 at Newfoundland, 1 at Carolina, and 1 at Maryland).
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TABLE A 2.3
Yearly Distribution of Royal Navy Prize Captures, 1702-1713
Year N %
1702 16 6.1
1703 34 13.0
1704 6 2.3
1705 12 5.0
1706 6 2.3
1707 28 10.0
1708 24 9.2
1709 16 6.1
1710 2 0.8
1711 17 7.0
1712 11 4.2
1713 0 0.0
Unknown 89 34.0
Total 261 100.0
*Of the 89 captures that could not be assigned to a specific year, 70 were made by British vessels of uncertain status.
TABLE A 2.4
Distribution of Types of Vessels Captured by the Ro^ /al Navy, 1702-1713
Type of Vessel N %
Ship 52 19.9
Sloop 24 9.2
Brigantine 4 1.6
Other 5 1.9
Unknown 176 67.4
Total 261 100.0
‘Those vessels referred to as ‘other' included two galleys, a snow, eorvett, and a Ketch.
‘70 of the prizes included in the ‘unknown’ category were captured by British vessels of uncertain status.
TABLE
Mean Tonnage, Crew Size, and Ordnance of
A 2.5
=>rlzes Captured by the Royal Navy, 1702-1713
Vessel Type Tonnage Crew Size Number of Guns
Ship 
Other 
Unknown 
Grand Mean
184 (7) 
83 (4) 
220 (20) 
162 (31)
77 (5)
78 (4)
76 (16)
77 (25)
34 (15) 
6 (5) 
37 m  
26 (39)
‘The figures in parentheses include the number of cases upon which the means are based.
‘Those vessels referred to as ‘other" included two sloops, a brigantine, a corvett and a ketch, while those vessels cited as 
'unknown' included all those references to prize captures which provided information on tonnage, crew size, and ordnance, 
but not a vessel type.
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APPENDIX ONE
’ The manuscripts of the Colonial Office are housed in the Public Records Office at Kew in 
London. The Calendar of State Papers relating to America and the West Indies, beginning in 
1574, were published gradually throughout the first part of the twentieth century, and provide a 
useful summary of the aforementioned manuscripts. Howard M. Chapin’s book on American 
privateering, while limited In analysis in preference for a narrative approach, provides 
invaluable information on the activities of British-colonial privateers in the War of the Spanish 
Succession.
 ^ These variables included information on the name, origin, commander, size, strength, and 
complement of predators and captured vessels, as well as where prize actions took place, the 
nature of captured cargoes, where they were condemned and their value.
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